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SUMMARY
 
Wi thin the context of debates over convergence and path dependency of 
corporate governance, this thesis discusses the shifts and changes in the former 
Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft (AG), later the DaimlerChrysler Corporation, in the 
1990s until 2005. In the first section the distinct features of the Anglo-American 
model of shareholder value and the Continental-European stakeholder model of 
corporate govemance are outlined, thereby pointing out the contemporary debate 
about changes in the German corporate stnlcture. The second section focuses on the 
internai evolution of the Daimler-Benz AG from a traditional German to global 
German-American corporation and the impact of external market forces - the 
deregulated market for capital, the globalized market for products and services, and 
the emerging market for managerial "talent"- on the company. The case study of 
DaimlerChrysler reveals how German corporations incrementally adopted 
shareholder-oriented principles, dri ven by international market forces, whiJe they 
maintained important features ofthe stakeholder system. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Dans le cadre du débat entre les conceptions convergentes ou dépendantes des 
trajectoires (path dependency) de la gouvernance d'entreprises, ce mémoire analyse 
les modifications et les changements ayant eu cours des années 1990 à 2005 HU sein 
de la firme Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft (AG) (devenue en cours de route 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation). Dans la première section de ce travail, nous 
soulignons les principales caractéristiques des modèles de gouvernance Anglo­
américains (orientés en fonction de la valeur des actionnaires) et de l'Europe 
continentale (plus axés vers leurs partjes prenantes) tout en mettant en lumière les 
enjeux contemporains entourant les transformations stnlcturelles auxquelles sont 
soumises les sociétés par actions allemandes. La deuxième section de ce mémoire, 
focalise sur l'évolution interne de Daimler-Benz AG d'un modèle d'entreprise 
traditionnel allemand à une entreprise Germano-américaine internationale. Dans cette 
section, nous étudions également l'impact externe de trois forces marchandes sur la 
firme allemande soit: le marché dérégulé des capitaux, le marché mondial des 
produits et services, et le marché émergent des talents de gestion. Au final, notre 
étude de cas révèle comment, à la suite des pressions des marchés internationaux, les 
firmes allemandes en sont incrémentalement venues à adopter des principes de 
gouvernance plus orientés en fonction de la valeur des actionnaires, tout en 
maintenant certaines caractéristiques importantes du système de gouvernance pour les 
parties prenantes. 
XII 
introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
Each company evolves in a specific context of markets. Tlùs context can vary 
from one country to the other and from business to business. Cultural background, 
different historical traditions and political systems seem to influence the way a 
company is organized and the way it conducts its business. 
The world's largest economies, the USA, Japan, the UK, and Germany, have 
aclùeved their wealth and growth under distinct systems of management and 
corporate govemance. Whereas liberal Anglo-Saxon economies have developed 
shareholder-value-oriented systems, Continental European economies, like the social 
market economy in Germany, have developed stakeholder-oriented systems of 
management and corporate govemance. 
Since the late 1970s traditional stakeholder-oriented systems have underwent 
radical changes. A contemporary scientific debate has arisen to which extent these 
corporate govemance systems are converging towards the shareholder value model of 
corporate govemance. In fact, there are two schools of thought: the first one believes 
that aIl economies worldwide are converging towards "one" most efficient global 
corporate govemance system, namely the shareholder value model, and the second 
one believes that economies maintain governance systems that are specific to their 
national context and historical background. 
The goal of this study is to analyze to which extent traditionally stakeholder­
oriented Gennan corporations have converged to a shareholder value approach in 
management and corporate govemance and which factors may be accountable for this 
change. T0 reach tlùs goal we will study the case of the German corporation 
DaimlerChrysler AG in the period between 1990 and 2005. 
introduction 
The master thesis is divided into six chapters and a final conclusion. In 
chapter l, I will develop and identify the major premises and research questions of 
this case study. In the following chapter II, a review of relevant literature, I will 
describe and define the Anglo-American model of shareholder value and the 
Continental-European stakeholder mode\. Furthermore, I will try to summarize the 
results of studies and contemporary debates about the convergence and path­
dependency of corporate govemance systems, particularly with regard to the 
development and changes in the German corporate structure. In chapter III, will 
describe the research concept on which this master thesis is based on. 
After having methodologically justified the case study method as an important 
and resourceful research tool in chapter IV, DaimlerChrysler will be presented as a 
company with a particular in-depth investigation of the corporate shifts and changes 
during the 1990s and their impact on the company today, in chapter V. In chapter VI, 
I will analyze the evolution of the market for products and services, "talent", and 
capital during the 1990s and beyond and their impact on the DaimlerChrysler 
Corporation. 
The final conclusion will summanze the impact of the three markets on 
DaimlerChrysler and to which extent the case of DaimlerChrysler can or cannot be 
considered as an important example for the convergence of German corporate 
governance systems from a stakeholder-oriented towards a shareholder-oriented 
model driven by distinct market forces. 
The issue considering the development, the functioning, and the advantages of 
a German "hybrid" corporate govemance model, combining stakeholder and 
shareholder value elements, will be as weil discussed in the final conclusion. 
2 
Chapter Il Research Questions 
CHAPTER 1 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this master's thesis, an in-depth case study of the Daimler-Benz AG from 
the 1990s to the present time, 1 endeavour to address several important research 
questions about the impact of global market forces on the management and the 
govemance of this large German corporation. Furthermore, I will map out how global 
market forces have shaped the management and govemance system of the present­
day Daimler Group AGI. I will assess the extent to which these market forces will 
remain an important influence on the company's management and corporate 
govemance in the future. The study of these market forces, and their influence, is 
based on Allaire's and Firsirotu's (1993; 2004) concept of the modem corporation as 
located at the nexus of three powerful markets, namely: the market for products and 
services, the market for "talent", and the financial markets. 
During the last semester of my MBA studies at the École des Sciences de la 
Gestion (ESG), the business school of the Université du Québec à Montréal 
(UQAM), 1 worked as a research assistant at the J. Armand Bombardier Chair, which 
focuses its research on strategie and governance issues. 
Professor Firsirotu teaches the strategy course and a radical change seminar in 
the Master's program (as weIl as in the Ph.D. program). Professor Firsirotu accepted 
to co-chair my master's thesis committee. Being a master degree student from 
Germanl, Professor Firsirotu and 1 decided that 1 should choose a research tapie for 
1 On May 14, 2007, DaimlerChrysler AG sold 80.1 per cent of its Chrysler shares to the American 
private equity investment firm Cerbems Capital Management. DaimlerChrysler AG wil! be renamed 
Daimler AG at its next shareholder meeting in the fal! of2007. 
2 ln September 2005,1 came 10 the ESG al the UQAM 10 star! my MBA studies as a participant of Ihe 
double diploma program between the UQAM and the University of Applied Sciences Kiel. 
3 
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my thesis, which wou Id bring together various aspects of market globalization and 
their impact on corporate management and governance within the very specifie 
cultural and socio-political context of Gennany. 
The thesis is predicated on a number of premises, which leads to a number of 
research questions: 
1.	 The system of corporate governance is at the heart of each corporation. 
Therefore, 1 wi \1 use the nature of the firm 's system of corporate 
governance as key indicator for the entire orientation of the firm. 
2.	 Firms' governance systems are reflections of their countries context 
(economic, politica1, cultural, and legal environment). The strongest 
economles, the USA, the UK (both traditionally shareholder value­
oriented), Japan, and Germany (both traditionally stakeholder-oriented) 
have achieved their successes under different corporate systems. 
3.	 From the late 70s onward, these corporate systems were assaulted by a 
series of radical transformations. Firstly, the shift from managerial 
capitalism to "investor capitalism", which brought about an affirmation of 
shareholders as the ultimate, and the most important, stakeholder, one 
which became determined to assert its authority over managements goals 
and priorities and to maximize the value of its investment. Secondly the 
emergence of a market for "talent" as corporation in large number gave up 
on their policies and commitment to job security and exclusive promotion 
within; managerial skills and leadership became increasingly viewed as 
generic and portable; a burgeoning "secondary" market for management 
skills came about, increasingly well developed and efficient. Thirdly, the 
waves of privatization and deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s, the 
opening up of borders to the migration of goods and services 
4 
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(globalization), the emergence of new technologies, have combined to 
make the markets. for products and services increasingly efficient and 
unforgiving. As a result, corporations (publicly traded ones, particularly) 
were buffeted by three pressing markets each one with its cJaims on the 
corporation and its quest for efficiency. The making of strategy, the 
creation of lasting economic value, the govemance and management of 
corporations, their ethos and culture, are ail deeply impacted by the 
growing pressure from markets. As this market model gradually replaces 
the traditional loyalty/stakeholder model, a radically different concept of 
the corporation emerged, the ramifications of which are still being worked 
out and are often but dimly understood by observers and participants 
(Allaire/Firsirotu, 1993; 2004; 2007). 
4.	 The pressures from the three markets (capital, product and services, and 
"talent"), originating in the USA and the UK, are increasingly prevalent in 
continental Europe and Germany. As a result, companies operating under 
the impact of the three markets have to adapt to the new circumstances by 
undertaking significant changes in their management and govemance 
systems, ethos, and culture. 
5.	 Further empirical studies of companies (both longitudinal case studies and 
quantitative analysis of a number of samples of companies) in different 
settings must be conducted in order to provide answers to the present 
debate between "the convergence theory" of corporate govemance 
systems to "one" most efficient global corporate governance system 
(Bradley et aL, 1999; Branson, 2001; Gordon, 1999; 
HansmannlKraakman, 2000) and "the theory of path dependence" in 
corporate ownership and govemance (Bebchuk/Roe, 1999; Roe, 1996; 
Roe, 1997). This is an ongoing debate between two schools of thought. 
5 
Chapter 11 Research Questions 
By focussing on the evolution of one significant German company, 
DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft (AG), l hope to shed sorne light on the processes 
underlying the present debated evolution of modern corporations. 
Research questions: 
1.	 What are the governance system changes in management style and 
practice of DaimlerChrysler at the end of the 1990s and how did 
they evolve? How different are they from those prevailing in the 
1970s and 1980s? 
2.	 To the extent that DaimlerChrysler shows significant changes in its 
governance system, what are the factors, which are accountable for 
these changes? How do we explain this evolution or shift? 
3.	 To the extent that significant changes have occurred at 
DaimlerChrysler, through what type of processes have they been 
carried out? Evolutionary or revolutionary ones? Different1y stated, 
did DaimlerChrysler adapt inerementally and as much managed to 
preserve featmes of the loyalty/stakeholder model in the midst of 
market pressures or did it change radically to shareholder value 
governance due to a specifie event? If the firmer is true, what are the 
mechanisms, which aliowed it to adapt to the new circumstances 
without fundamentally changing its essence? CouId "path 
dependency theory " be one explanation? 
6 
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CHAPTERII 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
While examining the case of DaimlerChrysler in particular in the 1990s, 1 wi Il 
try to reveal to what extent German corporations have changed their nature due to 
distinct global market forces. The system of corporate governance is at the heart of 
each corporation. Therefore, 1 will use the nature of a firrn's system of corporate 
governance as key indicator for the entire orientation of the firrn. 
ln the review of literature, l will concentrate on the major theories of 
corporate governance and the dehate about the global convergence of corporate 
governance systems towards an optimal model of corporate governance (Bradley et 
al., 1999; Branson, 2001; Gordon, 1999; HansmannlKraakman, 2000) opposing the 
theory of path dependency (Bebchuk/Roe, 1999; Roe, 2003), which provides strong 
arguments for the dependence of corporate governance systems on history, politics, 
and the evolution within a given economic system. After a short introduction to 
common definitions of corporate governance developed by eady scholars such as 
Bede and Means (1932) and later corporate governance researchers like Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) or Shleifer and Vishny (1997), l will concentrate on contemporary 
international corporate governance theories, which find their origin in the 1990s. 
After having defined the basic meaOlng of the concept of corporate 
governance, l will present and examine the contemporary corporate governance 
models, their theoretical underpinning, their characteristics, and the features of their 
socio-political, cultural, and economic environment within which they evolve. 
Today's strongest economies, the USA, Japan, the U.K., and Gerrnany have 
reached their success under different corporate governance systems. In comparative 
7 
Chapter II / Review ofliterature 
political economy it has become commonplace to distinguish two types of corporate 
governance systems: the Anglo-Saxon shareholder-value-oriented and the continental 
European stakeholder-value-oriented model (Hopt/KandaiRoe, 1998; Jackson, 2001; 
Kelly/Kelly/Gamble, 1997; McCahery et al., 2002). In the review of literature, 1 will 
illustrate the definitions of the two systems by concrete examples from the corporate 
governance systems in the USA and UK (shareholder-value-oriented model) and in 
Germany (stakeholder-value-oriented model). 
The Gennan economy used to be a prominent example for the stakeholder­
oriented approach, however, since the beginning of the 1990s, many economists 
presume that the German corporate system is converging towards a more shareholder­
value-oriented mode!. The debate about the evolution of the German corporate 
structure implies many aspects of the worldwide debate about path dependency and 
the international convergence towards an optimal corporate governance mode l, which 
will presumably, according to a great number of scholars, resemble the Anglo­
American shareholder value model. In the last part of the review of literature, 1 will 
survey the most important arguments of the contemporary international convergence 
debate. Furthermore, 1 will summarize sorne major aspects of the German corporate 
governance debate, such as the debate about the development of a German 'hybrid' 
model or the introduction of the German Codex of Corporate Governance. 
2.1 Basic definitions of corporate governance 
The etymological origin of the tenn 'Corporate Governance' gives a first idea 
of its deeper meaning. 'Corporation' derives from the Latin word 'corpus', meaning 
juridical person; 'governance' derives from the Latin word 'gubernare' or the Greek 
word 'kybernetes' both meaning 'to steer' (Encyc1opaedia Britannica, 2006). 
Morton Balling explained the term 'Corporate Governance' at the opening 
session of the Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières (SUERF) 
8 
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and the 7th Conference of the Robert Triffin-Sziràk Foundation (RTSF), May 15 
1997, Budapest, by relating the tenn to other words as follows: 
"The concept 'Governance' is related to words like influence, power, ruling, leading 
and guiding, directing, and inspiring. The concept 'Corporate' refers to ways of 
organizing business, the formation and management of joint stock companies, company 
law provisions on capital, regulation by laws and statues of managerlshareholder 
relations, procedures for the appointment of supervisory boards, definition of the 
respective responsibilities of managers, board members, auditors, etc." (Balling, 1997: 
6). 
The field now known as corporate govemance dates back to Bede and Means' 
classic work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, published in 1932. 
Interpretations of this important work have gone through several research waves, but 
almost all scholars commenting on Bede and Means (1932) work have acknowledged 
their basic concem, the separation of ownership from control in large US 
corporations: "Finally, in the corporate system, the 'owner' of industrial wealth is 
left with a mere symbol of ownership while the power, the responsibility and the 
substance which have been an integral part of ownershi p in the past are being 
transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control." (Berle/Means, 1932: 
293). In their work The Modern Corporation and Private Property Berle and Means 
(1932) point out the fact that stockholders have to rely on the 'good will' of 
managers to fulfil their fiduciary obligation, managing the company in the best interest 
of stockholders: 
"The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the share of stock as at present known, 
while it represents in a sense a participation in corporate assets, does so subject to so 
many qualifications that the distinctness of the property right has been blurred to the 
point of invisibility. For protection the stock-holder has only a set of expectations that 
the men who compose the management and control will deal fairly with his interest." 
(Berle/Means, 1932: 188). 
In how far stockholders can avoid relying on the 'good will' of managers, 
defined as fiduciary obligation, is subject to the research of Shleifer and Vishny 
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(1997). They precise ln their definition of corporate govemance that corporate 
govemance deals with the way in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a retum on their investment. Thus corporate govemance 
becomes a necessity in a situation where the suppliers of finance, the owner or 
shareholders of the company in question, do not run the company themselves but hire 
a management team to run the company on a daily base. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
try to explore in their research work how suppliers of finance make managers to 
retum profits to them and, furthennore, how they assure that managers do not steal 
the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects. The question how suppliers of 
finance may control managers, is from the point of view of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), central to corporate govemance research. 
The relation between stockholders and managers is in general very complex 
and not easy to manage. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explained in their voluminous 
theoretical and empirical body of research that there is a great potential for conflict of 
interest between owners and controllers, when ownership and control of corporations 
are not fully coincident. The conflicts of interest, combined with the inability to write 
perfect contracts, causing no costs, or the inability to monitor the controllers of the 
firm, reduce the value of the company, ceteris paribus. This problem of motivating 
one party to act on behalf of another is known as 'the principal-agent problem'. The 
costs arising from information asymmetry, uncertainty, and risk, are called 'agency 
costs', mentioned already in a study on US companies by Bede and Means (1932), 
but theoretically explained for the first time by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
The solution to the problem of information asymmetry - closely related to the 
moral hazard problem - is to ensure, as far as possible, the provision of appropriate 
incentives so that agents act in the way the principals wish them to do. In terms of 
game theory, it involves changing the rules of the game so that the self-interested 
rational choices that the principal predicts the agent will coincide with the choices the 
principal desires. Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), many scho1ars have explored 
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the field of 'the principal-agent problem' and 'agency costs', using different 
approaches and finding different solutions for the diminution of agency costs and the 
improvement of principal-agent relationships (Barney, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eccles, 1985). 
Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) provided with their 
complex theoretical work the basis for the corporate governance research today. We 
will now have a look at more recent studies and economic reports, which have 
contributed to further definitions of corporate governance. 
A recent definition of corporate governance can be found in the Cadbury 
Report, published in the UK, in 1992, which started more or less the corporate 
governance debate in Europe. The report defines corporate governance in a less 
complex and rather practical way as "the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled". As applied in practice, this narrower definition focuses almost 
exclusively on the internaI structure and operation of the corporation's decision­
making processes. 
The official definition of corporate governance by the OECD, published in 
April 1999 and commented in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), 
is consistent with the one presented by the Cadbury Report: 
"Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and 
controlJed. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures 
for making decisions on corporate affa irs. By doing this, it also provides the structure 
through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance." (OECO, 2004: Il). 
Other contemporary definitions of corporate governance put a stronger 
emphasis on the importance of transparency and ethically 'fair' behaviour in 
business. A good example is the comment of 1. D. Wolfensohn, president of the 
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World Bank, who pointed out in an article in the Financial Times in June 1999, that 
"Corporate governance is about promoting corporate fairness, transparency and 
accountability" (Financial Times, 1999). 
Since the 1990s a new generation of corporate governance has evolved, 
examining the effects of the general underlying system of corporate laws and 
regulations on corporate governance and firm value. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) have been one of the 
first researchers to hypothesize in their work Law and Finance that the extent to 
which a country's laws protect investor rights - and the extent to which these laws are 
enforced - are fundamental determinants of the ways in which corporate finance and 
corporate governance develop in a certain country. They found evidence for the 
existence of significant differences across countries in the degree of investor 
protection, and that countries with a lower investor protection show a high 
concentration of equity ownership and a lack of significant equity markets. The 
country's differences in the structure of equity ownership concentration and in the 
liquidity of equity markets will be an important aspect for the further study and the 
characterization of the two different corporate govemance systems: the stakeholder­
oriented and the shareholder-value-oriented approach. 
A contemporary approach to corporate governance has been provided by 
Allaire and Firsirotu (2005): the concept of value creating governance. The concept 
of value creating govemance is based on the framework of agency theory and the 
ways on which sorne "premium-diversified" companies, e.g. General Electric, 
Emerson, and United Technologies, have managed to create value through "strategie" 
or "internai" governance practices. In this context, Allaire and Firsirotu (2005) have 
mapped four important pillars of governance: 
•	 Pillar 1: the legitimacy and credibility of principals (board members). 
Legitimacy means that board members represent and defend interests of 
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shareholders either because they are themselves important investors in the 
company or have been directly selected by investors3. Credibility means that 
board members must show evidence of knowledge and expertise pertinent to 
the corporation, not only general business experience, accumulated over years 
in industries that may have only little in common with the company which 
board they represent. 
•	 Pillar II: the strategy process and dialogue. The board should insist on a 
strategy process that includes discussions on strategie orientation early on, and 
directors should be on-side before management proceeds to prepare its strategie 
plan. 
•	 Pillar III: the quality of financial and strategie information. A board needs 
to	 ensure that it has access to reliable, valid and timely information from 
independent sources. Therefore it has to design an efficient information system, 
which supplies the board not only with the standard information required for 
fiduciary purposes, but also with strategie information that is particularly 
relevant to the type of business the board is governing. 
•	 and, Pillar IV: the compensation and incentive system. An effective 
compensation and incentive system is a key driver of value, but is very difficult 
to design. It has to deal with: the proper balance of rewards between short-term 
and long-term performance; the calibration of overall compensation to relevant 
markets; the safeguards against tampering with performance measures and 
indicators; and the weight of internai measures (e.g. Return On Investment 
(ROI), Economie Value Added (EVA), etc.) versus external performance scores 
3 Allaire and Firsirotu (2005) suggest that any investor, or collection of investors, with a sizeable stake 
in a company (say 5 per cent or more) should be allowed to propose candidates for board membership 
and that there could be a minimum holding period (two years for instance) before a shareholder would 
be allowed to participate in the nomination process. In addition, they propose a cumulative voting 
process for the election of board members to enhance the representative character of boards. 
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(e.g. indexed stock priee, Market Value Added (MVA), etcl. 
The fol1owing graphie illustrates in which way the four pillars of value­
creating govemance: Corporate Architecture and Leadership, Strategie Management 
and Planning Process, Information System and Performance Monitoring, and 
Incentives and Reward Systems, are composed and which importance each partieular 
pillar has for the entire system ofvalue-creating govemance. 
Figure 2.1 The Four Pillars of Value Creating Governance 
Value-Creating Governance: 
Four Pillars 
1 
1 1 1 
Corporate 
Architecture and 
Leadership 
Strategic 
Management and 
Planning Process 
Information System 
and Performance 
Monitoring 
Incetltives and 
Reward System.' 
• Scope and mandale of Rewards genuine 
• Clear game plan for Reliability, limeliness 
each business economic value crealion cach business and inlegril)' of finandal 
• Core values Pushes for profitable 
• Opportunily for information 
• Struclure gro\~hcorporale office 10 Qualily of strategie 
Leadership and • Balances sborl and dlseuss and approve informalion 
enlTepreneurship in mcdium-term ealculus orienlalions Focuses opcraling 
each business Aligns operating Resources 10 lead managers on markets 
• Credibility and management's inleresls slralegie inilialives and economie
 
legitimacyof wilh that of
 performance
reporting relationship sharebolders' 
Defines clear end-game 
Necessary but not plan for each business Contributes to aligning 
sufficienl condition unit / produclline / managers' interests with 
operating company that of shareholders 
© Allaire et Firsirotu 1993,2004 
Source: AllairelFirsirotu (2005: 125). 
4 See Allaire (2003) for a discussion of these issues and a set of suggestions for a new compensation 
system. 
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2.2 The shareholder value approach 
"The princip le that the fundamental objective of the business corporation is to increase 
the value of ils shareholders investments is widely accepted." (Rappaport, 1986: 13)5. 
Should a company's management be most accountable to employees, 
customers, or management itself? Alfred Rappaport argues in his work Creating 
Shareholder Value that management's primary responsibility is to company 
shareholders. According to the concept of shareholder value, the management of a 
corporation should first and foremost consider the interests of shareholders in its 
business decisions. Published in 1986, the ideas put forth by Rappaport have since 
become commonplace in companies around the world. 
Otherwise, the approach has been subject to a great deal of criticism. Critics 
(Grotker, 2006; Malik, 2006) point out that the sole concentration on shareholder 
value maximization might be best for the owners of a corporation, however, for 
society other aspects like employment, environmental, ethical issues or 'good 
business practices,6 play a more important role. Thus a management decision that 
maximizes shareholder value may lower the global welfare of a society. lt may even 
threaten the long-tenn existence of a company and the creation of sustainable value, 
for example by emphasizing dividends and returning cash to shareholders rather than 
investing in innovation, in employee education, in environmental protection or in 
present and future production capacities. 
5 Alfred Rappaport is the Leonard Spacek Professor Emeritus at Northwestem University's lL. 
Kellogg Graduate School of Management where he was a member of the faculty for twenty-eight 
years. His research focusses on the application of shareholder value to corporate planning, 
performance evaluation, and mergers and acquisitions. He is Shareholder Value Advisor to L.E.K. 
Consulting. His widely acclaimed, pioneering book, Creating Shareholder Value: The New Standard 
for Business Performance, was published in 1986. 
6 The meaning of 'good business practices' that 1 will use in this study is based on the definition of 
good corporate behaviour precised in the German Code of Corporate Governance, published by the 
German Corporate Govemance Commission in Berlin, in 2006. 
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Other and more recent definitions of the shareholder value concept have been 
provided by Femandez (2002), Foudy, Jr. (2001), and Allaire and Firsirotu (1993; 
2004)7. 
Concentrating on the changing nature of the corporate govemance system in 
Germany, r will examine in detail the general characteristics of a corporate 
govemance system based on shareholder value and the classic environment within it 
usually evolves. 
2.2.1 The characteristics ofa shareholder value system 
A corporate govemance system basing on a shareholder value approach 
usually possesses the following characteristics, it is: 
• outsider-oriented; 
• market-based; 
• and closely-tied to financial indicators. 
In shareholder-value-oriented systems, power is concentrated in the hands of 
shareholders, and other groups have little or no influence on the management and the 
govemance of the corporation. Shareholder value systems are 'outsider' systems, in 
which market mechanisms play a strong role in governance, and owners exert 
influence on management through the threat of exit, in this case the selling of shares 
(Vitols, 2003). 
The strategic goal of a corporation in such a system lies in the maximization 
of shareholder value. The ultimate authority to determine corporate strategy and to 
appoint members of the board rests with a large number of anonymous investors, not 
with a single or a small group of dominant investors. Professional managers run the 
7 Allaire and Firsirotu's (1993; 2004) definition of the shareholder value approach, the model of the 
three markets, will be explained and discussed in the next chapter. 
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corporations and institutional investors have a large monitoring role to play. The 
nature of the interests of shareholders, and especially institutional investors, is usually 
purely financial and may not correspond to the interests of employees or 
management, making shareholders 'outsiders' from the point of view of the 
corporation. Therefore, this system of corporate govemance can be characterized as 
'outsider system' (Bhasa, 2000). 
The conflict of interest between shareholders and management has been 
mentioned before as 'agency problem' (JensenlMeckling, 1976). Financial markets 
and active investors, especially mutual and pension funds, press firms to take steps 
that align the interests of managers and directors with that of shareholders. In order to 
encourage strong profit orientation, shareholders reward performance aggressively, 
either via stock options or other performance-based incentives (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Considering that shareholder value firms are 'market-based', they also have 
shorter time horizons and are more c10sely tied to figures, like quarterly eamings 
(Porter, 1990). Transparency and regular disclosure of financial data and information 
are essential aspects of the shareholder value approach. However, the importance of 
financial indicators linked to the share price and the sometimes very short-sighted 
orientation towards the maximization of dividends, have been also subject to many 
critics, for example, Freeman (1984) or Paine (2002). 
The growth of corporations worldwide has led to the demand for more and 
more capital. Corporations in shareholder-value-oriented systems have turned mainly 
to capital markets, and no! to banks, in order to finance their growth. Consequently, 
these corporations are oriented towards capital markets and their demands. Financial 
markets press for and reward firms that increase disclosure, utilize independent 
auditors, reduce the size of boards to increase focus and accountability, increase the 
number of independent board members and may remove protections against hostile 
takeovers (Allaire/Firsirotu, 2005; Foudy Jr., 2001). 
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In their work Beyond Monks and Minow: From Fiduciary to Value Creating 
Governance Allaire and Firsirotu (2005) explain that fiduciary governance, 
characterized by the separation of the positions of chairman and CEO, the 
independence of board directors and of board committee members, the tight control 
of auditors and executive remuneration by the board, the regular meetings of 
independent board members only, and the mandatory shareholding by board members 
and senior management, aims to protect shareholders against egregious behaviour by 
management and to act as a sort of insurance policy against managerial fraud and 
misconduct. However, Allaire and Firsirotu (2005) reveal in their study that the 
obsessive quest for board independence may lead to the ascendancy of legalistic and 
ill-infonned directors, who will force the management to adopt a "timid, cautious, 
risk-averse, bureaucratie" style of management (Allaire/Firsirotu, 2005: 112). 
2.2.2 The classic environment ofa shareholder value system 
A corporate governance system basing on a shareholder value approach 
evolves usual1y in the context of: 
• a common law countries; 
• a dispersed share ownership structure; 
• powerful institutional shareholders in the capital market; 
• a high market capitalization; 
• highly liquid capital markets; 
• a one-tier board system; 
• an active market for corporate control; 
• and a mobile, flexible, and highly professionallabour market. 
The economies in Anglo-Saxon common-Iaw countries, for example the USA 
and the UK, where government is at arm's length relationship with corporations and 
creates a strong competitive economic environment (Carati/Tourani Rad, 2000), are 
18 
Chapter Il / Review of/iteralure 
traditionally good examples for the shareholder-value-oriented management and 
corporate governance approach. 
,,A corporation [...) should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a 
view to enhancing corporate profits and shareholders' gain." (§ 2.01 (a) of the US 
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations stated by the 
American Law Institute (ALI), 1994). 
Shareholder value regimes are necessarily underpinned by a general ideology 
of shareholder sovereignty that upholds the property rights of shareholders. In Anglo­
Saxon countries the 'assimilation of corporate property with private individual 
property' , begun already in the Nineteenth Century, and continued unchallenged 
throughout most of the twentieth century (DonneUy et al., 2000: 25). Consequently, 
corporate legislation and case law in the UK and in the USA are based on the 
underlying premise that a company's directors have a fiduciary responsibility to run 
the company in the best interest of its shareholders (Wedderburn, 1985; Parkinson, 
1998). 
This fiduciary responsibility necessarily denies the possibility of any pluralist 
form of governance that accommodates a range of interests (employees, customers, 
society, etc.) without giving any one overriding priority. However, it does not deny 
the possibility that the best interests of the shareholders (both current and future 
shareholders) may, in the longer term, be consistent with the interest of other 
stakeholders (Wedderburn, 1985; Parkinson, 1998). 
In the USA and in the UK, share ownership is typically widely dispersed 
among a large number of investors, each of who owns only a smal1 fraction of the 
total number of a company's shares (Franks/Mayer, 1994; Ooghe IDe Langhe, 2002). 
Institutional investors, such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance 
companies play an important role, representing the interests of a coalition of 
individual shareholders and may control, in average, 30 per cent of a company's 
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equity (Franks and Mayer, 1994). Single investors amount in general to no more than 
a few per cent of the shareholdings, often even much less. 
In their study about shareholder rights concentration in Europe, Becht and 
Roell (1999) empirically proved that the median size of the largest blockholdings and 
their average value were much larger in traditionally stakeholder-oriented countries 
(e.g. Germany and the Netherlands) than in traditionally shareholder-value-oriented 
countries (e.g. UK and USA). 
Table 2.1 Shareholder rights concentration: A cross-country comparison 
Country Number of studied Median of the largest Average value of the 
companies blockholdings (%) largest blockholdings 
(%) 
Austria 50 52.0 54.1
 
Belgium 121 50.6 41.2
 
BEL 20 45.1 38.3
 
France CAC 40 20.0 29.4
 
Germany 374 52.1 49.1
 
DAX 30 11.0 17.3
 
Italy 216 54.5 48.0
 
Netherlands 137 43.5 42.3
 
Spain 193 34.2 40.1
 
United Kingdom 250 9.9 13.4
 
USA 1309 (NYSE) 0* 3.6
 
2831 (NASDAQ) 0* 3.4 
*Shareholder b1ockho1dmgs are smal1er than 5 per cent and, therefore, have not been made public. 
Source: BechtJRoel1 (1999: 1053). 
The pension systems in Anglo-Saxon countries are based to a great extent on 
the stock market. Therefore, they provide enonnous financial resources, which come 
to the stock market through institutional investors. Another important reason for the 
low shareholder concentration in Anglo-Saxon countries is the fact that a greater 
number of companies are publicly traded and shareholders can thus spread and 
diversify their investments over a greater number of companies, lowering the level of 
risk inherent in their investments (Franks and Mayer, 1994). In addition, firms in 
Anglo-Saxon countries tend to be larger than their continental European counterparts. 
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A large percentage of shares, in a typical Anglo-Saxon company, usually represent an 
enormous amount of capital. 
Historically, Anglo-American firms have always been strongly depending on 
equity markets in order to finance their growth and expansion. The evolution of the 
Anglo-American banking sector, which has always been lacking integration with 
industrial strategy, at the micro and the macro level (Hutton, 1996; Charkham, 1994: 
298), may be considered as an essential factor for Anglo-Saxon companies to tum to 
the equity market as main source of finance. Therefore, the market capitalization in 
Anglo-Saxon shareholder-value-based systems has always been higher than in 
continental European stakeholder systems, where banks have always played a central 
role for companies as source of finance. 
Table 2.2 Shareholder structures in a cross-country comparison 
(Ali data in %) Private Compaoies Banks Iostitutional State Foreign 
households Investors investors 
USA (2000) 39.1 - - 40.6 10.3 8.9 
UK (1997) 16.5 1.2 0.1 56.2 0.1 24.0 
Japan (2000) 17.9 26.0 18.6 18.7 0.1 18.6 
Germanv (2001) 17.1 30.9 13.0 24.4 0.7 14.0 
Source: Deutsches Aktlenmstltut e.V. (DAI) (2001). 
Another important difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental 
European economies concems the liquidity of capital markets. The ability of market 
participants to easily enter into or unwind a particular type of transaction, for 
example, the buying and selling of shares without any or just !ittle price discount, is 
much stronger in Anglo-Saxon than in continental European capital markets. A major 
reason for the higher market liquidity in Anglo-Saxon equity markets is the already 
mentioned higher market capitalization. The more participants a capital market 
counts, the higher is the number of active and willing buyers and the greater is the 
volume of conducted transactions in the market, thus accounting for a higher market 
liquidity. 
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The focus on the maintenance of liquid capital markets has led countries, like 
the UK or the USA, to the development of financial market regulation, company 
laws, and self-regulatory measures for the corporate sector, which reconcile the 
principle-agency difficulties that arise with dispersed ownership. La Porta, Lopez-de­
Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), point out that minority investors will not be inclined to 
invest unless their interests are adequately protected from rent-seeking managers. Due 
to collective action problems and easy exit opportunities, investors in the Anglo­
Saxon equity markets are unable or unwilling to exercise direct control on companies. 
Therefore, common law countries, like the UK or the USA, have undertaken legal 
steps in order to maintain liquid capital markets, to prevent the expropriation by 
corporate management, and to align corporate decision-making with the interests of 
shareholders by improving transparency, disclosure, accountability, and the 
introduction of performance/share-based executive pay to a certain extent. 
In Anglo-Saxon shareholder-value-oriented countries, companies are usually 
governed by a single board, which is called the one-tier board system. In this one-tier 
board, the functions of management and management control are combined in a 
single body. In general, the one-tier board supervises itself and a single strong 
manager, assuming the role of both chairperson and CEO, dominates the board. He 
manages the corporation in the interest of the shareholders. The board itself decides 
the remuneration of board members. To prevent abuse, companies are obliged to 
disclose directors' remuneration individually. Besides, in the one-tier system it is 
taken for granted that stock exchange announcements are made as soon as the board 
of directors makes a decision requiring disclosure (v.Werder/Talaulicar, 2006). 
Another important aspect of shareholder value based systems is the active 
market for corporate control. In outsider systems the threat of hostile takeover plays a 
key role in aligning managerial decision-making with the interests of minority 
shareholders. They are usually triggered when managerial performance is deemed to 
be less than optimal in terms of creating shareholder value. This situation provides 
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the opportunity for a bidder to acqUire the company, install a more efficient 
management team and then profit from the resulting dividends and increase share 
priee. The threat of hostile takeover is deemed to discipline managerial decision­
making according to the norms of shareholder value. Consequently, outsiders will be 
more willing to invest and incentives for insiders to maintain their dominant 
blockholdings will be diminished (La Porta/Lopez-de-Silanes/Shleifer, 1999). 
The shareholders' rights govemance is concemed with the extent to which the 
control of the corporation is "on the market" and the qua1ity of govemance is 
measured by the relative absence of any impediment to, or defences against 
takeovers. According to this govemance approach, free markets for control create 
value through swift and radical actions to change the ownership and management of 
underperforming companies (Allaire/Firsirotu, 2005: 113). 
Allaire and Firsirotu (2005) mention in their work beyond Monks and Minow: 
From Fiduciary to Value Creating Governance a great number of anti-takeover 
measures developed in traditional shareholder-value-oriented markets with an active 
market for corporate control, which slow down or impede (hostile) corporate 
takeovers. These measures include: Anti-greenmail provisions, blank-check preferred 
stock, c1assified or staggered board, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority 
requirements for approval of mergers, legal restrictions on "business combinations" 
and unequal voting (dual classes ofshares)8. Although these measures are not in the 
interest of the shareholders' wealth, the traditionally shareholder-oriented USA state 
govemments, spurred by the wave of leveraged buyouts and hostile takeovers in the 
1980s and 1990s, have enacted various of these anti-takeover measures to "moderate 
and discipline" the free market for corporate control (Allaire/Firsirotu, 2005; 
Subramamian,2002). 
8 Following the definitions of Subramanian (2002) and Gompers, Ishiii, and Metrick (2003). 
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The final aspect of the classic environment of a shareholder value based 
system, which 1 would like to mention in this study, concerns the labour market. In 
general, shareholder-value oriented economies can be characterized as liberal and 
'uncoordinated,9. Dynamic and liberal markets require from the employees "[ ... ] 
individual skills of highly trained and mobile professionals [... ]" especially in sectors 
such as "[ ... ] management consultancy; advertising and related media services; 
international banking, including investment banking, derivatives, etc. [ ... ] " 
(Soskice, 1999: 114). The firm's relation with workers differs, therefore, strongly 
between shareholder- and stakeholder-oriented systems. 
Absent a high degree of certainty over future employment or generous welfare 
protection (that might diminish the costs of unemployment), workers rationally 
choose to develop more general skills (Aoki, 1988) in firms in the USA and the UK. 
Moreover, general skills provide workers a greater chance to find an employment 
elsewhere in case of dismissal and strengthen hislher possibility to bargain a higher 
salary with a firm. 
"We make the assumption that residual eamings maximization is the goal that good 
govemance seeks to make management achieve." (MacAvoy/Millstein, 2003: 53). 
According to the shareholder value concept, the overall goal of managers is 
the maximization of shareholder value. Therefore, the financial business expertise of 
the top management seems to be a competence, which is more important III 
shareholder value than in stakeholder economies (Jürgens/RuppNitols, 2000). 
9 In this context, the adjective 'uncoordinated' characterizes an economy, which is based on the free 
market forces of offer and demand. This economy is only to a very low level 'coordinated' by political 
forces. The 'invisible hand' (Smith, 1776) of competition coordinates naturally the way in which 
individuals pursuit their goals contributing thus to the welfare of the nation. From the classical liberal 
point of view, the state has to maintain a passive role, providing basic needs, for example education 
nand national security, but not interfering in economic relations, for example by protecting employees' 
interests through legal institutions. 
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2.3 The stakeholder approach 
"A stakeholder theory of the f1rm must redefine the purpose of the fum [... ] The very 
purpose of the fum is, in our view, to serve as a vehiele for eoordinating stakeholder 
interests." (EvanIFreeman, 1993: 102-103)10. 
As originally explained by R. E. Freeman (1984), the stakeholder theory 
attempts to ascertain which groups are stakeholders in a corporation and thus deserve 
management attention. In short, it attempts to address the "Principle of Who or What 
Really Counts". In stakeholder systems, power is dispersed across a number of groups 
with an interest in the firm (Freeman, 1984; 2004; Hutton, 1995; Kelly, Kelly, and 
Gambie, 1997). 
These stakeholders typically do not only include owners but also lenders, 
employees, customers and suppliers, and the community in which the firm is located. 
Figure 2.2 A stakeholder map of a large organization 
Source: Adapted from Freeman (1984). 
10 Elis and Signe Olsson Professor of Business Administration, R. Edward Freeman heads Darden's 
Olsson Center for Applied Ethies, one of the world's leading aeademie centres for the study of ethies. 
Freeman has written or edited 10 books on business ethies, environmental management, and strategie 
management 
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In their theOlY called Stakeholder view, Post, Preston, and Sachs (2002: 
112), use the following definition of the terrn 'stakeholder': "The stakeholders in a 
corporation are the individuals and constituencies that contribute, either 
voluntarily or involuntarily, to its wealth-creating capacity and activities, and that 
are therefore its potential beneficiaries and/or risk bearers." 
The stakeholder theory has been subject to many interpretations and has 
evoked praise and scorn from a wide variety of scholars and practitioners. Other 
defmitions of the stakeholder concept are provided by Jones and Wicks (1999), 
Post, Preston, and Sachs (2002), Marens and Wicks (1999), and Allaire and 
Firsirotu (1993; 2004)11. 
2.3.1 The characteristics ofa stakeholder system 
A corporate govemance system based on a stakeholder value approach usually 
possesses the following characteristics, it is: 
• insider-oriented; 
• and long-tenn oriented. 
Stakeholder systems are 'insider' systems, in which interested groups are 
c10sely tied to the finn and exercise influence through institutional mechanisms for 
expressing their 'voice' within the finn (Hirschman, 1970). From an economic point 
of view the ideal situation for a stakeholder company would be to maximize the total 
value creation for each of the firm's stakeholders, that is, the SUffi ofvalues created by 
contracting with the firm relative to the best alternative use of resources (Kay, 1995; 
Holmstrôm, 1999). This would include the SUffi of (positive or negative) value added 
to each stakeholder group. 
11 Allaire and Firsirotu's (1993; 2004) definition of the stakeholder approach, the model ofreciprocal 
loyalty, will be explained and discussed in the next chapter. 
26 
Chapler II / Review of/ilerature 
For owners value added would be economic profits net of the cost of capital 
(Copeland/Koller/Murrin, 1994) plus other benefits of control. For employees it could 
be the sum of wage and utility differences between relative to the best alternative 
jobs. For consumers it could be the consumer surplus created (sum of utility net of 
price created to ail consumers). For suppliers and creditors it could be the risk­
adjusted net profits on the firm's account. For governments and other citizens, value 
creation could imply the sum of tax revenues, and the net value of positive and 
negative externalities created by the firm relative to the relevant alternative firm 
(Thomsen, 2004). 
Firms in stakeholder systems, like Germany, have traditionally developed the 
ability to commit to their stakeholders at long term. Longer financial horizons, greater 
financial caution, the development of highly skilled workforces, and close 
relationships with suppliers have led companies and their managers to think about the 
future of their firm at long term. Furthermore, capital in Germany used to be 
characterized as 'patient' as the German system supported long-term capital 
investments, which did not underlie short-term decisions in response to volatile 
capital markets. 
2.3.2 The classic environment ofa stakeholder system 
A corporate governance system basing on a stakeholder value approach 
evolves usually in the context of: 
• code law countries; 
• social democracies; 
• a concentrated share ownership structure; 
• bank-intermediated capital markets; 
• a strong network of bank- and interfirm relations; 
• low market capitalization; 
• rather illiquid capital markets; 
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• a lack of detailed financial information disclosurel 2 ; 
• a non-existent or only a rather restraint market for corporate control; 
• strong employee codetermination; 
• a two-tiered board system. 
The German economy, which has developed within the limits of a social 
democracy, has become one of the most prominent examples for a stakeholder value 
system of corporate governance. Germany is a code law country, which corporate law 
was initially codified in 1937, and subsequently modified in 1965. The role of the 
board of directors and the objective of the public corporation are defined as 
fo\lowing, since 1937: "The managing board is, on its responsibility, to manage the 
corporation for the good of the enterprise and its retinue (Gefolgschaft), the common 
weal of the folk (Volk) and the state (Reich)." (Bradley et al., 1999: 52). 
The importance of stakeholders in corporate governance, such as employees, 
the German society, and the German state, has been emphasized since the beginning 
of the 2û lh century. 
However, nothing specific was mentioned about shareholders until the 1965 
revision. Furthermore, the law also provides that if a company endangers public 
welfare and does not take corrective actions, it can be dissolved by an act of state. 
Although shareholders recently represent an important constituency in Germany, 
German corporate law has historica\lY made it clear that shareholders are only one of 
many stakeholders on whose behalf the managers must manage the firm. 
Genera\lY' in stakeholder systems, politics can press managers to stabilize 
employment, to forego sorne profit-maximizing risks with the firm, and to use up 
capital in place rather than to downsize when markets no longer are aligned with the 
12 Disclosure of financial data seems ta be especially incomplete in comparison to the standards of 
information disclosure in shareholder value countries, like the USA or the UK. 
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finn's production capabilities. Therefore, common political pressures can induce 
managers ta stray further than otherwise from their shareholder's profit maximizing 
goal (Roe, 2003). 
Another significant difference between the USA, continental Europe, and 
lapan is the degree of the concentration of ownership and the control of capital 
sources. Ooghe and De Langhe (2002) have revealed in their study about shareholder 
concentration in Europe that the percentage of listed companies with shareholders 
owning more than 50 per cent of the shares is generally above 50 per cent in the 
traditionally European stakeholder-oriented countries, including Germany, 
Table 2.3 Shareholder concentrations in continental European countries 
Country Percentage of Iisted companies with 
shareholders owning more than SO per cent of 
the shares 
Germany 63.5 
France 53.00 
Italy 65.85 
The Netherlands 55.00 
Belgium 42.6 
Source: OoghelDe Langhe (2002: 438). 
Shareholder concentration in Gennany may be principally explained by the 
power of banks in stakeholder-oriented systems, which is traditionally very strong. In 
contrast with banks in shareholder value systems, Gennan banks are allowed to hoId 
large blocks of shares in industrial companies on their own account. Furthermore, to a 
much greater extent than in the USA or the UK, individuals purchase their shares 
through banks and leave these shares on deposit with the banks. Therefore, banks 
have been able to exercise votes on the shares of these small, largely passive 
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individual investors through a system of proxy voting 13 . Banks have thus been able to 
control upwards of 90 per cent of the votes exercised at many shareholder meetings. 
In the 1990s, German banks did not on1y influence companies through share 
and proxy votes. Powerful multifunctional banks, "Universalbanken", have been 
creditor, shareholder, proxy voter, supervisor, and investment bank, in one. In 
Germany, traditionally each corporation has its own 'Hausbank' (housebank), being 
creditor and strategie consultant at the same time for the company. Given the 
different preferences of shareho1ders and creditors, strong banks generally weaken the 
position of minority shareholders in corporations. 
Table 2.4 Ownership structure of shares in Germany 
Owner of the Amount / Portion of the blockholdings Value of the blockholdings 
shares (in million EURO) 
1997 2001 1997 2001 
Private 225 35% 303 39% 51,902 22% 110,763 22% 
households 
and families 
Financial 162 25% 150 19% 77,584 33% 158,496 32% 
sector 
Industrial 158 24% 184 24% 31,214 13% 81,853 16% 
and 
commercial 
sector 
Public sector 27 4% 36 5% 52,894 22% 72,291 14% 
Others 80 12% 108 14% 23,406 10% 76,225 15% 
Total 652 100% 781 100% 237000 100% 499,628 100% 
...Source: WOJcik (2001: 13). 
Summarizing the system of financing in stakeholder system, we can say that 
external corporate finance being dominated by bank loans, complements a strong 
capacity for internai finance in the absence of shareho1der pressure, e.g. institutional 
shareholders, like mutual or pension funds (CorbettlJenkinson, 1996; Borio, 1990). 
13 Data from the 1980s and 1990s has demonstrated that the three largest German banks exercised on 
average 84 per cent of the proxy votes in Germany's 1argest flnTIs, whi1e 40 per cent of outstanding 
equity is owned by non-financial firms (Schmidt!fyrell, 1997). 
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Furthermore, capital markets in stakeholder-value-oriented countries are often 
considered as less efficient due to the lack of disclosure of important financial 
information, a generally lower market capitalization and market illiquidity. 
In his work Shareholder Value or Stakeholder Value? Ray Shaw (2000) 
concludes: 
"It is claimed that the US capital markets are more efficient, arising from the need to 
provide much more public information, with capital flowing much quicker to more 
productive uses. Second, in the European/Asian model management is less likely to 
focus on value creation because the market price of shares is much less likely to reflect 
good information. Therefore, the market price of shares is often disregarded as the best 
indicator of management performance." (Shaw, 2000: 201). 
Disclosure by Anglo-Saxon standards used to be considered as inadequate in 
Germany until the end of the 1990s14• Capital market regulations and accounting 
standards, moreover, used to weaken the position of minority shareholders and 
market mechanisms. For example, the German accounting rules according to the 
"Handelsgesetzbuch" (HGB) are creditor-oriented and are considered to lack the 
same transparency as found in International Accounting Standards (lAS) or the US 
General Accepted Accounting Standards (GAAP) (Jackson/Hopner/Kurdelbusch, 
2004). 
The market for corporate control is usually poorly developed in stakeholder 
systems. Prowse (1994) reports that during the period of 1985 until 1989, only 2.3 per 
cent of the market value of listed stocks was involved in mergers and acquisitions in 
Germany, compared to over 40 per cent in the USA. Hostile takeovers and leveraged 
buyouts were virtually non-existent, although there was formai takeover law. Gnly at 
the end of the 1990s the German market for corporate control slowly but steadily 
14 ln an OECD survey of corporations, published in Paris, 1995, across the USA, Germany, and Japan, 
the companies were rated relative to OECD guidelines for full, partial or not implemented disclosure. 
Two thirds of the American firms surveyed met the full disclosure standard and the other third of US 
fJIIDS surveyed had partial disclosure. In contrast, none of the German frrms surveyed met the OECD's 
full disclosure requirement. 
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began to develop. However, in comparison to the UK and especially the US market 
for corporate control, the German market is still relatively small. 
In a study about the development of German corporate governance Helmis 
(2002) distinguishes the traditional German and the Anglo-Saxon system of corporate 
control among other factors by the evidence of the absence of an active market for 
corporate control in Germany, which has just recently started to develop to a 
significant level. Until the end of the 1990s there is no significant market for 
corporate control established in Germany according to the small number of takeover 
bids. 
Figure 2.3 Number of takeover bids in Germany, the UK, and the USA 
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The system known as "Deutschland AG", implying a strong strategie inter­
firm network, bank-intermediated capital markets, and a concentrated ownership 
structure, has protected the German corporations from the influence of international 
institutional investors and from hostile takeover attempts by outsiders until the end of 
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the 1990s. The legal Gennan framework, which allowed "intransparent" accounting 
standards and secured a high taxation of earnings derived from the sale of shares 
(until 2002), provided additional protection of the Gennan economy against takeover 
threats. 
A figure taken from a study of Gennan cross-holdings by Adams (1999) 
illustrates to which extent large Gennan companies (e.g. Siemens, Daimler-Benz AG, 
Hoechst, VIAG, RWE, etc.), banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdener Bank, Commerzbank, 
Bayerische Vereinsbank, Bayerische Hypobank, etc.), finance and insurance 
companies (e.g. Allianz and Münchener Rück) have been interwoven among each 
other. 
Figure 2.4 The German network of cross-holdings 
Source: Adams (1999: 107). 
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A powerful institutional mechanism, supporting the influence of banks and 
employees in stakeholder systems, like Germany, is the dual board system, which is 
mandatory for joint stock companies, the German "Aktiengesellschaften" (AG). The 
supervisory board, the so-called "A ufsichtsrat" , is responsible for making key 
financial and strategic decisions and for appointing top management in the firm. The 
board of management, the so-called "Vorstand", has the responsibility for strategy 
implementation, i.e. day-to-day operations of the firm. The "Aufsichtsrat" can 
include outside directors, while the "Vorstand" consists of senior company managers 
(equivalent to the officers in a US company). Members of the supervisory board 
cannot serve as members of the management board and vice versa. Banks insisted on 
this govemance reform of German company law in the wake of a wave of 
bankruptcies in the late 1800s (Jackson, 2001). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
banks nominate representatives to the supervisory boards of most large companies, 
including the chairs of these supervisory boards where their voting power is 
particularly large. 
Employees, as a key stakeholder group in the German stakeholder model, 
enJoy particularly strong rights of representation within the firm through the 
institution of the works council and the election of a third (if the company counts 
more than 500 employees) or even of half (if the company counts more than 2000 
employees) of the supervisory board members by the law of codetermination. 
Employees have the right to elect delegates to works councils, the so-called 
"Betriebsrat", at the plant level. This works councils enjoy a wide variety of 
information, consultation, and codetermination rights vis-à-vis management. In multi­
plant companies, plant works councils appoint delegates to a company works council 
(Helmis, 2002). Furthermore, in large corporations, defined as those with 600 
employees or more, a specified number of the members of the "Betriebsrat" must be 
freed from work in order to attend to corporate matters. 
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The most notable aspect of the Gennan corporate governance system is the 
fact that the supervisory board must be composed of a specified fraction of 
employees, depending on the size and industry of the finn. This practice known as 
'codetennination' is a legislated guarantee of employee involvement in the strategy 
and operations of finns. The employee board representatives are elected both, by the 
workforce (typically top works councillors) and appointed by external trade unions 
(Helmis, 2002; Schmidt, 2004). 
Figure 2.5 The Legal Structure of Corporate Governance in Germany 
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Concerning the firm's relation with workers, lifetime employment practices in 
stakeholder systems, such as Japan and Germany, along with state provisions have 
produced a pattern of sector-specific skills (Estevez-Abe/lverson/Soskice, 2001). 
Moreover, incentives ofworkers to increase labour productivity are diminished where 
such measures are likely to threaten employment levels. From the management 
perspective, strong occupationally based skills contribute to functional flexibility in 
the workplace, and, therefore, substitute for external recruitment. The German 
training system organizes occupations into categories of overlapping skills that create 
a wide 'substitution corridor' between occupations (Sengenberger, 1987)15. 
Coordinated wage bargaining hinders the headhunting of skilled workers, 
providing a stable labour environment for the production of diversified quality 
products. 
2.4 The convergence versus path dependence theory debate 
Globalization has led to a debate about the validity of two different 
approaches in corporate governance research: the convergence theory and the path­
dependence theory. 
Convergence theories imply that there exists "one most efficient" global 
corporate governance system towards which ail the other systems will converge 
naturally. According to most of the scholars this global system will be governed by 
the rules of the Anglo-Saxon system designed to maximize shareholder value 
(HansmannJKraakman, 2000). 
15 For example, apprenticeships in German metalworking occupations last 3.5 years. Six occupations 
share an identical basic training the fIrst year. In the second year, these occupations split ioto three 
'groups' that share an additional half a year of training. The next year is spent in training in six broadly 
defIned occupations. Finally, the last 1.5 years are spent within one of 17 specializations. Unions have 
pursued a strategy of lengthening and broadeniog occupational training, thereby drastically reducing 
the total number of occupations over the last decades. 
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Path dependence theories, like the theory published in the work A theory of 
path dependence in corporate ownership and govemance by Bebchuk and Roe 
(1999), point out that corporate ownership and the system of corporate governance 
are persistent structures. In this case persistence means that even though the structures 
have been built a long time ago, they will remain even if, today, they would not be 
developed in the same way. But why are the structures not changed and improved in 
order to match today's economic and political requirements? The answer is rather 
simple. Maintaining the same structures may be efficient in a basic economic sense: 
the costs of tearing them down and rebuilding them may exceed the value of a new 
improved model. Bebchuk and Roe (1999) mention two different kinds of path 
dependence: "structure-driven" and "rule-driven". "Structure-driven" path 
dependence explains why different stock ownership patterns may persist, even if legal 
rules converged. "Rule-driven" path dependence explains why, given the persistent 
differences in ownership structure, legal rules will not converge. 
Concerning the way in which path-dependence affects corporate rules 
Bebchuk and Roe (1999: 129) explain that "a country's initial pattern of corporate 
structures will create interest groups and determine the power of groups to influence 
which corporate law rules will persist and which ones will change. If a pattern of 
ownership creates a group with positional advantage inside the firm, that group will 
often have the motivation and the means to preserve rules that favour it. 
Consequently, the rules that a country will have down the road will depend on the 
type of corporate structures and corporate rules that it began with". 
In the conclusion of this master thesis, l will refer to the corporate governance 
'convergence versus path-dependence' debate in the case of the German corporation 
DaimlerChrysler and the question: Does the German stakeholder system converge 
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towards shareholder capitalism or does it only evolve within the limits of path­
dependency? 16 
2.5 Contemporary German corporate governance research and debate 
In this last section of the review of literature, l would like to give a short survey 
of the contemporary corporate govemance research and debate in Germany. 
The recent financial scandais affecting major American firms, such as Enron, 
WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen, and the resulting loss of confidence by the 
investing public in the stock market have led to dramatic declines in share prices and 
substantial financiallosses to millions of individual investors. Both the public and the 
experts have identified failed corporate govemance as a principal cause of these 
scandais. 
Viewing the situation in the United States with alarm, European countries, like 
Germany, which are mindful of earlier financial scandais of their own 17, are 
examining their own systems of corporate govemance in an effort to guard against 
similar abuses. Examining the German system of corporate govemance, experts 
engage in a much-heated debate as to whether or not the changes in coordinated 
market economies can be interpreted as a process of convergence towards the Anglo­
16 This question is at the heart of the Gennan contemporary corporate govemance debate, of which 1 
will present a short survey in the next section. 
17 Examples for financial scandais in Germany are: 
FlowTex, the company pretended to have sold 3000 drilling machines for each 1.5 million DM, 
between 1994 and 1999, publishing misleading financial information for shareholders and creditors. 
Holzmann, the traditional Gennan construction company, operating on a worldwide scaIe, went 
bankrupt due to mismanagement, which implicated even criminal behaviour. The accumulated loss in 
the year of bankruptcy, 2002, reached 2.4 billion DM. Gerhard Schrooer tried to save the company in a 
last attempt, however, the company finally had ta declare bankruptcy on the 21 sl March 2002. 
ComRoad, a company traded on the "Neue Markt", which was created in 1997, at the German stock 
exchange in Frankiurt in order to supply young enterprises with equity (the American NASDAQ served 
as model), published faIse financial information, which led to the damage of shareholders and creditors 
and, final1y, to the exclusion of the company from the German stock exchange. 
38 
Chap/er 11 / Review oflitera/ure 
Saxon system of shareholder value. Several authors avoid usmg the term 
'convergence' and prefer to describe the recent developments in corporate 
governance as 'hybridization' in the German case (CasperlKettler, 2000; Lane, 2000; 
Jackson/Hôpner/Kurdelbusch, 2004; Vitols, 2000). A 'hybrid' model would combine 
elements of both stakeholder and shareholder value systems (Vitols, 1999). 
In the context of this debate, an empirical study has been published by the Max 
Planck Institute, "Corporate Governance in Transition: Ten Empirical Findings on 
Shareholder Value and Industrial Relations in Germany" authored by Martin Hôpner 
(2001), which discusses the shareholder value orientation of Germany's 40 largest 
corporations. A shareholder value index compiling data on accounting, investor 
relations, variable top-management compensation and the implementation of 
profitability goals makes it possible to compare the shareholder orientations of the 
companies. The shareholder value phenomenon is explained firstly by the exposure to 
markets - the international product market, capital market pressures and the market 
for corporate control - and, secondly, by internai developments - changing 
management careers, increasing management compensation and reduced monitoring 
by banks and corporate networks - which cause external impulses to increase 
shareholder value to fall on fertile ground. Hôpner's study confirms that the CUITent 
developments and changes in coordinated market economies, like Germany, can be 
identified as a convergence process. However, Hôpner does not precise in his study to 
which extent the convergence process in traditionally stakeholder-oriented economies 
towards a market-driven shareholder-value-oriented economy leads to a hybrid model 
of corporate governance or rather to a complete transformation of the 'old' model 
towards a 'new' mode!. 
In order to prevent the German system from abuses and, furthermore, in order 
to enhance the transparency of the German system for the international community, 
the German government decided to develop and publish a German code of corporate 
governance. A government commission, appointed by the minister of justice, adopted 
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the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC), on the 26th of February 2002. 
Through the declaration of conformity, in Article 161 of the Stock Corporation Act 
(AktG) in the Transparency and Disclosure Law, the GCGC has a legal basis. 
The German Corporate Governance Code has the mm to make Germany' s 
corporate governance rules more transparent for both national and international 
investors, thus strengthening confidence in the management of German corporations. 
Therefore, the Code addresses ail major criticisms - especially from the international 
community - levelled against German corporate governance, namely: 
• inadequate focus on shareho1der interests; 
• the two-tier system of executive board and supervisory board; 
• inadequate transparency of German corporate governance; 
• inadequate independence of German supervisory boards; 
• limited independence of financial statement auditors. 
Each of these five points is addressed in the provisions and stipulations of the 
Code, also taking into consideration the legal framework. Of course, the Code does 
not coyer every detail of every single issue, moreover, it provides a framework which 
the individual companies will have to fill in. The Government Commission on the 
German Corporate Governance Code, appointed by the minister of justice, will 
remain in existence after the Code has been handed over. It will observe the 
deve10pment of corporate governance in legislation and practice in Germany and it 
will review the Code at least once a year for possible adaptation. The govemment has 
invited the public to take actively part in the development and improvement of the 
Code through comments and proposals18. Furthermore, Germany, as a member of the 
European Union, is also a member of the European forum for corporate governance. 
In October 2004, the European Union decided to create a European forum for 
18 The full version of the GCGC, in German, English, French, Spanish, and Italian, and further 
information about the govemment commission, is available on the following website, published by the 
German government: ..http://www.corporate-govemance-code.del.. (the last adopted change in the 
Code dates from the 12.06.2006). 
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corporate govemance in order to support the harmonization of national codes and 
commiSSIOns. 
One of the newest developments in corporate govemance in Germany is the 
law for the obligatory detailed compensation disc10sure of the members of the board 
of management. Since May 2005, the general disc10sure of top management 
remuneration is not sufficient anymore. By the law, companies now have to publish 
the individual remuneration of each board member, an obligation, which already has 
a long tradition in shareholder value countries like the USA or the UK. 
2.6 Conclusion 
ln the review of literature, 1 have presented and examined basic concepts of 
corporate govemance. The main differences between the shareholder and the 
stakeholder value approach, as weil as their characteristics and c1assic environment, 
have been described and pointed out. The two different corporate govemance systems 
are illustrated in two sections by the examples of the USA and the UK (shareholder 
value) and Germany (stakeholder value). It is important to consider that the 
characteristics and the environmental features, which 1 have used to theoretically 
define the two different approaches, do not always occur at the same time or to the 
same extent. 
The last part of the revlew of literature glves a short survey over the 
international 'convergence versus path-dependence theory' and the contemporary 
corporate govemance debate in Germany. Many scholars are engaged in these two 
debates, which are surely linked and interwoven with each other. The case study of 
DaimlerChrysler and the analysis of its three markets (products and services, "talent", 
and capital) (Allaire/Firsirotu, 1993; 2004) may contribute another perspective to the 
development and change of corporate govemance and management in German 
corporations. 
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CHAPTERIII 
RE8EARCH MODEL 
ln this chapter, 1 present the conceptual research model on which this master 
thesis is based. 
The research model provides the framework for the case study of 
DaimlerChrysler. It is a very specific lens through which one may examine the 
complex phenomena of shifts and changes in German corporate structures and 
govemance. This research framework, well grounded in theory and empirical work, 
will provide the intellectual tools to zero in the role of markets and their influence in 
shaping the character, strategies, and govemance of modem corporations. 1 will 
consider this argument further in chapter IV. 
3.1 The model of the three markets 
The Canadian researchers Yvan Allaire and Mihaela Firsirotu have proposed 
in a number of publications (1993; 2004; 2007) that corporations are buffeted by 
three increasingly efficient markets, the product and service market, the financial 
markets, the market for 'talent". For these authors, the ways in which companies cope 
with the pressures from these three markets define their strategy and determine their 
viability. The extents to which these three markets influence companies are variable 
across time period and national boundaries. 
Clearly, the so-called Anglo-Saxon countries have been leading the way in 
removing barriers and impediments to the efficiency of these three markets; but 
gradually, sorne of the features of this Anglo-Saxon model have been seeping in or 
were willingly adopted by corporations operating in most developed countries. 
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Figure 5 presents synthetically this concept of the corporation as located at the 
nexus of three markets. 1 shaH briefly review how, according to Allaire and Firsirotu 
(1993; 2004; 2007), these three markets have changed and now influence the 
management and governance of companies. 
Figure 3.1 The company in the context of the three markets 
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3.1.1 The market for products and services 
From the 1980s on, under the influence of the Reagan-Thatcher policy 
orientation in the USA and the UK, industries were deregulated, state-owned 
companies were privatized, and domestic markets were opened to international 
competition. New communication technologies created new industries and changed 
the way of doing business in scores of "old" industries. Companies had to adjust to 
these new realities. They undertook to "re-engineer" and "downsize" their operations, 
to outsource and offshore large slices of their operations to low-cost producers often 
located in less developed countries. 
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These changes have forced companies to undertake rapid and 'painful' 
adjustments to maintain their position in highly competitive markets. The competition 
for resources, the quest for innovative products, the implementation of cost effective 
production methods and models have come to define the strategy of a company. 
Furthermore, the relocation of production sites to developing countries, like 
China or Vietnam, and the downsizing of the industrial work force in developed 
countries, like in the UK or in Germany, for cost saving effects have a major impact 
on the entire organization. The legal protection of employees and their right of 
codetermination, the regulations concerning environmental protection, and the role of 
suppliers are usually very different in developing and in developed countries, 
affecting thus a change in the management and in the corporate governance of 
companies that relocate their production from industrialized to developing countries. 
3.1.2 The market for "talent" 
With the deep recession of 1981-82, North American companies, one after the 
other, started to default on their implicit contract with their employees, at least those 
in managerial ranks, whereby these employees could expect a high level of job 
security and a policy of exclusive internaI promotion. However, the growing 
pressures from financial markets and from the increasingly competitive product 
markets made it possible, or so it seemed, for companies to remain steadfast in these 
commitments. 
They needed the ability to expand and contract their staffing in tune with 
market demand and the flexibility to seek out new skills not available within the 
company. Boards of directors came to believe, in many cases, that recruiting sorne 
outsider as the new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) was essential to shake up the 
company and meet its new challenges. 
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Of course, managers and executives understood that their employer did not 
guarantee their economic security and career advancement any longer. Good career 
planning meant being on the lookout for job opportunities elsewhere. These goings­
on have led to the emergence of a "secondary market for the talent" of managers, 
executives and technical specialists. 
"Headhunters" and recruitment agencles became sorts of brokers in this 
market for talent, linking companies and people in an increasingly efficient manner. 
However, as with every situation where a market is created, the price of talent 
increased rapidly and very unequal prices were attached to the skills of different 
people. The size and nature of executive compensation became a source of concem to 
shareholders and societies at large. Once the Pandora's Box has been opened, markets 
have their logic and consequences, whether one likes it or not. 
On the positive side, the development of a market for skills and talent made it 
eaSler for companies to adjust and adapt to new competitive circumstances; It 
provided management with a larger share of the economic pie, thus compensating 
them for increased career risk. 
On the negative side, it prevents companies from appropriating the benefits of 
training and development of their people, of building lasting competitive advantage 
on the basis of the singular skills of its personnel, as these may well be recruited by 
other companies including direct competitors. It induces a mercenary attitude in 
managers and executives, a calculus of career enhancement, a strategy of self­
promotion, which may well lead to a short-term orientation in their decisions and 
actions. 
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3.1.3 Thefinancial markets 
The shareholding of companies saw a profound metamorphosis during the 
period between 1980 and 2005. In several countries, like the USA, the UK, Canada, 
and Australia, institutional investors own more than 50 per cent of ail shares of 
publicly traded companies. These institutional shareholders come in various forms, 
have different time horizons, and implement distinct investment strategies. They ail 
share, however, the postulate that management should be entirely and solely devoted 
to increasing the value of their investments. 
Whatever action must be taken to that end should be taken, be it the 
replacement of the CEü, various financial manoeuvres, the outright sale of the 
company, mergers and acquisitions, etc. Most importantly, management must not 
disappoint them, but must meet their expectations of earnings per share on a quarterly 
basis. To align the interests of management with their own, institutional shareholders 
were favourable to generous stock option plans, until these turned out to be the 
proximate culprit in sorne of the financial scandais of the 2001-2002 season. 
As a result, from the 1980s onwards, companies in the Anglo-Saxon countries 
moved gradually away from the "stakeholder" model that had dominated the 
corporate landscape during the period 1950-1980. They switched progressively to the 
"shareholder-value-creation model". In Continental Europe and Japan, sorne 
movement in that direction may also be observed since the mid-1990s. 
The institutional investors are also a globalizing force as they seek to impose 
their will and objectives on the management and governance of companies in every 
country to which they migrate in search of higher returns. The influence of capital 
markets has grown worldwide with the support of, or in spite of, government policies. 
As a result, companies wherever located must meet more stringent requirements in 
terms of their govemance, minority shareholder protection and financial performance. 
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3.2 The relationship between companies and the three markets 
The role and the importance of the three distinct markets: products and 
services, "talent", and capital, for the relationship between companies and their 
markets and, thus, strategie management, vary according to country specifie factors 
and the period of time. 
3.2.1 The period oftime 
During the last twenty years, markets have become more and more important 
for the formulation of corporate strategy, the character of leadership, and the style of 
management. Furthermore, the globalization of markets has led to an increase of 
global market pressures on firms worldwide. In order to survive in an environment of 
global competition for products and services, "talent", and capital, companies are 
'driven' to develop the ability to adapt to the new situation and to invent new 
corporate strategies, thus gaining a comparative advantage against other competitors 
in the market. 
Allaire and Firsirotu (1993; 2004) have named the company model, which has 
been in place before the emergence of strong market forces stemming from the three 
markets, product and services, talent, and capital, the period of 'the model of 
reciprocal loyalty' ("le modèle de la loyauté réciproque"). This model largely 
resembles the "stakeholder mode!" previously discussed. Allaire's and Firsirotu's 
(1993; 2004) approach, however, focuses on the relationship between individuals 
(e.g. employees, including management) and the organization. In earlier times, before 
1980, employment security and mutual loyalty between employees and employers 
played a very important role, not only in Continental Europe and Japan, but also in 
Anglo-Saxon countries, like the USA, the UK or Canada. Managers were recognized 
as highly legitimate and credible among workers as they have worked for years in the 
company, climbing step by step the company's internai career ladder. 
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Furthennore, managers cooperated with workers and unions for the good of 
the company, trying to find solutions that reflected both the interests of management 
and the interests of employees (see chapter II, the stakeholder approach). In a model 
of reciprocal loyalty employees and internai job training, to enhance the skills and 
specifie professional abilities of employees were regarded as human assets, 
immovable and difficult to replicate by competitors, being thus critical sources of 
competitive advantage. 
ln this system employees were becoming finn specialists rather than 
functional specialists, thus having an inferior economic value for other employers 
than hislher own. The remuneration system was generally based on the employee's 
position in the company's hierarchies and on the time he has worked for the 
company. Variable perfonnance based incentives for management employees were 
not present. 
The model ofreciprocalloyalty (AllairelFirsirotu, 2004) does not only possess 
positive aspects. Problems occur when companies become ineffective institutions, 
which lack the ability to respond to market pressures: a place, where employees and 
managers, 'imprisoned' in daily routine, are psychologically unable to make 
necessary flexible decision for the wellbeing of the finn. However, the time of the 
man in grey flannel or organization man, symbol for stubborn hierarchies and 
confonnism, is already over in Anglo-Saxon countries since the beginning of the 
1980s. 
Figure 3.2 shows a synthesis of the changes from 'the model of reciprocal 
loyalty', the stakeholder model, to 'the model of the three markets', the shareholder 
value mode!. 1 will refer again to this synthesis analyzing the changes at 
DaimlerChrysler in chapter V. 
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Figure 3.2 The two models of the corporation by Allaire and Firsirotu 
Governance in the... 
"Reciprocal loyalty" model 
•	 Recruitment at graduation from 
schools and colleges; 
•	 Intense socialization to company 
values and culture; 
•	 Promotion from within almost 
exc1usively; 
•	 Job security, employment "for life"; 
•	 Tenured executives, with no exit, 
highly dependent on the company's 
wellbeing for their own, now and in 
the future; variable compensation 
rather modest; 
•	 Management does not seek to 
maximize stock priee; will not seek to 
maximize stock priee; will not take 
any untoward or even risky action if 
that might put their career in any 
jeopardy; 
•	 Regulated, protected or dominated 
product markets, 
•	 Shareholders, but one stakeholder; 
retained earnings the main source of 
funding; shareholders expect 
dividends, are fragmented and 
generally passive; 
Board governance: a placid, relaxed 
affair with liUle risk of management 
misbehaviour (e.g. IBM in the 1980s). 
"Three markets" model 
•	 Active market for talent: executive 
search firms, etc; 
•	 High level of mobility of talent from 
company to company; 
•	 Mobile executives seek full market 
value for their "talent"; calculative 
assessment ofbest time to switch 
companies; "talent" is key asset of 
any business; 
•	 Selection process pits internaI 
candidates against external search; 
•	 Little or no job security; 
•	 Shareholders (fund managers, etc.) 
and analysts pressure top management 
for stock performance, and for their 
replacement if it proves 
unsatisfactory; 
•	 Deregulated, internationally, 
competitive, product markets; 
•	 Shareholders, the prime (and only?) 
stakeholder; 
Governance here a tough, risky 
business; particularly if board 
members still believe they are 
operating in the "Ioyalty model" (e.g. 
IBM from 1992 onwards). 
Source: Adapted from Allaire and Firsirotu (1993; 2004). 
Market-driven corporations, which face the challenges and the pressure of the 
three markets, as described in figure 3.2, have to develop and create new systems of 
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management and corporate govemance to successfully create value in a changed 
environment. 
Allaire and Firsirotu (2005)'s concept of value-creating govemance can be 
considered as an example for the successful creation of long-term value within the 
context of the three markets. The four pil1ars of value-creating governance, the 
legitimacy and credibility of principals (board members), the efficiency of strategy 
processes and dialogue between management and directors, the quality of financial 
and strategie information, and the design of the compensation and incentive system 
are the basis for the development of a strong system of management and corporate 
governance within the framework of the three markets. 
3.2.2 The country specifie factors 
Country specifie factors, like the economic, legal, and socio-political context 
of a society, have a very important influence on the complex relationship between 
companies and their markets. The dynamic socio-economic environment of a 
company, being the basis for daily decision-making, needs to be considered by 
companies for the development of strategie management and corporate governance. 
Social values, the mobility of talent and resources, political structures, the 
legal and economic system, the character and the functioning of financial and 
commercial markets differ to a high degree from one country to the other (or even 
within the boundaries of one country). Therefore, it is rather evident that companies 
face different challenges and requirements, developing their corporate strategy and 
system of govemance. Consequently, companies have to adapt their strategie 
management and corporate govemance system to the particular context in which they 
evolve. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
The model of the three markets developed by Allaire and Firsirotu (1993; 
2004), corresponding to the model of shareholder value previously discussed, builds 
the framework for the case study of DaimlerChrsyler and, furthermore, the basis for 
the analysis of the shifts and the changes, which occurred in German corporations 
during the 1990s. 
In the following chapters 1 will investigate to which extent the style of 
management and corporate govemance at DaimlerChrysler has converged from a 
model of reciprocal loyalty, representing a stakeholder approach, to a model of the 
three markets, representing a shareholder value approach. 
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CHAPTERIV 
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE 
ln this chapter 1 will present the research perspective and the methodological 
framework of this thesis. The research methodology applied in the case of 
DaimlerChrysler will be precisely described and, furthermore, theoretically justified. 
Chapter 1, covering the development of the research questions, can be considered as a 
first introduction to the research perspective ofthis study. 
4.1 The research perspective 
The design of a research study begins with the selection of a paradigm and a 
topic. A paradigm is essentially a worldview, a whole framework of beliefs, values 
and methods within which research takes place. It is this world view within which 
researchers work. Kuhn (1996) defines a scientific paradigm in his work, "The 
Structure ofScientific Revolutions", as follows: 
•	 what is to be observed and scrutinized, 
•	 the kind of questions that are supposed to be asked and assumed in order to find 
answers in relation to this subject, 
•	 how these questions are to be structured, 
•	 and how the results of scientific investigations should be interpreted. 
Alternatively, the Oxford English Dictionary defines a paradigm as "A pattern 
or mode!, an example". Therefore an additional component of Kuhn's definition of 
paradigm is: 
•	 how an experiment is to be conducted, and what equipment is available to
 
conduct the experiment.
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For this study l have chosen to adopt a distinct perspective, namely the 
conceptual model of the three markets developed by Allaire and Firsirotu (2004), 
which l will apply to my research topic. The company, its corporate structure, its 
model of corporate govemance, its strategic orientation, and its organization stand in 
the focus of this research perspective. The case of DaimlerChrysler is, therefore, 
considered from a market perspective, revealing in a unique way how and to which 
extent global market forces have an effect on the way a market-driven German 
corporation is managed and governed. 
In their work Stratégies et moteurs de performance : les défis et rouages du 
leadership stratégique, Allaire and Firsirotu (2004) explain logically the perspective 
through the three markets, capital, "talent", products and services. The model is a 
profound and sound research model, which enables the researcher to improve the 
understanding of changes in the corporate structure in economies worldwide. Of 
course, the market context is not the same in North America, Japan, France, or 
Germany, however, the company can always be viewed through the "three markets" 
perspective. The study of the impact of the three market forces on the management 
and on the corporate govemance structure of corporations in Germany, one of the 
world's leading economies, adds an important aspect to the existing research work, 
which is based on the model of the three markets (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1993; 2004). 
Furthermore, this study may account for a new research perspective in the 
contemporary corporate govemance debate in Germany. 
The review of literature, based on classic and modem corporate govemance 
research, may allow understanding the essential principles and arguments on which 
the contemporary German corporate govemance debate is based. This understanding 
is important in order to analyse and evaluate the case study of DaimlerChrysler. The 
case study, which will be methodologically justified in this chapter, will be developed 
in chapter V, VI, and in the final conclusion. 
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4.2 The research methodology 
In the following section, 1 will discuss and justify the approach, the research 
strategy, the techniques and methods, which 1 have applied in order to carry out the 
research work for this master thesis. 
4.2.1 A qualitative approach 
According to Cresswell (1994) "A qualitative study is defined as an inquiry 
process of understanding a social or human problem, based on building a complex, 
holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants, and 
conducted in a natural setting. 
Alternatively a quantitative study, consistent with the quantitative paradigm, 
is an inquiry into a social or human problem, based on testing a theory composed of 
variables, measured with numbers, and analyzed with statistical procedures, in order 
to determine whether the predictive generalizations of the theory hold true." 
The methodology of this master thesis is based on a qualitative approach. 
Basically, there are two reasons why 1 chose a qualitative rather than a quantitative 
approach: 
•	 First of all, a quantitative approach needs to be based on a relatively large 
sample in order to provide legitimate results. Several international, European, 
and German research 19 institutes have conducted intensive in-depth studies 
19 Some of the best known research institutions for corporate governance worldwide are: the Berlin 
Center of Corporate Governance (BCCG), Germany; the Centre for Corporate Governance Research, 
Birmingham University, UK; the Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of 
Delaware, USA; the Corporate Governance Initiative, Harvard Business School, USA; the ûlin Center 
for Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School, USA; the International Institute for Corporate 
Governance (BCG), Yale School of Management, USA; and the Max Planck Research Institute, 
Gennany. 
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about the development of the Gennan corporate structure since the 1990s2o. The 
majority of these studies are based on a sample of at least 30 companies, e.g. 
the 30 Gennan DAX companies21 • Sorne of these studies include research on 
the impact of certain market forces, e.g. the development of the Gennan capital 
market and its impact on management and corporate governance in Gennan 
corporations. However, there exits no quantitative study that examines 
explicitly the impact of aIl three markets: products and services, "talent", and 
capital, according to the model of Allaire and Firsirotu (2004). In fact, 1will use 
sorne research evidence from already conducted quantitative studies in order to 
base my argumentation on realistic facts and figures. The conduct of a new 
quantitative research for the purpose of this master thesis would have been 
difficult regarding the scope and the availability of the needed database and, as 
a matter of fact, not necessary regarding the volume and quality of the existing 
research work. 
•	 The complex nature of the research topic of this master thesis implies the 
concentration on a sample of one, on a longitudinal basis, in order to allow a 
thorough analysis of the research topic. The analysis of the case of 
DaimlerChrysler, through the three-markets perspective (Allaire/Firsirotu, 
1993; 2004), demands a great volume of infonnation and interesting diachronie 
insights into the Gennan corporate structure of the last 15 years. The case study 
of DaimlerChrysler thus contains enough relevant research material for an in­
depth analysis of the three markets, services and products, "talent", and capital, 
which finds itself at the heart of the research work of this master thesis (see 
chapter VI). 
20 A study published by the Max Planck Institute, "Corporate Governance in Transition: Ten 
Empirical Findings on Shareholder Value and Industrial Relations in Gennany" authored by Hôpner 
(2001), which discusses the shareholder value orientation of the 40 largest German corporations. 
21 DAX or Xetra DAX is a Blue Chip Index listing the 30 major Gennan companies. Priees are taken 
from the electronic Xetra trading system. 
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Examining the changes and shifts in the management and the govemance of 
Gennan corporations during the 1990s, a rather complex phenomenon, 1 chose to use 
a case study method for this master thesis. According to Yin (1994), a case study 
research is to be considered the appropriate research method or tool, if: 
•	 the research questions concem the "Why" and "How" of a phenomenon; 
•	 the investigator has little or no control over the events; 
•	 and/or the research focuses on a contemporary phenomenon III a real-life 
context. 
ln fact, in order to analyze the underlying events and the dynamic of a major 
change in a given structure, in our case the Gennan corporate structure, it is sensible 
to undertake a longitudinal research. The research period should also coyer a certain 
period of time before and after the major events of change, examining which factors 
have led to the change and, furthennore, which outcome the change caused. The case 
study of DaimlerChrysler covers a period of fifteen years, from 1990, the year, which 
most corporate govemance researchers (Bradley/Sundaram, 2003: 10; Helmis, 2002: 
9; JacksonIHopner/Kurdelbusch, 2004: 1; Schmidt, 2004: 8) consider as the 
beginning of the period of major changes in the Gennan corporate structure known as 
"Deutschland AG", until today. Furthennore, the end of the 1990s indicates also the 
final period of major changes in the management and the corporate govemance 
structure of Gennan corporations. The end of the 1990s stands for the final decline of 
the "Deutschland AG" and the beginning of a new economic era. 
With the end of the system called "Deutschland AG" came the decline of the 
role of banks, the unwinding of corporate networks, the rise of foreign and 
institutional investors, an emerging market for corporate control, and changing 
careers and compensation of top managers are just sorne aspects of the period of 
1990s, which had an major impact on the conduct and the purpose of the Gennan 
corporation. 
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ln chapter V, presenting the Daimler-Benz - later the DaimlerChrysler ­
Corporation, 1 will examine in depth the corporate shifts and changes of the company 
between 1990 and 2005. Subsequently, 1 will analyze the evolution of the three 
markets during the same period, in the following Chapter VI. 
The approach of this master thesis is to a certain extent rather descriptive as 
we are studying the evolution of a phenomenon over a certain period of time, 
examining the impact of the evolution of the three markets, products and services, 
"talent", and capital, on the management and the corporate governance of German 
corporations during the period of 1990-2005. 
The methodological application of the case study method, as in the case of 
DaimlerChrysler, is increasingly accepted among well-known scholars of the 
scientific community as the method permits to elaborate well-based theories 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
According to Yin (1994), the methodology of the case study can be 
considered an excellent research tool for the testing of existing theories, providing, 
furthennore, a hypothetical general analytic model. Moreover, Koza and Lewin 
(1999) point out that case studies, with a long-tenn time horizon, allow to fonnulate 
empirical and at the same time theoretical interpretations about a contemporary 
phenomenon. 
Firsirotu (1984) uses a long-term case study approach in her Ph. D. thesis22, 
"Strategie Tumaround as Cultural Revolution: The Case of Canadian National 
Express", examining the radical transformation of Canadian National Express (CNX) 
in order to propose a conceptual model, which has been empirically tested, for the 
22 In 1985, Professor Mihaela E. Firsirotu received the AT Keamey research price for the best Ph.D. 
thesis in North America from the Academy of Management. 
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fonnulation and implantation of strategies for a radical change 10 complex 
organizations. 
A case study is primarily based on qualitative data, which interest can be 
multiple. However, qualitative data pennits to present a phenomenon, respecting the 
chronological order of events. Precise and well-chosen relations of 'cause and effect' 
allow the researcher to develop a new integration and new concepts of the 
investigated phenomenon (HubermanIMiles, 1994). 
Eisenhardt (1989) reminds to consider the problem of asphyxia of the data 
used in a case study of a contemporary phenomenon. The definition of research 
limits and the review of scientific literature and public studies, conceming the 
analyzed phenomenon, are essential in order to develop and justify a new concept in a 
case study. 
Finally, the importance of a master thesis is based on its validity, which is at 
the same time a major challenge to the student conducting the research of the master 
thesis. Otherwise, would a scientist, who possesses access to the same infonnation 
and data, draw the same conclusion as the student conducting the research of the 
master thesis? Conceming this question, Firsirotu (1984) points out, for her research 
work on CNX, that another scholar or professional researcher could have drawn 
another conclusion upon the results of the analysis of the same infonnation and data. 
She insists on the fact that the explicit and detailed character of her case study as weil 
as the precise identification of research sources represents the essential argument for 
the validity of her work. 
In the same way, this master thesis provides an explicit research concept and 
provides detailed and précised infonnation about the sources, data and other sources 
of infonnation, on which this case study is based. 
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4.2.2 The research concept 
The analysis of this master thesis is based on the model of the three markets, 
developed by Allaire and Firsirotu (1993; 2004). The theoretical approach of the 
model and the three distinct markets, the market for products and services, the 
"talent" market, and the market of capital, have been already presented in detail in 
Chapter III. 
The research model developed by Allaire and Firsirotu has been a guide for 
the choice of literature and the relevant data on which this research work is based. 
The research topic: managing and goveming in a market-driven corporation, implies 
already in the word "market-driven" the relevance of market forces for the 
management and the govemance of corporations. Allaire and Firsirotu (1993; 2004) 
have developed the model of the three markets in the context of the evolution of 
modem corporations; from a traditional corporate model of mutual loyalty between 
the company and its stakeholders, e.g. employees, towards a more shareholder-value­
oriented company, depending on the evolution of the three markets, products and 
services, "talent", and capital. The phenomenon of changes and shifts in the German 
corporate culture, often called "Deutschland AG", in the 1990s, offers an interesting 
opportunity for an analysis through the perspective of the three markets. In how far, 
did these three markets trigger and drive the changes in the management and 
corporate govemance of German corporations? 
ln Chapter VI, 1 will individually describe and analyze the development of 
each of the three markets and their impact on Daimler-Benz, later the 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation, from 1990 until 2005. In the last chapter, 1will draw a 
general conclusion about the importance and the impact of the three markets on the 
management and the govemance in the Daimler-Benz, later DaimlerChrysler 
Corporation. Moreover, 1 will evaluate to which extent the case of DaimlerChrysler 
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can be considered an example for the development of other Gennan corporations in 
the 1990s. 
4.2.3 The research sampIe 
ln this section, 1 will justify why 1 have chosen the case of DaimlerChrysler 
for this study. As 1have already mentioned above, it is sensible to limit the number of 
companies in a sample to one case study, when a complex phenomenon, like the 
changes in the Gennan corporate culture and structure, is studied in depth. Moreover, 
Hamel (Hamel/DufourlFortin, 1993) and Yin (1984; 1993; 1994) argued that the 
relative size of the sample whether 2, 10, or 100 cases are used, does not transfonn a 
multiple case into a macroscopic study. The goal of the study should establish the 
parameters, and then should be applied to ail research. In this way, even a single case 
could be considered acceptable, provided it met the established objective. 
The choice of DaimlerChrysler for this case study can be justified upon 
several facts and arguments, pertaining to the cultural, organizational, legal, and 
economic characteristics of the corporation: 
•	 DaimlerChrysler has been the largest manufacturing corporation in Germany 
throughout the 1990s until today. Its principal trading markets were Frankfurt 
and New York, but, furthermore, the company stock was traded in Gennany on 
Berlin, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Hanover, Munich, and Stuttgart, in the 
United States on the Chicago Stock Exchange, and the Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange, and elsewhere on Paris, Tokyo, Toronto, and Zurich. The 
economical importance of DaimlerChrysler for the German economy and, 
moreover, its impact on other German corporations, the German capital market, 
the German corporate culture and corporate governance system, the German 
management elite, employees in Germany, the supplier industry, and the 
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Gennan society itself, have been major reasons for the choice of 
DaimlerChrysler as subject of this case study. 
•	 The Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft (AG), one of the plOneers of the 
automobile industry and one of the greatest corporations of the twentieth 
century, was founded in 1924. The company was the result of a merger between 
Daimler-Motoren-Gesellschaft, founded in Stuttgart by Gottlieb Daimler in the 
year 1890, and Rheinische Gasmotoren-Fabrik, founded in Mannheim by Karl 
Benz in the year 1883. In 1910, Daimler shares commenced trading on the 
Stuttgart exchange and Benz was the world's largest automobile manufacturer, 
with sales of 603 automobiles. During the following eight decades the company 
grew almost continually. Daimler-Benz can be considered as one of the oldest 
Gennan corporations. Hs corporate culture has been based on traditional 
Gennan corporate values, for example, loyalty between the employer and 
employees, honesty, diligence, innovation, the importance of high quality work, 
precision, Gennan engineership, teamwork, and a strong believe in technology. 
Considering that Daimler-Benz is one of the oldest Gennan companies with a 
traditional German, or 1 may even call it "Schwabisch" (= Swabian) culture (see 
chapter V), the company makes a very interesting case for the study of shifts 
and changes in the management and in the corporate govemance of market­
driven corporations in the Gennan context under the impact of its various 
markets. 
•	 The continued importance of the automobile sector to the national economy in 
Gennany, and DaimlerChrysler being one of the most important Gennan 
automobile manufacturers, make the company from Stuttgart an excellent 
choice for this case study. The automobile sector that has been tenned the 
"industry of industries" can be considered as one of the most intemationally 
exposed sectors, and remains one of the largest employers in Gennany. 
According to Foudy Jr. (2001: 13), who compared the influence of shareholder 
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value on the German and Japanese model in a case study of the automobile 
sector, the automobile sector is an excellent test for comparative advantages 
created in organized market economies, like Germany or Japan, due to "the 
complex nature of automobile assembly, ils multi-tiered supplier system and 
long product design cycles (. ..) ". 
•	 A further interesting aspect of the DaimlerChrysler case lays in the abrupt 
confrontation with the American business model based on shareholder value at 
the time of the merger with Chrysler, the 'all' American automobile 
manufacturer from Auburn Hills. The consequences of the merger with an 
American corporation for the management and the governance of 
DaimlerChrysler will be further discussed and examined in chapter V. 
•	 Another reason for the choice of DaimlerChrysler in this case study is the fact 
that the German corporation underwent important changes in the period of the 
1990s. Therefore, the company makes an interesting research case for a study 
about the changes and shifts in the management and the governance of German 
corporations. 
4.2.4 The sources 
The research is principally based upon secondary sources. However, l have 
also collected sorne primary sources, conducting individual interviews with several 
DC employees and a former Daimler-Benz financial assistant manager, who used to 
work for the board of management at the former Daimler-Benz headquarters in 
Stuttgart-Môhringen23 , on internai changes in the corporate organization during the 
1990s, and discussing research questions about the development of corporate 
23 In the year 2006, the DaimlerChrysler headquarters, which were titled by the former CEO Jürgen E. 
Schrempp as 'bullshit castle', were transferred from Stuttgart-Mohringen ta the headquarters of 
Mercedes-Benz in Stuttgart-Untertürkheim (see chapter V). 
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governance and shareholder value methods in Germany with scholars and experts 
from several specialized academic institutes in Kiel and Berlin. 
Therefore, the collected research may be divided into three different types of 
sources: 
•	 Scientific international corporate governance literature: 
Concerning the beginnings of the corporate governance theory, the stakeholder 
and shareholder value model, the path dependence theory, the convergence 
theory, and the corporate governance debate in Germany, the three markets 
model of the corporation and the value creating governance system. 
•	 Publications concerning the DaimlerChrysler Corporation: 
Documents published by the company, e.g. annual reports, shareholder 
information published following the merger with Chrysler, the corporate web 
site, legal information provided to the SEC (Security Exchange Commission), 
the German stock exchange (Frankfurter Barse) or the Deutsche Bank and the 
OECD. Secondary literature that 1 have used for the study of the 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation includes several books about the Daimler-Benz 
Corporation, the merger process with the American automobile manufacturer 
Chrysler, as weil as a biography of the former DaimlerChrysler (DC) CEO 
Jürgen E. Schrempp, press articles (mainly articles from the German Press: 
Handelsblatt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Spiegel, or the German 
Financial Times, but also from the international press: New York Times, 
Financial Times Intemational, Herald Tribune, or the European Times, and 
web sites (e.g. the online dossier about DaimlerChysler published by the FAZ). 
•	 Primary sources: 
Firstly, 1 could collect interesting pieces of information about the German and 
international corporate governance debate during discussions and interviews 
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with corporate governance experts. For example, at a meeting with the 
stakeholder value expert professor R. Edward Freeman invited from the 
University of Virginia at the 2nd International Conference on "Corporate Social 
Responsibility" at Berlin, organized by the Humboldt University of Berlin 
between the 121h and the 131b of October 2006. Furthermore, searching for new 
interesting literature on the topic of corporate governance changes in Germany 
at the Berlin Centre for Corporate Governance24 located at the Technical 
University of Berlin, the German Institute for Corporate Governance25 part of 
the Institute for Management and located at the Humboldt University of Berlin, 
and the Institute for International Economr6 at the University of Kiel, 1 had the 
occasion to meet research assistants and professors, who were specialized III 
this field. 
A second primary resource for this master thesis are the individual 
interviews which 1 have conducted with several DC employees, working for 
Airbus and Mercedes-Benz in Bremen, and a former Daimler-Benz financial 
assistant manager. For the interviews, 1 prepared a general questionnaire, in 
24 The Berlin Center of Corporate Governance (BCCG) was founded on the July 8, 2002 at the chair 
for Organization and Management of the Technical University of Berlin (Prof. Dr. Axel v. Werder) 
with the support of sorne of the greatest companies in Germany.The BCCG may be considered as the 
German centre of competence for ail questions concerning the governance and the control of 
corporations. The institute serves, furthermore, as a platform fort the exchange of knowledge and 
information between the academic world and the German economy. The two main aims of the BCCG 
are: Firstly to gather information on the practice of corporate governance in Germany and, secondly, to 
improve the empirical data base of the German corporate governance debate. 
25 The field of research in the German Institute for Management at the Humboldt University of Berlin 
is rather broad. International Management, Strategic Management, the theory of decision-making and 
und industry economy belong to this field. Research projects are frrst of ail theoretic but researchers 
explicitly aim to make them relevant for practice. Together with foreign universities the institute works 
on following contemporary research projects: Management compensation und corporate control; 
International competition and corporate cooperation; Corporate reputation; and Trust in corporate 
cooperation and the influence of multiple cultures. 
26 Institut.fùr Weltwirtschaft der Universitiit Kiel (IFW): The Kiel Institute for International Economy 
is an international centre for research in global economic affairs, economic policy consulting, 
economic education and documentation. Founded in 1914 by Bernhard Harms, the independent 
institution, is afùliated with the Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel and is a member of the 
Wissenschaflsgemeinschafl Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (WGL), which unites institutes and service 
providers of supra-regional importance. 
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Gennan, divided into three sections with questions concerning personal data 
(e.g. for how long the person has worked for the company; what hislher 
position and task have been during this time;), the corporation (e.g. which 
internai changes and shifts they have noticed during the 1990s; how they 
recognized the change from the era of Edzard Reuter to Jürgen E. Schrempp; to 
which extent the company changed after the merger with Chrysler; how they 
evaluate the importance and influence of the three markets on the company;), 
and finally, the corporate governance in Gennany (e.g. if they have noticed a 
change from a shareholder value towards a stakeholder mode! approach; or if 
they consider shareholder value tendencies in Gennany only as a short-tenn 
phenomenon, which companies use in order to realize rationalization measures 
in economically difficult times). 
During the interviews 1 had the opportunity to ask further questions or to 
concentrate on one specifically interesting topic. Ali the interviewees only confinned 
to be interviewed, if their identity is not revealed in this master thesis as the content 
of the interviews implied sensitive personal statements and subjective opinions 
towards the employer. Even if the number of conducted interviews is rather restraint 
and the interviewees only confinned to be interviewed anonymously, the personal 
views on the company DaimlerChrysler and the corporate changes it underwent 
during the 1990s have been enriching pieces of infonnation for this research work. 
The primarily use of secondary sources is rather a necessity than an 
obligation. The evaluation of financial data and secondary sources on the 
management of DaimlerChrysler, as weil as secondary sources on the development of 
the three markets with a global and a national perspective and, furthennore, the 
development of the corporate governance system in Gennany, make the platfonn of 
this study. However, the collected data from primary sources helps to complete the 
picture of internai changes within in the organization of DaimlerChrysler during the 
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1990s and, conceming the corporate govemance debate, supports, criticizes, or limits 
certain theoretical arguments from secondary sources. 
Of course, it would have been also interesting to interview the members, or 
former members, of the management and supervisory board of DaimlerChrysler on 
the research topic of this study, but the access to this group of people is rather 
restraint and it was not possible for this study. The absence of such primary sources 
and data enables me, on the other hand, as Allaire (1992) already pointed out 
regarding his research experiences, to maintain a certain distance towards the actors 
involved in the studied events. According to Allaire (1992) a certain distance towards 
the studied events and their actors allows a researcher to develop interpretations of 
the studied case, which are independent from the opinion of the actively involved 
actors. 
4.2.5 The analysis and the fidelity ofdata 
The principal problem, being one of the greatest risks when it cornes to data 
analysis, is the asphyxia of data (Eisenhardt, 1989), which 1 have already mentioned 
above. The excess of information may distance a researcher from his axis of research 
and, moreover, may drag him or her into secondary questions, meaning the conductor 
of the research looses the focus on the relevant questions of the study. Evading the 
problem and risk of the asphyxia of data (Eisenhardt, 1989), 1 have decided to focus 
the collection of data and information around the research questions, which 1 have 
developed in Chapter I, since the beginning of the research. 
Another problem linked to the analysis of data concems the ability to verify, if 
the given information and data are based on true facts. Testing and proving the 
verification of data and information used for this study, 1 compared the information 
deriving from numerous different sources in order to determine their verification. 
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Otherwise, 1 tried to apply the data analysis model developed by Huberman 
and Miles (1994), which implies three continuous kinds of activities: 
•	 Reducing the amount of data and information by selecting, simplifying, and 
transforming secondary and primary sources in order to identify their essential 
contents; 
•	 Organizing the collected data and information in form of a matrix or of figures 
in order to enhance the comprehension for the studied phenomena; 
•	 Elaborating and verifying conclusions. 
Although 1 analyzed a great amount of data and information at the beginning 
of my research, 1 continued the process of data analysis throughout the evolution of 
this study. 
4.3 The validity and the limits of the study 
As interesting and relevant the research topic of a study may sound, it is 
always very important to examine the validity of the study. Would another researcher, 
having access to the same data and information, draw the same conclusions? Firsirotu 
(1984) precised "the explicit and precised character of a case study, as weil as the 
precisely identification of documents used as sources, offers the only gauge of 
validity to the scientific community". 
Of course, there are certain limits conceming this study. First of ail, the 
generalization of the results of this study is limited to German corporations facing 
similar global market pressures to those, which occurred in the automobile sector 
during the 1990s. The German corporate context is very specific conceming a great 
number of characteristics: industry networks, the capital market, the corporate 
govemance structure, and organizationai behaviour, etc. 
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Regarding the fact that this study is mainly based on secondary sources, it is 
impossible to consider ail exact information on the studied corporation. However, it 
has been a great help to me to discuss vague or controversy data and information with 
experienced researchers at the Institute for International Economy (IFW) at the 
University of Kiel. In the case of especially controversy issues, 1 tried to compare and 
balance the opinions and arguments from different categories of sources, e.g. 
journalists, management experts, financial analysts, representatives of the company, 
and politicians. 
4.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, 1 have presented the methodology and research perspective, 
which seemed to be the most adequate in order to conduct a research on the chosen 
research topic, and, which corresponded strongly 10 my own research interest. 1 have 
opted to conduct my research in form of a case study based on secondary and sorne 
primary sources. The selected research model, the model of the three markets 
developed by Allaire and Firsirotu (1993; 2004), integrates several research 
disciplines and may be considered as conceptually solid. 
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CHAPTERV 
THE COMPANY 
This chapter is about the company Daimler-Benz, smce 1998 the 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation. In a brief review, l will present the history of Daimler­
Benz, one of Germany's oldest corporations, from the early beginnings in Stuttgart in 
1890, to the period of intensive diversification in the 1980s. The early history of the 
company is an important aspect for the analysis of corporate changes. It helps us to 
understand the original cultural roots of the organization and, furthermore, to be 
aware of the socio-political situation within which the company has evolved. As l 
have already explained in the last chapter, this study focuses on the changes and 
shifts in German corporations. Therefore, in this chapter, l will concentrate 
exclusively on the German company Daimler-Benz and its history and evolution 
throughout the 1990s. The American automobile company Chrysler will not be 
considered until the merger of the DaimlerChrysler in the year 1998. 
After having reviewed the past of the Daimler-Benz Corporation until the end 
of the 1980s, l will examine in depth the period of the 1990s, the chosen research 
period of this study (see chapter IV). In order to guard a certain chronology of events 
and to study certain key events in detail, l have decided to subdivide the years 
between 1990 and 2005 in three distinct periods and sections: from 1990 to 1995, 
from 1995 to 1998, and from 1998 until 2005. 
From 1990 to 1995, l will concentrate on the serious economic slump, which 
the company suffered already since the late 1980s, and the corporate impact of 
Daimler-Benz's first listing at the US stock market in New York. In the following 
period between 1995 and 1998, l will examine, in particular, the corporate changes 
due to the new CEO Jürgen E. Schrempp and the merger of Mercedes-Benz and 
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Daimler-Benz. In the last period, covering the events between the beginning of the 
year 1998 and 2005, 1 will take a detailed look at the year 1998, the time of the 
Daimler-Benz transatlantic merger with the American corporation Chrysler, and the 
following years, in which the merger revealed its major consequences for the 
corporate structure and governance of the German-American DaimlerChrysler 
Corporation. 
The turning points In the history of the Daimler-Benz - later the 
DaimlerChrysler - Corporation have a special importance for the study in how far the 
three markets have had an influence on the evolution of the German market-driven 
corporation. Although, this chapter provides an overview of the general evolution of 
the company during the 1990s, it may focus, in particular, on events, which embody 
important shifts and changes for the DaimlerChrysler Corporation. 
In the next chapter, analyzing the evolution of the market for products and 
services, the market for "talent", and the market for capital, 1 will attempt to reveal to 
what extent the three markets have caused the corporate shifts and changes mentioned 
in this chapter. 
5.1 The history of Daimler-Benz: from 1890 to 1989 
The Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft (AG) was one of the pioneers of the 
automobile industry and one of the great corporations of the twentieth century. Its 
history is c10sely related and interwoven with the history of Germany, and in 
particular, with the history of the South West German province ofSwabia. During the 
over 100 years of its existence, the German company underwent many shifts and 
changes, from a small and humble car manufacturer at the end of the nineteenth 
century operating in barns and sheds, to a globally working multi-technological group 
at the end of the 1980s. 
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5.1.1 The early beginnings in Swabia 
The story of the company started at the end of the nineteenth century, when 
Karl Benz and Gottlieb Daimler combined "solidity, persistence verging on 
stubbornness, and a tendency to missionary zeal" (Lehbrink/Schlegelmilch, 1997: 7) 
in order to develop the first car27 . 
Karl Benz, a graduate of Karlsruhe's Polytechnic College, founded the "Benz 
& Co. Rheinische Gasmotoren-Fabrik, Mannheim" together with the businessman 
Max Kaspar Rose and the commercial agent Friedrich Wilhelm Esslinger in the legal 
form of an "offene Handelsgesellschaft (oHG)", or general partnership, on 1 January 
1883. In the year 1899, Benz & Co. changed the company structure from a general 
partnership (oHG) to a stock corporation, "Aktiengesellschaft" (AG) and, by the year 
1910, Daimler shares commenced trading on the Stuttgart stock exchange. At that 
time, Benz was the world's largest automobile manufacturer with sales of 603 
automobiles per year. The average income was around 1,800 Deutschmark (DM), and 
the social welfare provisions for the workers, like a benefit fund, a salaried-staff relief 
fund, and a foundation, which enabled employees in need of convalescence to be sent 
away on holiday, were unparalleled in the world. 
In 1890, Daimler, a gunsmith, who studied later at the Stuttgart Polytechnic, 
founded the "Daimler-Motoren-Gesellschaft" (DMG) together with Max Duttenhofer 
and Wilhelm Lorenz. Beforehand, Daimler had worked for several years together 
with his friend and partner Wilhelm Maybach, a very gifted automobile designer, on 
the "Stahlradwagen", a vehicle with a tubular steel frame and wire wheels, which was 
exhibited at the World Exhibition in Paris, in 1889. 
27 Although Karl Benz was granted on January 29, 1886 his German Imperial Patent no. 37435 by the 
relevant authority in Berlin for his fust car and Gottlieb Daimler ran his fust four-wheeled 
"Reitwagen" ("Riding Carriage") with a "Gas or Petroleum Engine" as patent DRP No. 36423, neither 
was actually the fust to create gasoline-powered vehicles. They were, however, the first to persist long 
enough to make them viable as transportation. 
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At first there was competition between Benz & Co. and DMG, as they 
engineered and styled the earliest motorwagens and began to develop markets for 
their products. These early efforts led to the establishment of an entire industry by the 
start of World War 1. But the war and its aftermath devastated the two companies, as 
it destroyed the German economy overall. Both companies continued to manufacture 
their separate automobile and combustion engine brands. 
By the early 1920s it became apparent that the only way to survive was a 
merger, and thus, on June 28, 1926, the stockholders of both companies gave 
approval to the new company, Daimler-Benz, which led directly to the birth of one of 
the world's best-known brands: Mercedes-Benz. The head office of the company was 
created in Berlin but, however, the organization of the central administration is 
located in Untertürkheim in Stuttgart. The inclusion of the name, Mercedes28, as the 
new brand name for the automobiles from all Daimler-Benz factories, honoured the 
most important model series of DMG automobiles, the Mercedes series, which were 
designed and built by Wilhelm Maybach. 
5.1.2 The years ofdepression 
In the depression years of 1931 and 1932, motoring had become an expensive 
luxury and the German purchasing power was extreme1y low due to unemployment 
and excessive taxation on vehicles, benzene, fuel, and luxury goods. Furthermore, the 
German state issued emergency decrees and intervened in a partisan way in the 
competition between road and rail traffic in favour of the railway, the German 
Reichsbahn. In 1929 the American car giant General Motors had taken over the 
German company Opel. Other German car manufacturers seek shelter under the 
protective umbrella of the Auto Union. At the end of 1932, Daimler-Benz noted 
28 The name of the Mercedes series derived from a 1900 engine named after the daughter of Emil 
Jellinek. Jellinek became one of DMG's directors in 1900, ordered a small number ofrace cars built to 
his specifications by Maybach, stipulated that the engine must be named Daimler-Mercedes, and made 
the new automobile fa mous through motor sports. 
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record losses of 13.4 million DM, around a third of the stock capital. But every cloud 
has a silver lining. Proximity and increasing familiarity had a therapeutic effect on the 
image neuroses and separatist leanings of the Daimler and the Benz camps, producing 
a new "We" feeling. 
5.1.3 The company during the Third Reich 
The seizure of power by Hitler, a car enthusiast, on 30 January 1933 heralded 
a boom in car sales, which was fanned by tax breaks, sports promotion, and the 
prospect of a major road-building program. In 1934, Sindelfingen was working at full 
capacity on the production of mass-produced bodies for Wanderer and for 
"Bayerische Motoren Werke" (BMW), which did not operate as independent car 
factory until 1935. 
For the first time since the merger of Daimler and Benz dividends were paid, 
five per cent on the ordinary shares and four per cent on the preference shares. "lt is 
thanks to the persona! initiative of our Führer and Reichskanzler that this business 
sector ... has become a defining factor in our overall economy," rejoiced the annual 
report at the end of the year 1934 (Lehbrink/Schlegelmilch, 1997: 27). 
The treaty of VersaiIle had long bound and gagged the German aircraft 
industry. During the regime of the Third Reich, however, the new pre-war period 
marked the beginning of a new German aircraft industry. Daimler-Benz was part of it. 
Moreover, with the beginning of the Second World War on September 1, 1939, petrol 
was only available on coupons, cars were called up for military service, and private 
sales were banned from 3 September onwards. Therefore, it was not surprising that, 
in the course of the events, Daimler-Benz finally had to stop its car production, in 
1944, and specialized entirely on the production of aircraft, tanks, and submarine 
engmes. 
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5.1.4 Rack to thefuture 
After World War II, Germany was destroyed and poor as never before. A 
bombing in July 1944 had destroyed about 80 per cent of the buildings and more than 
50 per cent of the machinery and equipment at the Sindelfingen Mercedes-Benz plant. 
AIl in aH, about 20,000 explosive and incendiary bombs hit the factory. On 20 May 
1945, the Untertürkheim Mercedes-Benz plant was provisionally reopened and 1,240 
employees began rebuilding it. The first chairman of the board of directors after the 
war, in 1948, was Wilhelm Haspel, who had served already as chairman of the board 
of directors during the last years of war from 1942 to 1945. 
A gentle flow of exports and the popularity of new Daimler-Benz post-war 
vehicle models, such as the multifunctional Unimog, as wel1 as a bridging loan of ten 
million DM from Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank matched by 
finance from the insurance industry, provided a strong basis for the revival of the 
company. The economic miracle in the 1950s, during which the gross national 
product doubled and unemployment turned into over-full employment, accelerated 
the growth and the wealth of the company Daimler-Benz. As early as 28 September 
1956, Daimler-Benz inaugurated the Brazilian Daimler-Benz plant at Sao Bernardo 
do Campo. And by the year 1965, the company was the biggest automobile 
manufacturer in the European community. 
Those who bought Daimler-Benz shares in this decade saw a reliable increase 
in their wealth. Shares with a nominal value of 100 DM in 1953 had risen to 250 DM 
in 1954, 940 DM in 1958, and 2,650 DM in 1959. This development was also 
affected by powerful men such as the industrialists Friedrich Flick and Herbert 
Quandt, carefully watched by Fritz Konecke and Hermann 1. Abs who succeeded 
Hans Rummel as chairman of the supervisory board between 1955 and 1970. The 
two major shareholders Flick and Quandt claimed their place on the supervisory 
board. The Daimler-Benz AG's Annual Shareholder Meeting in 1956 met their 
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demands, granting Flick three seats and the position of the first deputy, and the 
Quandt brothers two seats and the post of second deputy. Fritz Konecke became 
chairman of the board of the Daimler-Benz AG in 1953. He requested voluntarily to 
be relieved of his duties in 1960. His successor, the Austrian honorary planning and 
construction official and head of the steel group Vereinigte Osterreichische Eisen­
und Stahlwerke (VOEST), Walter Hitzinger had an "unfortunate touch in many 
respects" (LehbrinklSchlegelmilch, 1997: 341) and loyalty soon crumbled towards 
him. 
In November 1965, Joachim Zahn, a doctor of law and financial expert, who 
had been a member of the management board since 1958, became chief executive and 
chairman of the board of management between 1971 and 1979. He found himself 
faced by the contemporary equivalent of the eternal double-headed challenge: to 
rationalize and expand capacity. 
5.1.5 Striving for worldwide omnipresence 
At the beginnings of the seventies, Daimler-Benz had a full range of 
commercial vehicles from vans to heavy goods vehicles, making it the unchallenged 
world market leader, plus buses of every size. When Krupp in 1967, and a few years 
later Rheinstahl AG, decided to sell their commercial vehicles section because of 
immense losses, Daimler-Benz stepped forward to incorporate the truck factories. 
Meanwhile, Daimler-Benz became more and more international. During the times of 
the coId war Daimler-Benz even attained to exhibit their products at a trade affair in 
Moscow from February to March 1973, the shining status symbols of the class enemy 
met an enormous response and the PR worldwide was tremendous. The company, 
which had begun from very humble origins in Swabia, was now on its way to 
becoming a worldwide commercial empire. In the annual report of 1983 the company 
states its intention: "to be represented not just in major markets but in every country" 
(LehbrinklSchlegelmilch, 1997: 346). Two years later Daimler-Benz was represented 
75 
Chapter V/The DaimlerChrysler corporation 
in 200 countries, 123 general agents were working on the company's behalf, there 
were 21 wholly-owned sales companies in the market with a high Mercedes density, 
companies assembling components in 24 countries, mainly in the Third World, and 
25 factories manufacturing independently. 
However, the increasing complexity of the group demanded a high degree of 
diplomatic skilis and tactics and imposed many new challenges to the management in 
Stuttgart. In dealings with the sales and service organizations in Europe, which 
Mercedes liked to see under its own direction, the way in which Mercedes-Benz of 
North America (MBNA) was set up in 1965 served as a mode!. The German parent 
company adopted a very cautious approach in converting the branches in France, the 
UK, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria into Daimler subsidiaries. 
By 1973 for the first time foreign sales outstripped those on the domestic 
market and the Daimler-Benz AG started issuing shares to employees. The tremors 
following the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 did not touch Untertürkheim and its 
satellites in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, the USA, or South Africa. On the contrary, in 
1973, the group produced 331,682 cars and 215,935 commercial vehicles, and sales 
totalled 13,799 billion DM (::::; 7,040 billion Euro). The figures for 1974 were 
comparable: 340,006 cars and 205,344 commercial vehic1es, and sales of 15,283 
billion DM (::::; 7,797 Euro). The dividend in this year reached 15 per cent and the 
capital stock increased from 951,3 million (::::; 485 million Euro) to 1189,1 million DM 
(::::; 606 million Euro). The shareholder reactions at the annual meeting ranged from 
praise to astonishment. 
There were many reasons for the fact that the company stayed unaffected by 
the pressure waves of the two c1everly planned oil shocks. One of these was the oft­
cited creed that the company's growth was only moderate but constant and that it was 
not prey of short-term highs and lows of the economy. Besides, long delivery times 
in the seventies were not only accepted by the customers, they tumed into a virtue as 
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anticipation often increases the appetite and makes the final enjoyment ail the more 
intense. Moreover, the desire for Mercedes was fanned by innovations such as the 
elegant S-c\ass sedan from September 1972. The launch of the 240 D, in August 
1973, was tailor-made for the miserable period: there were no restrictions at ail on the 
availability of diesel oil and it was cheap. The production of the 240 D augmented 
within one year from 116,000 to 147,000. 
Besides, at the time the demand from the oil exporting countries for Daimler­
Benz noble products experienced exponential growth. Between 1974 and 1977, sales 
in Iraq and Saudi Arabia were eleven times higher than in 1973. The diesel plant in 
Tabriz, manufacturing engines under license since 1970 in Iran, proved to be the ideal 
gateway to the new markets in the Far East. Even after the end of the Shah's reign 
and Ayatollah Khomeini's seizure of power the business relations between Stuttgart 
and Teheran maintained prosperous. Otherwise, bad news came from Düsseldorf and 
Bremen, where short-time work was introduced in the sensitive field of van 
production and the bus market stagnated because of fierce competition. However, 
these negative aspects could be balanced out by the lively demand from the Middle 
East. 
In its dealings with the staff Daimler-Benz used the family principles even in 
difficult times, no fewer than 149,742 employees eamed their living "at Daimler", "at 
Benz" or at one of its suppliers near or far. The bible of modem man management 
was the brochure "Principles of Management and Cooperation" from 1979, which 
subscribes to the principle of vertical cooperation. Dismissals are unusual at the time, 
moreover, a certain willingness to be mobile within the corporation was expected of 
the members of the extended "Mercedes family", for example from a site with over­
full employment to an area where there was an urgent need for staff. So even 50 years 
after the death of the founding father Karl Benz, it was still a privilege for the 
employees to work "at Benz". 
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However, earthquakes can also emerge from the inside of the Daimler-Benz 
microcosm. On 28 November 1974, the Quandt Group decided to sell its 14 per cent 
holding in the company, nominally 166,5 million DM (~85 million Euro) of the 
firm 's 1189,1 million DM (~ 607 million Euro) of capital, for around a billion DM (~ 
half a billion Euro) to a foreign investor. A week later, the identity of the investor, 
who asserted to daim his rights through the Dresdner Bank, was revealed: the 
Emirate of Kuwait. The situation calmed, when the Emirate of Kuwait declared that it 
had no intention to influence the company's policy or to daim a seat on the 
supervisory board. Shortly after this spectacular episode, Friedrich Karl Flic~9, a 
German-Austrian industrialist and billionaire, was proposing to sell 39 per cent of his 
holding to the Shah of Iran. But Franz Heinrich Ulrich, who was both chairman of the 
board of management at Deutsche Bank and Hermann J. Abs' s successor as 
chairman of the supervisory board at Daimler-Benz since 1970, intervened in this 
affair. He persuaded Flick to retain ten per cent and to transfer the balance 
temporarily for two billion DM to Deutsche Bank. Then the bank set immediately 
about selling Flick's shares, using the water can principle30 in order to prevent a 
future concentration of shares, and thus, the chances of extemal influence being 
exerted or even of absolute majorities. 
29 Friedrich Karl Flick (1927-2006) was the youngest son of Friedrich Flick and Marie Schuss. After 
his studies, he worked in his father's company. In 1972, he inherited the family business, which had 
made massive use of concentration camp laborers. The Flick family has a Nazi legacy and has always 
refused to pay compensation to wartime victims. As the sole owner of the Friedrich Flick Industial 
Holding, Flick had interests in major companies including Daimler-Benz, WR Grace, Gerling 
Insurance, Buderus, Dynamit Nobel, Feldmühle and others. In 1975 he sold his part of Daimler-Benz 
to the Deutsche Bank for more than $ 1 billion. Major tax Iiabilities were avoided through "cultivation 
of the political landscape", - a process that turned into the Flick Affair in 1983 as about $25 million 
had been paid to German political parties in return for tax cuts and favourable rulings. Although 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl benefited from the dealings, he claimed he had "no recollections", while 
others resigned from their posts. In 1985 Flick sold off the remainder of his companies. When 
Deutsche Bank announced that it had bought his holdings for about $3 billion German marks, Flick 
retired in Austria, where he became a naturalised citizen. At the time of his death, he was the 
wealthiest person living in Austria. 
30 The "water can principle" in this sense means that the shares were sold to a great number of 
disperse shareholders and not to one or two shareholders, which would have meant the creation of new 
some new major shareholders who could influence the strategie orientation of the company. 
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After the intervention of the Deutsche Bank, Daimler-Benz capital was for the 
time being well spread: Deutsche Bank 28 per cent, Mercedes Automobil-Holding 
AG (MAH) 26 per cent, Kuwait 14 per cent, Flick 10 per cent (which he sold to 
Deutsche Bank in 1985), Bosch and Siemens owned two per cent each. Subsequently, 
the influence of the Quandt family and Flick as major shareholders of the company 
ended and the two disappeared from the supervisory board. 
Germany's new codetermination law of May 1976 was already making the 
news and in an advance show of obedience the number of shareholders' 
representatives was cut from twelve to ten. Ten workers' representatives, making in 
total the number of supervisory board members twenty as plalU1ed for large 
companies by the German government, balanced the ten remaining shareholders' 
representatives out. 
In the light of increased production figures and multiplying range of vehicle 
types, the questions of space remained a permanent issue for the board of 
management and the supervisory board. Finally, in 1977 the supervisory board 
decided to acquire the former Borgward manufacturing plant in Bremen. The 
question if the air of rugged solidarity, which was basically included in the purchase 
priee for the Swabian products from Stuttgart, could simply be transferred 
northwards, remained. The acquisition of the Bremen production site announced also 
a fundamental organizational restructuring: cars were to be built in Sindelfingen and 
Bremen, trucks in Worth and Düsseldorf, buses in Mannheim, and the Unimog and its 
agricultural derivative, the Mereedes-Benz-tractor, in Gaggenau. 
5.1.6 New models and markets 
By the end of the seventies the increase of oil price brought along the 
introduction of smaller, less polluting, and economical cars, such as the W 201 
compact class. In 1979, Werner Breitschwerdt, who had replaced Hans Scherenberg 
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as R&D boss, sanctioned the compact design by presenting a model of the Baby Benz 
(the wide ranging 190 fleet from the 190 Diesel to the 190 E 2.3 - 16), thus appealing 
to new market segments but maintaining the old charisma. By 1988, over a million 
(1,125,928) W 201 models had already been sold, even to people who had never 
owned a Mercedes before, and around a third ofthem (413,905) were diesel powered. 
In January 1984 journalists from a1I over the worId voted the 190 E WorId Car of the 
Year, and at the annual shareholder meeting in July the same year, Werner 
Breitschwerdt, chairman of the board of management since December 1983, 
expressed his satisfaction for the fact that Daimler-Benz was now able to offer a 
product in the new compact c1ass, too. 
Breitschwerdt's predecessor Gerhard Prinz, who had been active between 
January 1980 and October 1983 (when he died because ofa heart failure), earned the 
credit for the new Mercedes market strength, now being represented within the trident 
of S-class, mid-range, and compact c1ass. Prinz was responsible for two further 
important projects: the modification of the Bremen site for car production and the 
advancement of powerful outposts in the North American truck market. After several 
more or less successful attempts to enter the North American truck market, Prinz 
knew that he had to reach at the heart of this different worId, where truckers had a 
romantic notion about their intimidating sized vehicles. Therefore, the Daimler-Benz 
AG decided to acquire two native manufacturers in the USA: the Euclid Inc. in 
Cleveland/Ohio in 1977, and the Freightliner Corporation four years later in 1981. 
On the one hand, the Euclid Inc. turned out to be loss-making and was sold 
again as soon as 1984. On the other hand, the Freightliner Corporation tumed out to 
be a success and Daimler-Benz could meet its target of access to the US market. The 
newly estab1ished Daimler-Benz of North America Holding Company Inc. formed 
the umbrella for the two subsidiaries Freightliner and Mercedes-Benz Truck Co. Inc., 
which covered jointly the trucks business, and for Mercedes-Benz of North-America, 
which handled the car side. 
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5.1.7 Diversification: Reuter's attempt to build an integrated technology company 
In the mid-eighties, after reconstruction and takeovers and expansion of 
Mercedes provinces throughout the world, big was best, in line with the watchword 
of German classicism that isolation is reprehensible. The new acquisitions should 
form a colourful patchwork in their totality, be lucrative individually, and promise a 
generous living for the future. 
Between February and April 1985, Daimler-Benz bought the Motoren- und 
Turbinen-Union (MTU), building aeroengines and large engines, the holding of 
(MAN) as weil as the majority of the stock of Domier-Werke, weil known for 
aeronautical engineering, space technology, and medical technology. By February 
1986, Daimler-Benz had also accumulated 56 per cent of the capital of the electrical 
giant at a cost of 1,6 billion DM. The expansion of the once purebred carmaker into 
an integrated technology company with a new organizational structure, which had 
been forcefully promoted in particular by Edzard Reuter, Breitschwerdt's successor 
since September 1987, was crystallized by 1989. 
In May 1989, Deutsche Aerospace AG (DASA) was established by the merger 
of Domier GmbH with Motoren- und Turbinen-Union (MTU) and two sectors of 
AEG AG, as a 100 per cent subsidiary of the Daimler-Benz Group. The chairman of 
the board of management was Jürgen E. Schrempp. In a corporate restructuring of the 
Daimler-Benz AG in June 1989, the Mercedes-Benz AG was established with Prof. 
Werner Niefer becoming chairman of the board of management. Mercedes-Benz AG, 
AEG AG and Deutsche Aerospace AG now operated as independent enterprises 
under the roof of the Daimler-Benz AG, the managing and holding company. In the 
same year in November, a shareholder meeting and the supervisory board of 
Messerschmitt-Bôlkow-Blohm AG (MBB) voted in favour of majority ownership by 
Daimler-Benz, making MBB a subsidiary of "Deutsche Aerospace AG." By 
December 8, the Deutsche Airbus GmbH was established. It encompassed the former 
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MBB group enterprise Transport- und Verkehrsflugzeuge (cargo and passenger 
aircraft) and the former "Deutsche Airbus GmbH" (Munich). 
At the end of the intensive period ofrestructuring, in 1989, the Daimler-Benz 
AG, which formed the umbrella and executive holding company in which the 
management functions and R&D were centralized, rested on three columns - of 
extremely different solidity, as it later turned out, the columns were namely: DASA, 
AEG, and the Mercedes-Benz AG. 
5.2 Corporate shifts and changes during the 1990s 
The research period of this study focuses on the years between 1990 and 2005, 
a period of major shifts and changes in the organization of the Daimler-Benz AG, 
which became later, from 1998 onwards, the Hybrid German-American 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation. 1 have chosen to split the research period into three 
distinct sub periods in order to examine certain important events, changes, and 
tendencies in detai!. The three sub-periods range: from 1990 to 1995, from 1995 to 
1998, and from 1998 to 2005. 
5.2.1 The period between 1990 and 1995 
5.2.1.1 debis: Reuter's (ourth column 
The beginning of the 1990s was stil1 part of Reuter' sera of corporate strategie 
expansion in multiple technology sectors, which had begun already at the end of the 
1980s. In 1989, the Daimler-Benz AG, including AEG, employed 368,200 employees 
and reached an arumal turnover of 76,392 million DM (::::: 38,977 million Euro). In 
1990, the annual turnover increased to 85,500 million DM (::::: 43,622 mil1ion Euro). 
In July 1990, the same month the new Daimler-Benz corporate head office in 
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M6hringen, Stuttgart, was inaugurated, Edzard Reuter founded the company's fourth 
corporate column: The "Daimler-Benz Inter Services" (debis). The fourth corporate 
unit of the Daimler-Benz AG comprised the business units IT-Services, Financial 
Services, Insurance Brokerage, Trade and Marketing Services. In September the same 
year, Daimler-Benz shares were issued on the Tokyo and London stock exchanges. 
Figure 5.1 The organizational structure of the Daimler-Benz AG in 1990 
Mercedes-Benz DASA AEG debis
 
AG AG AG AG
 
Passenger cars Commercial Railway systems, Financial
 
and commercial Aircraft, Military microelectronics, services,
 
vehicles Aircraft, Space diesel engines, Insurance
 
systems automation Brokerage, Trade 
Infrastructure, technology, and Marketing 
Satellites, energy services, debis 
Defense and Civil technology property 
Systems, management, 
Aeroengines Mobile Phone 
services 
Source: Daimler-Benz (1992: 2). 
The Daimler-Benz's strategy to grow and expand continued in 1992, when 
DASA CEü Jürgen E. Schrempp and his right-hand, the former economics professor 
Manfred Bischoff. initiated the acquisition of the legendary Dutch aircraft company 
Fokker3'. DASA, which was already Germany's biggest aerospace and defence 
manufacturer, grew in size. 
However, at the end of 1992, crisis heralded with the changing of the 
economic climate especially due to changes linked to the German reunification. The 
31 Fokker was a Dutch airplane company with a long tradition. It was the maker of the fearsome 
German "Red Baron" in World War 1 and the plane in which Amelia Earhart soloed the Atlantic 
Ocean. 
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cost of reunification had exceeded expectations, taxes had risen accordingly, and 
unemployment was high. Germany had become one of the most expensive industrial 
locations in the world and there was a serious fall-off demand. 
5.2.1.2 Problems in Stuttgart 
In 1993, almost 40 per cent of Daimler-Benz's revenues derived from: DASA 
(aircraft, space, and defence), Daimler-Benz's transportation unit (e.g. rail systems), 
AEG (technical equipment, engines, turbines, rail systems, cables, microelectronics), 
and debis (IT-services, financial services, insurance brokerage, trade and marketing 
services). 
Nevertheless, the Mercedes-Benz AG, producing passenger cars and 
commercial vehicles, continued to provide the bulk of the group's revenues and was 
the primary source of the company's fame. Mercedes-Benz had become one of the 
best-known brand names in the world, and the company's products had a long­
standing and well-earned reputation for quality engineering, reliability, refinement, 
and luxury. 
The heir to the throne of the Mercedes-Benz AG, which was considered as the 
icing on the cake of the other activities of the diversified Daimler-Benz Group, was 
Helmut Werner, hitherto Werner Niefer's deputy chairrnan. Helmut Werner, "a lively 
and highly qualified manager" (Lehbrink/Schlegelmilch, 1997: 355), came from the 
outside. He had been chairrnan of the board at the Hanover-based tire manufacturer 
Continental when he came to the attention of the ten heads of the Daimler-Benz 
supervisory board and chairrnan Alfred Herrhausen (Deutsche Bank) who persuaded 
him to move to Stuttgart in 1987. 
But in contrast with its remarkable history, by late 1993 Daimler-Benz faced 
significant challenges and an economic crisis. While its automobile products 
continued to live up to their vaunted reputation, a variety of economic and political 
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changes threatened the company's viability as an independent car manufacturer. 
Recent diversification moves from the era Reuter had tumed sour. Daimler-Benz 
management was trying to address these problems, but was struggled by a system of 
corporate govemance that was better suited for steering corporate growth and for 
dividing its spoils among stakeholders, than for confronting strategic decisions with 
painful consequences for sorne stakeholders. 
The serious chal1enges that revealed themselves during the year 1993 for the 
Daimler-Benz AG were unprecedented, even in consideration of the company's rather 
long and dynamic history. 
5.2.1.3 The first listing in New York 
On October 5, 1993, Daimler-Benz stock commenced trading on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). It was designed to be an American Depositary 
Receipt (ADR), which is the most popular cross-border share-trading facility used by 
non-US companies. The ADR itself is a separate certificate issued by US depositary 
banks as a daim against home-market shares deposited with a local custodial bank. 
In fact, no Gennan company had previously been listed on a US national 
exchange, in large part due to the various costs and consequences of meeting the US 
Securities Exchange Commission's (SEC) financial reporting and disclosure 
requirements. Daimler-Benz became the first Gennan company to gain a full listing 
on the NYSE. The full listing allows the stock to be purchased by institutional 
investors, insurance companies, and pension funds as weil as by individual investors. 
The price Daimler-Benz paid for the full listing, however, was to produce two 
sets of accounts, one Gennan and one American. For 1993 this produced a 
discrepancy of 2.5 billion DM (1.28 bil1ion Euro) between net profit US-style and 
net-profit Gennan style, which created concern among shareholders (Covill, 1995: 
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43). Besides, subsequent events at Daimler revealed how substantial the 
consequences were of the US listing. 
5.2.1.4 Changes in financial reporting 
On September 17, 1993, in preparation for the coming NYSE listing, the 
Daimler-Benz AG publicly announced half-yearly earnings that had been calculated 
under the United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP). The 
US GAAP is a widely accepted set of mies, conventions, standards, and procedures 
for reporting financial information as established by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, an independent financial agency in the USA. 
When Daimler-Benz listed their American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) in 
New York, it was the first time that any German public company had done so. The 
disclosure had widespread and long-lasting effects on Daimler-Benz and other 
German public companies (Bail, 2004; Foudy Jr., 2001). The company's release of 
earnings calculated under US GAAP was required under Rule 20-F of the Securities 
Exchange Commission Act of 1934, which regulates US securities markets. 
Rule 20-F reporting requirements apply to ail firms issuing or listing securities 
on national markets in the United States. The mie requires a reconciliation of the 
company's home-country financials to those that would be reported under US GAAP. 
Daimler reported the major effects of differences between US and German 
accounting mies on Consolidated Net Incarne and Stockholders' Equity, for the first 
time in 1993. 
Further implementations of the US GAAP financial reporting and the listing 
on the NYSE for German corporations and the German financial system in general, 
will be discussed in the analysis of the three markets in the next chapter. It is 
important already to note at this point that the discrepancy between the German 
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accounting system based on the "Handelsgesetzbuch" (HGB) (= Gennan Commercial 
Code) and the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles is an indicator for the 
two distinct corporate governance systems prevailing in the US and Gennan 
economy. 
5.2.1.5 The first loss announcement 
The year 1993 was not only the year of major changes for Daimler-Benz in 
the corporate financial reporting, but also the year of the company's first ever­
reported loss. When calculated according to US GAAP, the loss for the first half, 
which ended June 30, 1993, was 949 million DM (~ 484 million Euro). This 
surprising outcome was due largely to a 16 per cent fall in sales relative to the 
comparable period in the previous year, an unusual fall for such a stable automobile 
manufacturing company (Daimler-Benz, 1994). 
The reported loss was all the more surprising because the company previously 
had reported a profit, 168 million DM (~ 86 million Euro), for precise1y the same 
half-year period. This earlier profit figure had been computed under Gennan 
accounting standards, the "Handelgesetzbuch" (HGB), and had been reviewed and 
certified by the company's auditors (Bali, 2004). 
At the time, many international observers were left shaking their heads about 
how the announced profit of a major international corporation could, when merely 
recalculated under US GAAP, tum into such a substantialloss. 
Daimler-Benz later announced a US GAAP loss of 1839 million DM (~ 938 
million Euro) for the full year 1993, compared with a Gennan-standard profit of 615 
million DM (~ 314 million Euro). The enormous difference between the numbers, 
approximately 2.5 billion DM (~ 1.26 billion Euro), quickly attracted the attention of 
analysts, regulators, and accounting standard-setters worldwide. It drew considerable 
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attention to the radically different German and US models of financial reporting, 
disclosure, and corporate governance generally (Daimler Benz, 1994; 1995). 
5.2.1.6 Plant closings. payro/l reductions and business divestitures 
On September 17, 1993, the very day that Daimler-Benz released the US 
GAAP reports, the company announced it would abandon investments that were not 
central to its core competence, focus its product 1ine, close factories in Germany, and 
slash its payro1!. The immediate1y announced payroll cuts were: 35,000 jobs in 
Germany by the end of 1994, plus another 8000 jobs in other countries, and included 
sorne invo1untary terminations (Daimler-Benz, 1994; 1995). 
The company thereby revoked fifty years of post-war labour practices. 
Between the beginning of 1993 and the end of 1996, the number of Daimler-Benz 
emp10yees in Germany was reduced from 302,464 to 222,821, during which time the 
total assets of the group increased by over 30 per cent (Daim1er-Benz, 1998: 88). 
9000 jobs were cut at DASA and three major defence plants were closed in 
Germany. AEG, whose name was synonymous with Germany's industrial rise in the 
late nineteenth century, was dismantled in the same year. In fact, managers were not 
spared: 50 per cent of the jobs at the company's headquarters in Stuttgart-Môhringen, 
which the new CEO Jürgen E. Schrempp used to cali the "bullshit castle", were 
eliminated by the year 1996 (Vlasic/Stertz, 2001: 129). 
The following figure 5.2 illustrates the development of employment at 
Daimler-Benz, later DaimlerChrysler, in the period of 1990 and 2005. Ail in ail, the 
number of employees remained almost the same before and after the merger of 
DaimlerChrysler, which is the result from serious employee reductions at Chrysler 
and later in 2005 also partially at Daimler. 
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Figure 5.2 DaimlerChrysler: Number of employees, 1990-2005 
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5.2.2 The period between 1995 and 1998 
5.2.2.2 Schrempp' s "Unternehmenskonzept" 
At the latest after the record losses of 5.7 billion DM (;::;; 2.91 billion Euro) in 
1995, it was clear that an integrated system à la Edzard Reuter was no longer 
appropriate. His successor Jürgen E. Schrempp, who came in office in May 1995, 
prescribed a drastic slimming course for the Daimler-Benz AG. In three years of 
"Untemehmenskonzept" (enterprise concept), Daimler streamlined its operations, 
reinvigorated its product line, and disengaged from businesses that were taxing its 
core businesses by losing money and distracting management. It dismantled AEG, its 
century-old and much revered electronics business. It spun off its Energy Systems 
Division and Automation Division, requiring a 1600 million DM (;::;; 816.33 million 
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Euro) charge against 1995 eamings, with an additional 300 million DM (~ 153.06 
million Euro) in 1996. It discontinued financial support for Fokker, which then filed 
for bankruptcy under Netherlands law, causing a 2158 million DM (~ 1101.02 
million Euro) loss to be recorded against Daimler's 1996 eamings. Between 2001 and 
2002, it sold its stake in the debis Systemhaus information-technology joint venture 
to Deutsche Telekom, and part of its US commercial-financing portfolio to GE 
Capital. In total, eleven of the company's thirty-five businesses were eliminated 
(Vlasic/Stertz, 2001: 129). 
Figure 5.3 Daimler-Benz share performance between 1988 and 1997 
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Figure 5.4 showing the share performance of Daimler-Benz between 1988 and 
1997 reflects Daimler's economic problems at the beginning of the 1990s, with a 
serious crisis in 1993, and the implementation of Schrempp's successful restructuring 
strategy with a focus on the core automobile business between 1995 and 1997. 
The initial reaction of the German public in regard to Schrempp's radical 
restructuring strategy was swift and furious. Protesters carried black coffins in the 
streets of Frankfurt, and the tabloids referred to management board chairman 
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Schrempp as "Neutron Jürgen," a reference to General Electric's ruthless CEO 
"Neutron Jack" Welch (Vlasic/Stertz, 2001: 129). Among the company's most savage 
initial critics were managers at other large German industrial companies, including 
Bayer AG and Siemens AG. German accounting is an integral part of the stakeholder 
system of corporate govemance. 
For decades the reported eammgs of German corporations had directly 
determined a smoothly rising stream of employee and manager bonuses, dividends, 
and taxes, like a steadily growing pie in which ail parties shared. In many ways, the 
eamings of a company like Daimler-Benz were a microcosm of the post-war German 
economy, which had experienced steadily growing wealth that was distributed among 
political stakeholders under a pervasive social contract. 
Daimler's abrupt departure from traditional German accounting practices 
therefore challenged a corporate and social govemance system that seemingly had 
served ail parties weil, and of which Germans were understandably proud of. This 
pride manifested itself in a type of competitiveness with (and suspicion of) the US 
system, and Daimler management was seen as breaking ranks in that competition. 
A related complaint was that, in agreeing to comply with the Security Exchange 
Commission's (SEC) insistence on US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) information, Daimler-Benz had undermined Germany's prospects for 
negotiating mutual recognition of accounting standards with US authorities. Mutual 
recognition was strongly advocated by the German authorities, for example Biener 
(1994). The concem was valid: Germany subsequently legislated to allow 
consolidated financial reporting under US GAAP, but the United States has never 
recognized HGB rules. 
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5.2.2.2 The merger between Mercedes-Benz and Daimler-Benz 
Schrempp's reaction towards the stonn of criticism that hit him in the Gennan 
public was for many people in Gennany rather surprising. He did not only cope with 
the critics, he absorbed them and continued his mission tightening costs, taking 
smarter decisions, and taking enlightened risks on a global scale. The Daimler-Benz 
leader envisioned himself as a leader of fundamental change in the Gennan industry, 
which was weakened by padded payrolls, inefficient production, and an overly 
developed sense of self-satisfaction. Daimler was to set a new tone for the German 
corporate agenda. "You cannot change the world," he would say, "if you cannot 
change the major issues at your front door.", or even more drastic, "Sometimes you 
have to walk over dead people" (the Gennan proverb "Über Leichen gehen") 
(Vlasic/Stertz, 2001: 130). Jürgen E. Schrempp, who was tall, stern-jawed, and who 
possessed a kind of magnetic presence and strong rhetoric skiIls, became one of the 
most recognized and despised businessman in Europe. To one of his closest aides he 
said: "1 am independent. If they cali me Rambo or whatever, it is not important to me. 
1 have one task. That is to solve this company, and bring this company in the peer 
group ofthe most profitable companies in our industries." (Vlasic/Stertz, 2001: 130). 
Schrempp's first radical changes in the company were the sale of loss making 
business units, he chopped off eleven of Daimler's thirty-five business units, and the 
setting of new profitability goals, he announced that every business unit achieving 
less than 12 per cent return of capital employed would be jettisoned. Subsequently, he 
reduced the number of managers and administrative staff at Daimler-Benz 
headquarters in M6hringen, which he had titled "bull shit castle". Schrempp's next 
aim was to concentrate his power in the company by merging the Mercedes-Benz AG 
with the holding company Daimler-Benz AG. From his office in the Daimler 
headquarters in M6hringen, he could see that the engine of growth, the heart of the 
company, was in the massive office and industriaJ complex across the Neckar River 
in Untertürckheim, the home of the Mercedes-Benz AG. 
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However, Mercedes was since the year 1992 in the hands of its CEO Helmut 
Werner. Schrempp chaired Daimler's board of management, a body whose members 
were the chief executives of the subsidiary businesses: Mercedes, DASA, AEG, and 
debis. Every strategic decision involving Mercedes went to the in-house management, 
chaired by Helmut Werner, first. Countless corporate functions were thus duplicated 
in Daimler and Mercedes. 
A conflict of power was on its way, when Schrempp announced "It doesn't 
make sense to have Mercedes, the subsidiary company, having seventy per cent of the 
revenue and almost one hundred per cent of the profits of the entire concern. On top 
of that, when Werner makes a decision with his board he has to come to my board 
and review the whole bloody story again with people who are not as qualified to 
judge the motor business as the Mercedes guys! It is crazy. This cannot work." 
(Vlasic/Stertz, 2001: 134). 
Both Schrempp and Werner had competed to become Daimler's CEO and 
when Schrempp won, Werner took over the Mercedes chair in Untertürckheim. 
Werner was not willing to hand Mercedes over to Schrempp, especially not after his 
own Mercedes revolution had started to bear fruits. In the first half of 1996, Mercedes 
sold 315,000 cars, a 7 per cent increase from the previous year. Revenue rose 12 per 
cent to 15 billion $US. Mercedes' newest cars, the jaunty SLK roadster, the bubble­
eyed E-class sedan, and the trendy C-class station wagon, were very successful both, 
in the eyes of consumers and the automotive media. Although Werner was against a 
mega merger with the American automobile manufacturer Chrysler, he pushed the 
company into China and the Brazilian market. 
While Schrempp prepared the merger of Daimler and Mercedes with his 
"kitchen cabinet,,32, Helmut Werner pumped up his people at Mercedes as the true 
32 Schrempp's closet circle of advisors was calied internally at Daimler-Benz the "kitchen cabinet". It 
consisted of: Eckard Cordes, a mergers and acquisition expert who worked at AEG before moving to 
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inheritors of the legacy of Gottlieb Daimler and Karl Benz: "We are an automobile 
company. [ ... ] That is our future." (Vlasic/Stertz, 2001: 137). 
In the spring of 1996 Schrempp started a series of off-site meetings that 
moved from Brussels to Paris to Munich to New York. On these occasions Schrempp 
tried to find an answer to the question how the company should be restructured and 
consolidated by discussing the present situation and future outlook of Daimler-Benz 
with investment bankers, business professors, and corporate leaders such as Jack 
Welch and Lawrence Bossidy of AlliedSigna!. The outcome from these meetings was 
a set of eight alternatives for the corporate reorganization of the Daimler-Benz AG. 
As a matter offact, Schrempp' s favourite alternative merged Mercedes into Daimler. 
However, Schrempp's power over his board of management was not like the 
authority held by an American CEO over his corporation. Moreover, Schrempp could 
be voted down in the eight-member management board, where he would oppose 
Helmut Werner. On August 31, 1996, at a special strategie two-day meeting 
Schrempp presented his eight concepts to the board of management. The group ­
Schrempp, Werner, Bischoff, debis chairman Klaus Mangold, Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO) Manfred Gentz, and three others - debated the various options. Schrempp 
always came back to Model Number Six, which merged Mercedes into Daimler and 
abolished the position of the Mercedes CEO. "I1's like a dog," Schrempp said, 
"Daimler must be the dog, not the tai!. Mercedes must be the tai!." (Vlasic/Stertz, 
2001: 141). Even Werner could agree to this logic. Nevertheless, he fought back "1 
will fight to the last day for the integrity of Mercedes! [... ] l will make sure that this 
will not become a part of a conglomerate where we cannot make sure that the brand 
Mercedes will keep the great value it has!" (Vlasic/Stertz, 2001: 144). 
the headquarters as head of corporate development, Rüdiger Orobe, who caught Schrempp's eye when 
he plotted corporate strategy at DASA, and Claudia Deiniger, a former secretary at DASA who 
became his personal assistant. 
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The conflict prevailed between Schrempp and Werner. In order to decide the 
next meeting in his favour, Schrempp started lobbying Werner's three top deputies, 
car chief Jürgen Hubbert, sales chief Dieter Zetsche, and heavy truck head Kurt 
Lauck, promising them that under his reorganization the three deputies would aU be 
given raises and elevated posts on the Daimler management board. In the next 
meeting, seven board members voted in favour of merging Mercedes into Daimler, 
and one against. Werner was the only dissenting voice. 
On January 16, 1997, Werner, who had also been neglected by the Daimler 
supervisory board chairman Hilmar Kopper to serve as CFO of Daimler-Benz ­
Kopper wanted to keep Manfred Gentz - resigned as CEO of Mercedes. Six days later 
in a final meeting the supervisory board confirmed the decision of the board of 
management to merge Mercedes into Daimler with Jürgen E. Schrempp as CEO. 
5.2.3 The situation in 1998 and beyond 
5.2.3.1 The merger ofDaimler-Benz and Chrysler 
In 1997, Daimler-Benz net sales were over $68 billion (:::: 49.26 billion Euro) 
and its market capitalization was $36 billion (:::: 26.08 billion Euro) on December 31, 
1997. The company had over 550,000 shareholders with its shares distributed across 
14 stock exchanges around the world, including the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) as ADRs since 1993. In 1997, approximately 33 per cent of the Daimler­
Benz revenues derived from sales Germany, 25 per cent from sales in other member 
states of the European Union and 21 per cent from sales in the USA and Canada. The 
automotive segment contributed to approximately 71 per cent of the company's 
revenues in 1997 (Daimler-Benz, 1998). 
However, Schrempp knew that the company's future was not yet assured. 
Seven months after the board of management had decided to merge Mercedes into 
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Daimler, the board of management team met again to discuss the corporate strategy 
for the future ofthe company. Rüdiger Grube presented the facts: 
"In the past, Daimler-Benz has had a growth rate every year averaging seven per cent. If 
you grow seven per cent every year, you double your revenues in ten years. In 1976, 
Daimler-Benz revenue was 26 billion Deutsche Mark [:::: 13.27 billion Euro]. Ten years 
later, in 1985, it was 52 billion Deutsche Mark [:::: 26.53 billion Euro]. In 1995, it was 
one 125 billion Deutsche Mark [:::: 63.78 billion Euro]. We have to create a way that we 
can double our revenues in the next ten years from 125 billion to 250 billion [:::: 127.55 
billion Euro]." (Vlasic/Stertz, 2001: 171). 
It was obvious to the members of the board that neither the financial services 
unit debis, nor the aerospace division DASA could generate such growth. The motor 
of growth remained the automobile sector. However, Mercedes-Benz operated in the 
premium sector of the automobile market, which made up for only twelve per cent of 
the total market. 
Henceforth, it was obvious that the company could not double its revenues in 
ten years as a premium brand, only a significant expansion in the mass-market could. 
Besides, although Mercedes commenced to enter the market for small cars with the 
micro-compact car, Smart, since 1994 produced in Hambach (France), and the A­
class, Mercedes had no suitable car to enter the markets in emerging countries, such 
as China, India, or South America. The A-class, for example, was too expensive with 
too much high technology for the emerging markets. 
Schrempp told only a very small team of people whom he trusted to study 
mass-market manufacturers, e.g. Toyota, Honda, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, 
for a potential merger or partnership. Any potential partner had to provide not just 
growth, but profitable growth. The products and the geographical markets should not 
overlap with those of Mercedes-Benz. And under no circumstances would Daimler­
Benz accept to become the junior member of any partnership. 
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It soon became clear that a partnership with Ford and General Motors (GM) 
would be difficult in regard to their enormous size. Daimler-Benz was not willing to 
end up as a subsidiary of Ford, like Jaguar. Furthermore, with GM the state of the 
company did not seem to be very attractive and there were obvious overlaps between 
Mercedes and Opel. The research team and Schrempp agreed that the American 
automobile manufacturer Chrysler would be the best partner for their company. 
Chrysler and its subsidiaries were based in Auburn Hills, Michigan, and 
operated in two principal industry segments: automotive operations of cars, trucks 
and related parts, and financial services. Chrysler, which was the number three US 
automobile company, dated from Walter Chrysler' s first model in 1924. It had $61 
billion in net sales in 1997, and its market capitalization was $23 billion on December 
31,1997. 135,000 shareholders held the shares worldwide and its shares were traded 
worldwide, including Frankfurt, Berlin, and Munich in Germany (St. Jean, 2004; 
RadIer, 2003). 
In 1997, trucks including mInIVanS accounted for about 65 per cent of 
Chrysler's vehicle sales in the USA, while cars made up only 35 per cent. Chrysler's 
brands included Jeep, one of the best-known automobile brands in the world and 
others like Chrysler, Dodge, and Plymouth. Chrysler's larger cars, such as the Stratus, 
were priced similar to Mercedes-Benz's lower mid-size car, the so-called C-class. At 
the end of the range Chrysler offered the DodgelPlymouth Neon. Its car product line 
included mass-market cars such as the Neon to niche vehicles such as the Dodge 
Viper and the Plymouth Prowler. 
After several serious tumarounds, Chrysler achieved new strength, using a 
platform strategy and lean manufacturing saving costs and introducing a new rather 
spectacular design. However, Chrysler CEO Robert J. Eaton knew that Chrysler 
could not survive on its own. In order to be successful in the global automobile 
market, the American company needed to have a strong foot in the European market 
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and in the emerging markets in Asia and South America (Airey et al., 2003; Nolan, 
2003). 
On May 7, 1998, Daimler Benz and Chrysler announced their merger 
agreement, a share-for-share exchange realized with a new global registered share 
facility, which had a new name: DaimlerChrysler (DCX). Under the terms of the 
proposai, the exchange ratio was computed at 0.6325 new DCX shares per Chrysler 
share and even swap of DCX and Daimler Benz ordinary shares (or, 1.005 DCX per 
Daimler Benz share if over 90% were tendered). The transaction closed and the first 
really global share33 was launched on November 18, 1998. Daimler Benz and 
Chrysler management agreed to design and implement a global share as the only 
equity vehicle to be issued to aU DaimlerChrysler stockho1ders with their merger 
transaction (Karolyi, 2003). 
The fusion of Daimler and Chrysler led to the creation of a company with 
revenues of US$ 132 billion and approximately 440,000 employees. DaimlerChrysler 
became the fifth largest automaker in the world in number of vehicles sold and third 
largest in sales. 
Eaton and Schrempp now charged with the responsibility of ama1gamating 
two enterprises with very different cultures, market segments, and product lines, were 
now forged to create a vision on which DaimlerChrysler couid base its future. Both 
leaders believed in the potential benefits from joint product design, development of 
new technology to meet emissions and fuel economy requirements, efficient 
manufacturing, combined purchasing and other economies of scale, as weil as brand 
expansion and diversification. These synergies would position the combined entity as 
a powerful global player in the world market (St. Jean, 2004; RadIer, 2003; Airey et 
al., 2003; Nolan, 2003). 
33 A global registered share (GRS) is an ordinary share of a company that trades and transfers freely 
across national borders. On US exchanges, a GRS is quoted, traded and settled in US Dollars. Unlike 
American Depositary Receipt (ADR), a GRS is the actual share of the company, not a receipt 
representing the ordinary shares deposited in trust. 
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The fol1owing figure 5.4 illustrates the enormous growth in revenues after the 
merger with the American automobile manufacturer Chrysler. However, between 
2000 and 2003 revenues of the German-American corporation began to drop due to a 
crisis of Chrysler in the American market and final1y even decreasing sales of 
Mercedes-Benz in the world market. 
Figure 5.4 DaimierChrysler34 development of revenues: 1990-2005 
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Sources: Adapted from Daimler-Benz (1991; 1992; 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998a) and 
DaimlerChrysler (1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006). 
The new board of management consisted of 18 members, eight from Chrysler, 
eight from Daimler-Benz, and two being responsible for the Aerospace and Services 
divisions. Jürgen E. Schrempp and Bob Eaton were to be co-chairman and co-chief 
executive officers for a period of at least three years (DaimlerChrysler, 1999). 
Figure 5.5 shows the corporate structure of DaimlerChrysler after the merger 
in 1998. Chrysler apparently became Daimler's fifth business unit, which illustrates 
once more that "the merger of equals" did not reflect the reality of DaimlerChrysler's 
business structure after the merger. 
34 The revenues before the merger in 1998 represent the revenues of the Daimler-Benz AG. 
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Figure 5.5 The post-merger structure of DaimlerChrysler 
Mercedes Chrysler Commercial Financial Aerospace 
Car Group Group vehicles Services 
Mercedes­ Chrysler, Mercedes­ Core EADS, 
Benz, Smart, Dodge, Jeep Benz Trucks, Financial, Commercial 
Maybach Coaches and Services inc!. Aircraft, 
Buses, OC Bank, Military 
Freightliner, Mobility Aircraft, 
MB Vans, Management, Space 
Setra, Others systems 
Sterling, Infrastructure, 
Western Star, Satellites, 
Mitsubishi- Defense and 
Fuso Truck Civil 
and Bus Systems, 
Corporation Aeroengines 
Source: Adapted from DaimlerChrysler (2000: 2-5). 
5.2.3.2 The guest to create one company 
The merger with Chrysler revealed new challenges to the German corporation 
Daimler-Benz. Not only sensitive cultural issues were on the DaimlerChrysler 
agenda, but also issues concerning the general system of corporate governance: 
external transparency, controlling instruments, dividend payments, the orientation 
towards shareholder value, and the remuneration of top management. 
The transparent disclosure to the public, including the use of US GAAP for 
financial reporting, was considered as central to the process of managing in the terms 
ofshareholder value. For example, when the Chrysler side of the company was losing 
money in the year 2001, the response was a turnaround plan involving workforce 
reductions, asset write-downs, and supplier contract cancellations. Under GAAP, this 
required an immediate restructuring charge against earnings of US$ 3.1 billion (~ 
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2.25 billion Euro). Earnings thus incorporated the economic loss more quickly, and 
managers stemmed the losses more quickly. The contrast with covering up the 1993 
losses under HGB accounting was stark (Bali, 2004; Küting/Pfitzer/Weber, 2004). 
DaimlerChrysler saw the US GAAP and the shareholder value perspective as 
being a "managerial" as much as a "financial" accounting issue. A lack of internai 
transparency was a corporate governance liability, reducing unit managers' incentives 
to deliver profits, allowing loss-making activities to be tolerated longer, and reducing 
the ability of corporate managers to evaluate unit managers' performances and 
allocate resources among them. Therefore, it was a competitive disadvantage. Within 
three years, the Chief Financial Officer was able to report "significantly risen 
transparency within the group," subsequently to the merger with Chrysler and the 
adoption of US transparency and accounting standards (Gentz, 1999: 8). 
The former German corporation Daimler-Benz moved toward the shareholder 
value model in other ways as weil. In 1996, the Daimler-Benz AG instituted a 
stockholder approved stock option plan for management board members and other 
senior executives (Daimler-Benz, 1997). The plan was renewed in 2000, in order to 
close the gap between the remuneration of top managers in the USA and in Germany 
after the DaimlerChrysler merger. There were substantial differences in management 
compensation structures: in 1997, Chrysler CEO Robert Eaton was compensated with 
US$ Il.5 million (::::: 8.34 million Euro), whereas Daimler-Benz CEü Schrempp 
received only US$ 2 million (::::: 1.45 million Euro) (Grasslin, 2005). 
In addition, Chrysler was already very adept with investor relations, for 
example, in dealing with Wall Street analysts or institutional investors. Daimler was 
traditionally more insider-oriented and had sorne difficulties to adjust to the 
American corporate investor policies. After the merger with Chrysler, investor 
relations improved in Germany and became more and more important on the 
corporate agenda (Airey et al., 2003; Nolan, 2003). 
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While Daimler-Benz very clearly adopted elements of a shareholder value 
model, it equally clearly did not embrace it in its entirely. After the Chrysler merger, 
it chose to remain a German corporation, "Aktiengesellschaft" (AG), and thus chose 
not to totally shed the consequential legal, economic, and other cultural influences on 
its govemance and reporting. For example, its supervisory board continued to contain 
50 per cent labour representation. In his report on Value-based controlling at 
DaimlerChrysler, CFO Gentz (1999) described a company trying to evolve a more 
hybrid govemance model than it had described in 1996, incorporating elements of 
both the US and German systems. He now saw the need to merge the "common 
philosophies" of "shareholder value management at Chrysler" and "value-based 
management at Daimler-Benz." (Gentz, 1999: 6-8). Subsequent indications reveal 
that merging the two govemance models into a viable hybrid could be more difficult 
than initially envisaged. 
Another problem in the quest to create one company, which was not of 
financia1 nature, was the lack of communication between American and German 
managers. The differences between the US management style and the German 
management style 1ed to serious communication problems and tensions in the first 
transatlantic merger. German CEOs spend more time developing and implementing 
consensus among members of their manageria1 boards, and less time acting as 
decision-makers, than their US counterparts. 
The clash in management styles had almost immediate consequences: By 
2002, on1y two of the thirteen members of the company-wide Management Board 
were from the Chrys1er side of the business (V1asic/Stertz, 2001). 
5.2.3.3 The dream o(crealing a "Weil AG" 
Since the mid-1990s, when Schrempp tumed away from Reuter's vision of an 
"integrated multiple technology corporation", the new Daimler-Benz CEO worked on 
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the realization of his own dream: the creation of a leading global automobile 
corporation, the so-called "Welt AG". 
This new period of strategie management was characterized by many radical 
changes. The separation from less profitable business units, e.g. Fokker, the 
expansion of the scope of products offered in the automobile business unit, e.g. the 
introduction of the Smart or the A-class, and the acquisition of shares in foreign 
automobile companies in order to achieve a strong global presence in the automobile 
sector, e.g. the "merger of equals" with Chrysler or the acquisition of shares III 
Mitsubishi and Hyundai, were ail part ofSchrempp's "Welt AG" strategy. 
In 1998, Bob Eaton (CEO of Chrysler at the time of the merger) and Jürgen E. 
Schrempp presented themselves as equally responsible leaders of the 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation. The Spiegel, one of Germany's best-known political 
and economical magazines, stated at the merger of DaimlerChrysler that with the 
DaimlerChrysler merger a company was born, which had no longer a place called 
home (''[. .. ] mit der Fusion eine Wirtschaftswelt entsteht, die kein Zuhause mehr 
kennt.") (Spiegel, 1998). 
According to Schrempp's idea of a "Welt AG" Chrysler was not an "equal" 
partner of Daimler-Benz as publicly announced, but should rather become one of 
Daimler's global business divisions, like the Mercedes- Benz Car Group or DASA. In 
2000, Schrempp confessed publicly that the role of Chrysler in the "marriage made in 
heaven" was not the one of an equal partner, but rather the role as a subdivision of the 
German corporation Daimler-Benz AG. In an interview published by the London 
Financial Times Schrempp said: 
"The structure we have now with Chrysler [as a stand-alone division] was always 
the structure l wanted. We had to go a roundabout way, but it had to be done for 
psychological reasons. If l had gone and said Chrysler would be a division, 
everybody on their side would have said 'There is no way we'lI do a deal.' But it's 
precisely what l wanted to do." (BurtlLambert, 2000). 
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Already before the merger sorne of Chrysler's top executives left the 
company. Shortly after the merger, Chrysler's drain of talent continued. 
In 1999, Dennis Pawley announced his retirement, stressing that his departure 
had nothing to do with the merger. In addition, Schrempp initiated the payment of 
"golden parachutes" to former Chrysler executives on the DaimlerChrysler board of 
management and in the same year the board size was reduced from 17 to 14 
members. The streamlined board consisted of nine executives from Daimler and five 
from Chrysler. 
The changing shareholder structure of DaimlerChrysler mirrored this trend. 
On January 26, 2000, Bob Eaton announced his retirement, which became effective 
on March 31. Since the beginning of the merger, Eaton had declared that his role was 
only transitional in the new firm (Airey et al., 2003; Nolan, 2003). 
In November 2000, after a tierce crisis and continuing losses at Chrysler, 
Schrempp decided to get ride off Eaton's successor Jim Holden, the last Dream 
Team35 member. His departure eliminated yet another board of management position, 
reducing the total members to thirteen. Dieter Zetsche, who moved to Auburn Hills, 
replaced Jim Holden. 
At the same time Wolfgang Bernhard, a close associate of Zetsche, was 
named Chief Operating Officer of the Chrysler Group. On his arrivai Zetsche 
demanded the resignation of three executives associated to Holden: Theodor 
Cunningham, Vice President of Sales, Kathleen Oswald, Chief Administrative 
Officer, and Antonio Cervone, Vice President of Communications (Vlasic/Stertz, 
2001). 
35 The "Dream Team", consisting of Robert Lutz, Thomas Stallkamp, Francois Castaing, James 
Holden, Thomas Gale, and Dennis Pawley, was created by Chrysler to support the integration process 
of the two companies after the DaimlerChrysler merger. 
104 
Chapter V/The DaimlerChrysler corporation 
Table 5.1	 DaimlerChrysler's Board of Management after the merger: 
10 Daimler and 9 Chrysler Executives 
Member Company Responsibilities Changes Board 
position 
Jürgen E. Schrempp Daimler Co-chainnan 
Robert Eaton Chrvsler Co-chairman Retired 31/03/00 Removed 
Manfred Gentz Daimler CFO 
Thomas Stallkamp Chrysler President of OC AG Quit 09/24/99 
James Holden Chrysler S&M in North America + Fired 11/07/00 
Chrvsler brand management 
Dieter Zetsche Daimler	 S&M outside America + President/CEO Changed 
Mercedes-Benz brand Chrysler Group, 
management 11/00 
Theodor Chrysler S&M in Latin America Gave up his board Removed 
Cunningham position 09/99 
Eckard Cordes Daimler Corporate Development & 
Management 
Thomas Gale Chrysler Strategy, design and Retired at the end Removed 
Operations, Chrysler brands of2000 
Thomas Sidlik Chrysler Procurement Chrysler brands 
+ Jeep Operations 
Gary Valade Chrvsler Global procurement & supplv 
Jürgen Hubbert Daimler Daimler-Benz passenger cars 
KurtLauk Daimler Commercial vehicles Succeeded Changed 
Zetsche 
Manfred Bischoff Daimler Aerospace and non­
automotive operations 
Klaus-Dieter Daimler Research and technology 
Vohringer 
Klaus Mangold Daimler Services 
Heiner Tropitzsch Daimler Human resources & labour Retired 09/99 
relations Daimler-Benz 
Dennis Pawley Production & Labour Retired 01/3 1/99 Removed 
Relations 
Source: Adapted from Dow Jones Business News (DJBN) (1998). 
Although, Schrempp excused himself for his comments ln the Financial 
Times, he never denied the fact that it had been his plan to make Chrysler a division 
of the Daimler group. After Holden's dismissal, news leaked that the US $ 7.5 billion 
Chrysler bank account, which had been saved after Chrysler's tumaround in order to 
protect and support the company bad times, was empty. Rumours quickly spread that 
Daimler had used the money to purchase shares in Mitsubishi (Japan), 37 per cent, 
and Hyundai (South Korea), 10 per cent, which were part of Schrempp's vision of a 
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"Welt AG" with divisions on every continent and with automobile products ranging 
from small compact cars to luxury class sedans, and from lorries to caravans. 
DaimlerChrysler had failed to acquire shares in successful Asian companies such as 
Honda and Nissan. Therefore, the Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (MMC), although 
at the time highly indebted, seriously loss making, and having hardly any new 
potential models at hand, and Hyundai were to become DaimlerChrysler's first and 
main pillar in the Asian market (Airey et al., 2003; Nolan, 2003; Vlasic/Stertz, 2001). 
On November 27, 2000, Kirk Kerkorian, DaimlerChrysler's third largest 
shareholder (he owned 14 per cent of the shares), filed a federal US$ 9 billion (~6.52 
billion Euro) lawsuit against DaimierChrys1er accusing the German management of 
lying to shareholders about the deal being a "merger of equals" (V1asic/Stertz, 2001). 
In the following years, Schrempp's dream of DaimlerChrysler becoming a 
leading "Welt AG" started to crumble. In 2004, the board of management decided to 
cut ail financial support for Mitsubishi, Chrysler remained a problem child, and new 
ventures in China seemed to be rather difficult and slowly processing (Preul3, 2005). 
However, Schrempp never questioned his corporate "Welt AG" strategy and even if 
the value of the DCX share diminished about 40 per cent during the reign of the 
formerly so-called "Mr. Shareholder Value" (Grasslin, 2005). In spite of major 
corporate problems, Schrempp maintained, until 2005, in his position as 
DaimlerChrysler's CEO. He and his strategy were always supported and backed up 
by the chair of the supervisory board, and his personal friend, Hilmar Kopper 
(Deutsche Bank) (Dunsch, 2004; FAZ, 2004a; 2004b). 
On July 28, 2005 Schrempp decided to resign from his post, although his 
contract had been already prolonged for the next three years. Subsequently to the ad 
hoc message, which publicly announced Schrempp's resignation, the share price of 
DCX increased enormously and several DaimlerChrysler executives (who had 
benefited from the new share option plan for executives in 1998), as well as the 
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Deutsche Bank took advantage of the sudden rise of the company's share priee, 
selling great parts of their stock of shares (Grasslin, 2005). 
The following figure 5.6 illustrates DaimlerChrysler's share pnce 
development between 1998 and 2005. 
Figure 5.6 DaimlerChrysler's share priee development: 1998-2005 
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After a short peak between 1998 and 1999, due to the merger with Chrysler in 
1998, the DaimlerChrysler share priee began to decrease continuously until mid­
2003. Only after Schrempp resigned as DaimlerChrysler's CEO in 2005, the 
company's share priee gained new strength (PreuJ3, 2005). Moreover, Zetsehe's new 
strategy to focus on Daimler's core activities and the deeision to sale Chrysler in 
2007 had a positive impact on Daimler's share perfonnance, which led to the fact that 
the company has finally regained its share price value after ten years. 
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5.2.3.4 An outlook to the present 
Since January 1, 2006 Dr. Dieter Zetsche has taken over the lead of the 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation, announcing serious lay-offs and a cost-cutting strategy 
to bring the company's financial results in better shape. Dr. Dieter Zetsche has been a 
member of the Board of Management of the DaimlerChrysler AG since December 16, 
1998, and Chairman of the Board of Management of the DaimlerChrysler AG since 
January 1, 2006. He is also responsible for the Mercedes Car Group division, which 
includes passenger cars of the brands Mercedes-Benz, Maybach and Smart as weil as 
Mercedes-Benz AMG and Mercedes-Benz McLaren. Dr. Dieter Zetsche has replaced 
Dr. Eckard Cordes, who had become chief of the Mercedes-Benz Car Group in order 
to bring the "star division" back on track (Preu13, 2005). However, Cordes decided to 
leave the company, on August 31, 2005, when he got to know that Zetsche was going 
to become the heir to Schrempp's throne (FAZ, 2005a). 
Schrempp's plan and dream to create a leading automobile "Welt AG" had 
caused serious damage to the shareholder value of the company. 
In the course of Zetsche's new strategy the company and its divisions should 
return to stable profitability. Lean management, cost cutting, lay-offs, and the sale of 
loss-making divisions are an important part of this new strategy. In October 2005, 
DaimlerChrysler, Hyundai, and Mitsubishi, in order to create and to benefit from 
scale effects in the development and production of engines for the three companies, 
found the Joint Venture Global Engine Manufacturing Alliance (GEMA). A month 
later DaimlerChrysler sold the remaining shares of MMC (12.4 per cent). Between 
the years 2005 and 2008 the company plans to lay-off about 14.000 employees, 
furthermore, in the following years, after the end ofworkforce security act, which the 
company has signed unti12012, another 10.000 jobs are to be cut (FAZ, 2005b). The 
workforce reduction is to be achieved by payout offers, early retirement initiatives, 
fluctuation, and displacements, which have proven to be rather costly methods. 
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In September 2006, DaimlerChrysler finally achieved to find its first 
cooperation partner in China: Chery Automobile. Chrysler is to sell the cheaply 
manufactured small compact cars from China under the Dodge label in the US 
market. 
After the difficult eras of Reuter's "integrated technology corporation" and of 
Schrempp's "Welt AG", Zetsche will have to prove in how far he is able to create a 
new DaimlerChrysler vision for sustainable growth in global markets in the present 
and in the future. In February 2007, Zetsche announced that Chrysler and Daimler 
might go separate ways in the future. One of the most potential buyers of Chrysler 
was Kirk Kerkorian (Financial Times, 2007). 
On May 14, 2007, the DaimlerChrysler Corporation announced it sells a 
controlling interest in its struggling Chrysler Group to Cerberus Capital Management, 
a private equity firm that specializes in restructuring troubled companies, for US$ 7.4 
billion (::::: 5.35 billion Euro), mostly in the form of capital that Cerberus will put into 
Chrysler. The agreement leaves DaimlerChrysler with a 19.9 per cent stake in 
Chrysler, but frees it of a great amount of pension and health care liabilities. Cerberus 
will take an 80.1 per cent stake in the new company, to be known as Chrysler 
Holding. Chrysler executives will leave the DaimlerChrysler management board, 
which will be reduced to six people. In regard to the Chrysler buyout Zetsche said, 
"We're confident that we've found the right solution that will create the greatest 
overall value - both for Daimler and Chrysler," and Chrysler's chief executive, 
Thomas W. Lasorda added "As a private company, Chrysler will be better positioned 
to focus on its long-term plan for recovery, rather than just short-term results." (New 
y ork Times, 2007). 
Chrysler's former president, Wolfgang Bernhard, who advised Cerberus, may 
receive a seat on the board of the new Chrysler or play sorne other role. Bernhard 
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visited Chrysler several times in the last few weeks, and has remained friendly with 
Zetsche, who ran Chrysler when Bernhard was president during the early 2000s. 
Regarding the Chrysler buyout the Service Employees International Union, a 
politically active organization that represents nearly two million workers, released a 
report expressing public policy concerns about private equity. Among those were 
questions about the lack of disclosure and about certain tax breaks for buyout firms. 
Along with the unions, goverrunent officiaIs have expressed increasing concern over 
the financial restructurings that are the lifeblood of buyout firms; their overhauls of 
companies have often included massive cuts in jobs or benefits. In Germany private 
equity firms have been traditionally derided as 'locusts that strip companies of their 
assets' (Wihofszki, 2007). 
Nonetheless, DaimlerChrysler's shares have c1imbed 15 per cent, to $82 on 
Friday, since mid-February, when private equity firms entered the bidding for 
Chrysler. The shares rose again in trading today, c1imbing about 1.7 per cent. At the 
company's raucous annual meeting in Berlin last month, a succession of shareholders 
stood up to demand that the company move swiftly to dispose of Chrysler. "This 
marriage made in heaven turned out to be a complete failure," said Hans-Richard 
Schmitz, who represented the German Association for the Protection of Shareholders 
"What's missing now is a swift resolution of the issue by the management of the 
group." (Landier, 2007: 1). 
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5.3 Conclusion 
The early history of the German Daimler-Benz Corporation, which was 
created in 1926, in the course of the merger of "Benz & Co. Rheinische Gasmotoren­
Fabrik, Mannheim" and the "Daimler-Motoren-Gesellschaft", moulded the corporate 
culture and corporate identity of Daimler-Benz for the following decades. Until the 
1970s, the evolution of the Swabian automobile company remained closely related to 
the evolution of the German economy. In the 1980s the globalization of markets led 
to a first brake with the traditional manufacturing of automobiles in Germany. New 
production sites were increasingly set up abroad and Edzard Reuter, Daimler's CEO 
between 1987 and 1995, tried to make the company an "integrated technology 
corporation", acquiring companies from other technology fields (AEG, Domier, 
MTU, etc.). 
The 1990s, on which this study focuses, tumed out to be a period of radical 
shifts and changes for Daimler-Benz. 
One of the most difficult periods in the company's history has proven to be 
the period between 1990 and 1995. At the very beginning of the 1990s until the end 
of 1992, Reuter still tried to continue the realization of his dream founding the fourth 
column of his worldwide operating integrated technology corporation for 
transportation and defence. His dream ended in 1993, when major problems occurred 
for the company, forcing the Daimler-Benz management to react by closing down 
production sites and cutting jobs. The consequence of events that unfolded around the 
Daimler-Benz AG in the year 1993 was without precedent. It started with Daimler 
reporting a profit under HGB mies and ended with announcements of plant closings 
and involuntary employee lay-offs. In between, Daimler announced it would list its 
stock on the NYSE, reported key financial information calculated under US GAAP, 
revealed it actually was making a loss, and revealed it had substantial hidden 
reserves. The news of the first loss announcement in the company's history and the 
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enormous difference between the results calculated under HGB and US GAAP, 
shocked the public as weil as financial experts. 
In 1995, Jürgen E. Schrempp, former DASA chairman, succeeded Edzard 
Reuter as head of the Daimler-Benz Corporation. With Schrempp, "Mr. Shareholder 
Value", a new era with radical changes commenced. The new CEO, following his 
"Untemehmenskonzept", chopped of loss-making business units (Fokker, AEG, 
debis, etc.), rationalized the size of the workforce, and merged Mercedes-Benz with 
Daimler-Benz, making him the absolute leader of the company and its divisions. 
Schrempp's vision to make Daimler-Benz a leading automobile "Welt AG" lead to the 
merger with Chrysler, the number three US auto manufacturer. The DaimlerChrysler 
Corporation was formed in 1998 with the biggest industrial merger in history, 
creating a global giant with sales of US$ 155 billion and 440, 000 employees. It 
combined Mercedes-Benz, for decades synonymous with supreme German 
engineering quality, luxury, and speed, with Chrysler, a symbol of Americana and the 
world's most profitable auto company. Startlingly, after three years DaimlerChrysler 
was reporting financial statements prepared "from the ground up" under US GAAP, 
and was openly espousing a modified shareholder value mode!. 
However, hailed at the time as a marriage of two great industrial icons, the 
rhetoric has since given way to a more prosaic reality. The "merger" tumed out to be 
a German takeover and the combined group plunged into losses. Jürgen E. Schrempp, 
the CEO and architect of the deal, fought in the following years a desperate battle to 
restore the company to financial health. In addition, Schrempp's "Asian Strategy" to 
buy important share holdings in Mitsubishi and Hyundai, making a first step into the 
emerging market, failed due to the bad condition Mitsubishi was in and tumed out to 
be very costly for the company. 
However, until the end of his reign in 2005, Schrempp never questioned his 
"Welt AG" strategy, even if the shareholder value of DaimlerChrysler had decreased 
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about 40 per cent during is time in office. Hilmar Kopper, representative of the 
Deutsche Bank and chairman of the Daimler-Benz, later DaimlerChrysler, 
supervisory board, always backed up for Schrempp's mistakes. The new and present 
CEü, Dr. Dieter Zetsche, will have to prove how he will bring the financially stricken 
DaimlerChrysler AG back on track and create a vision for sustainable growth in the 
future. The recent sale of Chrysler to the private equity company Cerberus seems to 
be Zetsche's first and fundamental step in a new corporate restructuring process. 
In the next chapter we will analyse the evolution of the market for services 
and products, the market for capital and the market for "talent" in the case of 
DaimlerChrysler with a focus on the corporate changes in the 1990s. The chapter 
about the company, its history and its evolution throughout the 1990s, will be an 
important reference for the conclusion of the study about the impact of the market 
forces, described in chapter VI, on the corporate governance and management system 
ofthe German corporation Daimler-Benz, later DaimlerChrysler. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS OF THE THREE MARKETS 
According to the model of the three markets developed by Allaire and 
Firsirotu (1993; 2004), a company is influenced and controlled by the forces of three 
distinct markets: 
the market for products and services; 
the market for "talent"; 
and the market for capital. 
ln the case of DaimlerChrysler these three dynamic market forces seem to 
have had an important influence on the nature of the company's system of 
management and corporate governance particularly in the 1990s. In this chapter, 1 
will try to explore and investigate the evolution of the three markets surrounding 
Daimler-Benz, 1ater DaimlerChrysler, in particular in the period between 1990 and 
1998, and their impact on the company until the year 2005. 
6.1 The market for products and services 
ln 1993, passenger cars and commercial vehicles provided the major part of 
the Daimler-Benz's revenues and were the primary source of the company's 
worldwide reputation. Only 40 per cent of the company's revenues derived from 
other business activities: aircraft, space, defence, rail systems, microelectronics, and 
financia1 services (Daimler-Benz, 1995). The Mercedes Benz brand (cars and 
commercial vehicles) was one of the best-known brands in the world, and the 
company's automobile products had a long-standing and well-eamed reputation for 
"made in Germany" quality engineering, reliability, refinement, and luxury. 
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At the end of the 1990s, DaimlerChrysler refocused on its core competencies 
In the automobile business, after the merger with the American automobile 
manufacturer Chrysler in 1998. Henceforth, it was not surprising that in 1999 already 
over 85 per cent of DaimlerChrysler's revenues derived from passenger car and 
commercial vehicle activities (DaimlerChrysler, 2001). 
Considering the strategic and economlc importance of the automobile 
business for DaimlerChrysler, 1 have decided to concentrate, in the analysis of the 
market for products and services, on the situation and development of the automobile 
market in the 1990s. Furthermore, the focus on one product market provides the 
research advantage of an in-depth analysis of one specific market for products and 
services. 
6.1.1 Globalization, modernization and consolidation 
The German automobile industry changed to a great degree during the 1990s 
due to strong rationalization and modemization tendencies, but especially due to the 
globalization of the whole industry. 
The globalization of product markets in the 1990s led to a consolidation of the 
automobile sector into a few global players. The number of firms dramatically 
declined and the conventional wisdom spread among automobile makers that they 
must produce 4-5 million cars a year to remain competitive (Foudy Jr., 2001; 
JürgenslKrzywdzinski, 2006; Pries, 1999). 
Changes in the automobile sector were global and made worldwide leading 
car manufacturers rethink their corporate strategies. 
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Figure 6.1 The 1990s pace of consolidation in the automobile industry 
From fragmented national industries To a few global players 
US Japan Big Six 
General Motors Toyota 
Ford Hino GM Group 
Chrysler Daihatsu Isuzu, Suzuki, Saab, Subaru, Fiat, 
Nissan Daewoo 
Germany Honda 
Daimler-Benz Isuzu Ford Group 
Volkswagen (Audi) Suzuki Mazda, Volvo, Jaguar, Rover 
BMW Subari 
Mitsubishi Volkswagen Group 
France Audi, Skoda, Seat 
Renault Korea 
Peugot-Citroën Hyundai DaimlerChrysler Group 
Kia Mitsubishi, Hyundai (Kia) 
UK Daewoo 
Rover Renault-Nissan 
Jaguar Eastern Europe Dacia 
Skoda 
Sweden Dacia Toyota Group 
Volvo Hino, Daihatsu 
Saab Spain 
Seat Independents 
Italy Honda 
Fiat BMW 
Peugot-Citroën 
Source: Foudy Jr. (2001: 22). 
In the past, Japanese automobile manufacturers' lean production techniques, 
e.g. Toyota or Honda, and the unique keiretsu structure were Japanese strategies to 
render scale economies obsolete in competition with American firms, e.g. General 
Motors or Ford, which dwarfed them in size. German automobile makers, e.g. BMW, 
Mercedes-Benz, or Porsche, used to rely on a high skill engineering craft tradition 
that permeated its workforces and suppliers to find its competitive edge. However, at 
the beginning of the 1990s, powerful new economies of sca1e started to drive the 
industry, which reflected several forces at work: 
•	 First, the shear size offers an advantage in terms of purchasing power for parts 
and raw materials. Firms have become much more skilful at pooling their 
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purchasing and driving down the prices for the goods and services they buy. The 
larger the finn, the larger the company's power to demand discounts from its 
suppliers. This includes also first tier suppliers in the automobile industry who 
purchase billions in raw materials and finished parts. 
•	 Second, size allows firms to save money by sharing parts and platforms between 
several models (Brylawski, 1999). This saves money by spreading the cost of 
designing and developing parts over a larger number of vehicles. Designing a 
separate engine alone may cost over half a billion dollars but doubling or tripling 
the order volume for a single part from a supplier will often enable 20 per cent 
reductions in priee or more. In this way, costs for commoditized inputs such as 
steel may also be effectively lowered by purchases on a larger scale. Furthermore, 
reducing the number of firms with which the company must maintain purchasing 
relations, saves substantial personnel costs and money usually spent negotiating 
over parts priees and visiting suppliers to insure quality standards. The 
development of shared automobile 'platforms' (loosely considered to be frame 
and major components of the car) is another important factor increasing the 
product volume and reducing product costs. Dramatic cost savings can be 
achieved sharing a major platform by saving a large amount of the engineering 
costs for different models (ClarkIFujimoto, 1991). The remaining parts of the car 
the so-called 'hat' (loosely defined as the interior passenger compartment of the 
car and the exterior frame of the car that is visible to the customer) can be 
inexpensively customized. Platform sharing has been a major rationale in the 
acquisition of a stake in Mitsubishi for DaimlerChrysler, since Chrysler and 
Mitsubishi could rationalize their use ofplatforms. 
•	 A further step from the use of "platforms" in the manufacturing process is the 
modularization of the production. In this case, new megamodule suppliers, who 
amortize their own R&D, design and engineering costs for parts by selling 
modules, albeit customized, to several automobile manufacturers, supply the 
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automaker for the final assembly. The structural change in the automotive supply 
has been greatest in Europe. According to a study of a German consultant group, 
modules and systems made up 22 per cent of the total automotive supply for 
European carmakers in 1993; components made up 57 per cent; standard parts 13 
per cent and raw materials 8 per cent (Wolters, 1995). In 2000, the share of 
modules and systems reached 43 per cent; the share of components decreased to 
42 per cent; the share of standard parts made up 8 per cent and the share of raw 
materials 7 per cent of the total supply value (McAlinden/Andrea, 2002). 
However, the use of platfonns and modules in the production process does not 
only have positive cost saving effects for the company. In fact, the new 
production methods force a shift in the architecture of car production: a reduction 
of the core workforce of finns via increased outsourcing, a consolidation in the 
supplier industry, and a greater internationalization of production, which finally 
leads to a loss of the production skills necessary to produce cars in traditional car 
manufacturer companies. 
•	 Third, size offers also product and service diversification advantages. The 
automobile sector being a highly cyclical industry bears a high level of uncertainty 
and at the same time it implies very high fixed costs and capital needs. In order to 
reduce the volatility, cannakers strive to diverse their model lines and their 
geographic scope. Global sales and production capacities offer a natural hedge 
against downturns, protecting finns from dangerous currency swings (Pries, 
1999). 
•	 Fourth, the increasing technological sophistication of the industry and the 
adoption of new technologies are forcing an increase in capital spending. The 
R&D budgets of ail the larger manufacturers fUll into billions of dollars yearly. 
The global shift from the internai combustion engine to fuel cel1s, hybrid engines 
and other new technologies are very costly (Becker, 2005). In particular, the 
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resources of smaller producers are seriously outstripped in strive for new 
technologies. Even for luxury producers, such as BMW or Porsche, which are able 
to maintain large margins on their profits to develop such technologies or buy 
them from others, the insurance of the access to these future technologies remains 
a great challenge. Other large capital concerns are the increasing use of the internet 
in managing production and suppliers (for purchasing and supply chain 
management) and telematics (the internet, drive-by-wire, computers in 
automobiles). In fact, the costs are so daunting that large-scale collaboration 
arnong competi tors has become the norm in this area. The Ballard fuel cell 
consortium and the Covisint Internet exchanges are orny two exarnples of 
companies sharing the risks of these technologies and accepting that they will 
operate from a level playing field in their use. 
6.1.2 Changes in the supplier industry 
Changes in the automobile industry led also to a fundamental restructuring of 
the automobile supplier industry and the general automotive value chain. 
The majority of the automobile manufacturers increased the outsourcing of 
important processes down the value chain to first-tier suppliers, including the 
management of second- and third-tier suppliers. Due to this change the nwnber of 
first-tier suppliers reduced from hundreds to a few megasuppliers, which gained new 
competences and grew in size. For example, GM moved to select 5 suppliers to 
manage the complete interiors of its cars. Between 1994 and 1998, consolidation in 
the supplier industry was intensive; the value of merger and acquisitions among auto 
suppliers grew from US$ 2.1 billion to US$ 18.9 billion annually. The average deal 
size, a rough proxy for the growth in average firm size, grew from US$73 million in 
1994 to US$205 million in 1998 (Foudy Jr., 1999). 
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In Europe, the restructuring of the 1990s made the European supplier 
landscape a particular hot spot. This for two reasons: Firstly, many of the existing 
companies were too smalt in terms of new product development capacity, global plant 
coverage, and access to capital markets. Hence, requirements of car manufacturers 
regarding modularization and globalization could not be met under these conditions. 
Secondly, with the Big Three US companies, GE, Ford, and Chrysler, as weil as PSA 
Peugot Citroën and Fiat in Europe, spinning off their internai supplier base, these 
companies aggressively acquired European firms to gain access to specifie 
technologies. Other American companies, most of them publicly listed, foltowed 
taking advantage of the favourable stock-market conditions in the USA. 
Figure 6.2 Annual turnover of the German automobile sub-supplier industry 
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Consequently, the traditional structure of the European supplier industry had 
come under strong pressures for change, including the restructuring of car 
manufacturer-supplier relationships in Europe (Jürgens, 2003; Pries, 1999). In this 
regard, the following three developments are of specifie interest Firstly, 
modularization, as mentioned before as one of the main causes for consolidation in 
the automobile sector, and systems-supply capabilities; secondly, supplier parks and 
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car manufacturer/supplier plant consortiums, and thirdly the formation of regional 
networks ("clusters") of small and middle-sized enterprises (SME) 
(McLaughl inIMaloney, 1999). 
Although the trend towards modularization is global, there exist different 
country-specific models of modularization. Japanese car manufacturers, in particular 
Toyota and Bonda, prefer functional modules and emphasize the optimization of total 
vehicle design. Outsourcing is only one of the available methods to reach such goals. 
Both companies do not see the benefits of charging their suppliers with larger 
responsibil ities in the sense of the modularization approach. They rather seek to retain 
basic competencies in all strategie areas, especially in the gain of new competences 
and in the development of new technologies, as well as the control over the value 
chain. 
In contrast, European and American car manufacturers, aiming to focus on 
core competencies, have increased the responsibilities of their first-tier suppliers even 
if this meant the loss of competencies in these areas. They also require suppliers to 
take the responsibility for new product development as well as for purchasing and 
organising the supply chains of their products. 
Another trend in the supplier industry, which commenced in the 1990s, led 
towards increasing specialization, affecting the way the value chain is coordinated 
and controlled. While in the past the car manufacturers had tried to control more or 
less all steps of the process chain of its suppliers, since the mid-1990s each of the 
new specialised groups developed its own area of responsibility. 
Generally, it is possible to distinguish between four different groups of 
specialists: firstly, the group of companies specialising in components that require 
high technology expertise (e.g. KS, Mahle, GKN and Meritor); secondly, the group 
that specialises in systems and modules (examples are Visteon, Lear, Johnson 
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Controls, and Bosch); the third group specialises in product development tasks such 
as computer-aided design, prototyping, testing, etc. (e.g. firms like EDAG 
Engineering, AVL, Bertrandt and Rücker); and the fourth group aims at becoming 
assembly specialists (e.g. Karmann, Bertone, Matra, Pininfarina, Magna, Valmet, 
etc.). Most companies of the fourth group have the engineering capacity to develop 
whole cars (Jürgens, 2003). 
Figure 6.3 Major automobile sub-suppliers (turnover in billion of Euro) 
Scbaemer (Gennany) 
1 1 
ThyssenKIupp (Germany) 
ZF Group (Gennany) 
Continental (Germany 
Siemens (Gennany) 
Johnson ContraIs (USA) 
BridgeslOlJe (Japan) 
Dense (Japan) 
Delphi (USA) 1 
] 
Robert Boscb (Gennany) 1 1 
o 5 10 15 20 25 30 
Source: Adapted from FAZ (200Sc). 
From a competence point of view, these companies are very close to become 
brand name companies themselves. The fifth group would be composed of the former 
car manufacturing companies, which have become more or less brand integrators 
focussing on product planning and marketing. A consequence from the tendency of 
specialization is the fundamental change of the relationship between car 
manufacturers and their suppliers. The image of "networks" seems more appropriate 
than the image of car-manufacturer-dominated "pyramids" to describe the new 
configuration of actors (Jürgens/KrzywdzinskiiTeipen, 2006). 
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6.1.3 The spread ofglobal vehicle sales 
The spread of vehicle production on a global scale, especially the relocation of 
production sites to developing countries increased markedly in the boom years of 
rapid expansion in the emerging markets in the 1990s. Production was increasingly 
moved to other countries because of high German labour costs (hourly rates 
approximately double those in the United States). 
Global vehicle production rose by nearly 7 million units between 1990 and 
1997, although the increase in sales over the same period lagged considerably behind 
this, at just under 4 million units (OICA, 2007). Much of this growth was 
concentrated in developing countries. In the Triad regions (the United States of 
America and Canada, i.e. North America, Japan and Western Europe), the vehicles 
industry was already in a very mature state, being plagued by overcapacity, cost 
pressures and low profitability. Of the three Triad economies, only North America 
was buoyant at the end of the 1990s until 2005. In fact, this resulted from the long 
boom of the United States' economy, the substitution of imported Japanese cars by 
cars built in transplant factories, and the remarkable and profitable shift of consumer 
demand from passenger cars toward light trucks (Becker, 2005). 
In contrast, vehicle sales in both Western Europe and Japan decreased steadily 
since 1990. Overall, vehicle sales in the three Triad regions rose by only 0.6 per cent 
between 1990 and 1997 and by 3.6 per cent between 1997 and 2005. Production rose 
by 4.2 per cent in the period 1990-1997 and decreased in the period 1997-2005 even 
by 1.39 per cent. The stagnation of production and sales in the Triad regions was in 
marked contrast with the growth of the industry in the rest of the world. While both 
production and sales of vehicles remained concentrated in the Triad economies, 
which accounted for more than 70 per cent of global vehicle sales in 1997 and still for 
62.95 per cent in 2005, a remarkable feature of the period 1990-2005 was that in 
absolute terms the increases in production and sales of vehicles in the rest of the 
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world far outstripped the increases in the Triad regions. In the Triad regions, vehicle 
sales rose by 1,686,000 units in this period. In the rest of the world (World total 
minus Triad countries), sales increased by 13,944,000 units. For vehicle production, 
the respective figures were 1,149,000 units and 14,895,000 units (OICA, 2007). 
Table 6.1	 International automobile sales and production: Unit sales and 
production of motor vehicles by country and region 
Country Unit sales Production 
(in thousands) (in thousand units) 
1990 1997 2005 1990 1997 2005 
USA/Canada 15464 16922 19570 11704 14690 14669 
Western Europe 15005 14829 14510 15568 16825 16440 
Japan 7777 6725 5852 13487 10975 10799 
Mexico 550 503 1 110 821 1338 1670 
South America 1201 3270 4534 1 121 2803 2984 
Eastern Europe (exc1uding Russia) 1090 1060 2560 1266 1686 3 no 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan 1437 1995 1832 1674 3 199 4145 
ASEAN36 848 1347 1200 841 1325 2260 
China 704 1616 5969 509 1583 5707 
India 357 761 830 364 770 1626 
Other (Russia, the whole of Africa, 3367 2752 5463 3275 2407 2445 
and other unspecified producers) 
World total 47800 51780 63430 50421 57257 66465 
Triad regions 38246 38476 39932 40759 42490 41908 
Fast-growing emerging markets 4750 8557 16203 4922 9505 17967 
Other markets 4804 4747 7295 4740 5262 6590 
Source: Adapted from OICA (2007). 
A consequence of the development described above was that new emerging 
automobile and commercial vehicle markets in Asia and South America became a 
36 The Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a geo-political and economic organization 
of 10 countries in Southeast Asia: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
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new important focus for the global players in the automobile manufacturing in the 
1990s. 
Figure 6.4 Light vehicle sales and production by manufacturer in 2005 
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Conceming the number of vehicle units sold and produced by manufacturer it is 
important to notice that Toyota has become the most successful manufacturer in 
terms of efficiency. Even in terms of quantity Toyota (sales in units of thousands: 
7,646; production in units of thousands: 7,100) has succeeded to overcome leading 
American and European automakers, like DaimlerChrysler (sales in units of 
thousands: 4,244; production in units of thousands: 4,319), Ford (sales in units of 
thousands: 6,547; production in units of thousands: 6,418), and Volkswagen (VW) 
(sales in units ofthousands: 5,026; production in units ofthousands: 5,173). 
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The following figure 6.4 shows DaimlerChrysler's share price performance 
between 1998 and 2005 in comparison to its two competitors General Motors and 
Toyota. The graph illustrates Toyota's outstanding perfonnance and the generally 
weak performance of American car manufacturers, represented in this example by 
General Motors and partially also by DaimlerChrysler. 
Figure 6.5	 DaimlerChrylser's share price performance in comparison to its 
competitors in the period between 1998 and 2005 
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6.1.4 Shifts in the labour market 
The spread of global vehicle sales and, hence, the increase of international 
competition among car manufacturers, had also a serious impact on the labour 
relations in traditional industrialized countries, like Germany. There was no real threat 
of total exit	 to the third world, but a dynamic of constant competition and 
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benchmarking of one plant against another and whatever prices suppliers can offer 
within a more closed, European production network. One response to this has been 
the creation of European Works Councils and calls for creating global works councils 
(Hancké, 2000). 
Furthermore, in the 1990s, the increase of outsourcing triggered not only the 
competition among car production plants but also the competition between car 
manufacturers and supplier firms. Coordination among labour across the extended 
enterprise and across firms now seemed as pressing as coordination within one firm 
that happens to operate across national boundaries. Moreover, companies shifted 
from simply having suppliers deliver modules to having them produced within the 
same industrial park and even installed by supplier workforces. German unions were 
resisting these trends, which they saw as breaking up the solidarity of the factory 
floor. But the alternative to integrated production systems with suppliers tied-in 
closely, was a more spread out geographical network of module suppliers, where the 
threat of exit was much higher and relocation became easier (as modular factories 
employ fewer workers, require much less capital and automakers do not have to 
worry about the costs of suppliers also relocating). The shifting of labour force from 
larger to smaller firms and the increase in exit options ail were potential threats to 
workers (Jürgens/Krzywdzinski, 2006). 
For labour, modular production could also greatly reduce the skill level 
necessary for workers to produce diversity-quality-products (DQP) (Knauss, 1998). 
It threatens the entire premise of the "tightly coupled production system" and the 
highly skilled German "Facharbeiter' (specialized worker) to operate within it. 
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With the increasing globalization of the market for automobile products and 
services, the German labour relations, characterized by unique labour market 
institutions and apprenticeship and vocational training prograrns, as weIl as a strong 
codetermination and work council law ("Mitbestimmungsgesetz" and 
"Betriebsverfassungsgesetz"), was more and more under pressure to change. 
6.1.5 The impact on the DaimlerChrysler Corporation 
In the face of industry consolidation in the 1990s, which had been caused 
arnong other reasons by the need for size and permanent capital access, Daimler-Benz 
treated expansion as a critical component to its profit strategy. 
Platforrn development costs were being increasingly shared by Daimler­
Benz's competitors across a range of models, creating substantial cost disadvantages 
for companies that operated with a limited product range. In fact, Daimler-Benz's 
production was concentrated on high-end luxury cars, and companies that were 
trapped in that segment of the market alone were disappearing one by one through 
merger and acquisition. In addition, competition in the luxury passenger car market 
was increasing and threatened the company's market niche, for example, Toyota's 
stunning entry with its Lexus brand and BMW's resurgence in top-end models. 
Sharing platform costs across models was what had aIlowed Toyota to sell the 
superbly engineered and produced Lexus at such a low price - a price that Daimler 
was unable to match with a comparable Mercedes. On the other hand, management 
was concemed that extending its product range down-market to achieve cross-model 
economies wouId dilute the Mercedes brand's cachet. 
In 1993, sales plans and production schedules had to be revised downward by 
Daimler-Benz as sales of passenger cars weakened throughout Europe. Moreover, 
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sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) and light trucks had moved into the market, generating 
an urgent need to revamp and extend Daimler-Benz's product line. 
The merger with Chrysler, the acquisition of a large stake in Mitsubishi, and 
the alliance with Hyundai were part of the attempt to reach a "critical mass" in the 
new "global" automobile market. Even before the merger with Chrysler, Mercedes had 
been attempting to leverage its position in the luxury market toward other segments 
of the car market. 
The introduction of the C-class in the 1980s and the A-class in the mid-1990s, 
were examples of this strategy that predated Daimler's embrace of shareholder value. 
The Smart subcompact car was another attempt to grow the company's car sales, 
though it does not share the Mercedes logo. The M-class sport utility vehicle (SUV) 
is an attempt to leverage its existing brand to enter the highly profitable SUV segment. 
The purchase of Chrysler and its later purchase of a large stake in Mitsubishi would 
allow aIl three companies to share parts, pool purchasing costs through a global 
sourcing strategy, merge R&D budgets, and find other sources of cost savings through 
an increased economy of scale. Mercedes pushed for this despite the potential 
dangers to its brand image and to the large margins it receives on the sale of its 
Mercedes luxury sedans. 
In fact, Daimler-Benz first seemed reluctant to embrace modularity given its 
traditions of craft production and excellence in engineering. The fear that quality might 
suffer, considering the low tolerances and emphasis on quality manufacturing, seemed 
to stop Daimler from outsourcing. However, pressure from global competition in the 
automobile markets to reduce costs and Jürgen Schrempp's newly introduced profit 
goals, which he set in 1995, led the company to an aggressive policy of outsourcing 
and modularization. Already during the 1970s, Daimler-Benz outsourced about 45% 
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of the value of the car and built 55 per cent. At the end of the 1990s, the company 
produced below 40 per cent of the content for many models and only about 21 per 
cent for the new M-class (Foudy Jr., 2001). Although Mercedes executives believed 
that if the company produced below 20 per cent of its cars, especially its premium 
lines, it would lose its identity and water down the brand (Vlasic/Stertz, 2001), the 
German car manufacturer produced a "de-integrated supply chain" where Mercedes 
finally added only 15 per cent of the value to the final automobile (Van HoekIWeken, 
2000). Daimler-Benz's Smart car facility, where it was responsible for less than 15 
per cent of the value of production and suppliers "Ieased" space from Daimler for the 
car manufacturing, was an industry trendsetter at the time. 
The new modularity concept allowed Mercedes also to set up new production 
facilities in the US, whose quality finally met the standards necessary to maintain 
their brand. Furthermore, US production networks could be set up with a far greater 
degree of outsourcing and less costs. 
Modularity also allowed the company to rapidly integrate new developments 
into its cars that otherwise might require substantial planning and redesign. Utilization 
of modular production and increased outsourcing within the firms' production 
systems forced a reassessment of the diversified quality production concept. At the 
end of the 1990s, DaimlerChrysler could produce luxury vehicles in the US with 
American workers lacking in vocational training without an increase in cost or a 
decline in quality, outsourcing the production of entire segments of the car. 
In Germany, Mercedes also started to make greater use of European and 
American megasuppliers for components or whole modules. The need for high 
technology and cost reductions in the production process seemed to render 
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incremental innovation, skilled workforces and tightly coupied production systems 
less important. 
Global centralized purchasing became another important issue for Daimler­
Benz, later DaimlerChrysler, in the 1990s. The company aimed to achieve important 
cost savings, leveraging the larger relationship with many suppliers in price 
negotiations and creating a global sourcing system pooled for its production facilities 
around the world. However, the preservation of key aspects of the Mercedes prestige 
was assured with a "brand bible", a detailed memorandum dictating what can and 
cannot be shared between brands (Vlasic/Stertz, 2001). Most notably, Daimler-Benz 
banned the concept of platform sharing between Chrysler and Mercedes, which was a 
major source of competitive advantage in other mergers of automakers. Although the 
common use of parts between Mercedes and Chrysler was planned to provide 
important synergy effects, the weakened financial condition of Chrysler avoided 
important progress and benefits in this aspect. Concerning the idea to share parts 
between Chrysler and Mitsubishi, executives expressed concern about losing the 
identity through sharing of parts and too much outsourcing but faced strong pressures 
to cut costs (Vlasic/Stertz, 2001; Foudy Jr., 2001). 
Mercedes competitive supplier strategy, in order to introduce the latest 
innovations into its cars, is built around forging links with the leading supplier firms, 
like Bosch, Siemens Automotive, Mahle, and Hella, for instance. In Germany, many 
of these firms are as old as the industry itself, especially those centred in the Stuttgart 
area around Mercedes. Besides, there is a strong mix of global firms like Siemens and 
Bosch and medium-sized ("Miltelstand") companies. These firms can produce high 
quality components and have access to the latest technologies, creating innovations 
that set vehicles apart, e.g. anti-10ck brakes for instance. In contrast to Toyota's 
model, Mercedes got no exclusive rights to technologies from suppliers. Even if 
Mercedes worked jointly with suppliers or helped fund their research technology, 
both realize for the investments to pay off for the supplier, the supplier needs other 
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customers to recoup its investment. Otherwise, the priees charged by suppliers would 
be prohibitive. Short periods of exclusivity (1-2 years) are often negotiated before the 
supplier is allowed to sell the new components globally. This offers Mercedes only a 
slight technological lead, but given the slow changes of models it is more or less a 
question of brand image to be the first to market with sorne new innovation. 
Daimler's embrace of shareholder value changed also the firm's relationship 
with one of its most important stakeholders: the company's employees. Mercedes, 
one of Gennany's oldest and most established companies reduced its workforce by 
about 35,000 through various means in the early 1990s. 
In the early 1990s, the income statement of Daimler-Benz was substantially 
unhedged, with a strategie imbalance between costs (incurred largely in 
Deutschmark) and revenues (received in a variety of currencies, including the US 
dollars). This exposed the company to considerable foreign exchange risk over the 
long term. Recent strength in the Deutschmarks had eroded profit margins, 
convincing management of the need to source more costs offshore. This required 
closing several German plants and reducing German employment. 
Where firms traditionally outsourced under half of their content, by the year 
2000, they were outsourcing as much as 80 per cent for sorne models. Besides, the 
opening of the former East Germany and the rest of Eastern Europe created a new 
potential source of competing low-cost labour for German unions, and concerned 
about currency exposure, Mercedes moved to open production facilities in the US. 
Daimler's Jürgen Schrempp, who owed his position only to the opposition of labour 
to a contender, commenced the new era of "shareholder value" neglecting one of its 
key stakeholders - its employees. Under Schrempp, Daimler reduced the number of 
units from 35 to 23 and reduced Daimler's payroll by 63,000 workers through 
divestures. His demand for a 12 per cent return-on-capital target reinforced the 
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message that divisions which could not perfonn wouId be sold-off or closed. While 
strong sales of the Mercedes brand and expansion into new model areas had kept up 
demand, the rest of the Daimler workforce shrank under these divestments in the 
1990s. 
In fact, even the powerful Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), a Gennan 
national union confederation, and the IG Metall, the powerful steel workers union 
representing labour in the automobile sector (leading national wage bargaining in a 
pattern-setting agreement that other sectors follow) could not withstand the 
augmenting redundancy of labour due to economic pressure fonn the global market for 
products and services (Bradley, 2004). As the low overlap in models of Daimler and 
Chrysler promised that there would be no redundancies from the merger, Gennan 
labour even offered one of its supervisory board seats to the President of the 
American automobile union United Auto Workers (UAW). 
The increased size and international orientation of DaimlerChrysler's new 
board affected its labour relations as weil. At the board level, infonnal personal 
communications with workers' representatives remained strong, but workers' 
representatives at times went into meetings where shareholders' representatives had 
already decided their position. Within the company, the increased size and the 
centralization of sorne decision-making and other areas had left workers at the plant­
level expending 80 per cent of their time just getting basic infonnation (Daimler-Benz 
former senior manager, interview, October 2006). 
Works councils continued to be successful at other functions like coordinating 
among plants to insure that inter-factory competition for getting production did not 
lead to a spiral in wages and other standards (JürgenslKrywdzinski, 2006). In fact, 
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much of the labour relations of Mercedes were c10sely related to its location in Baden­
WÜTttemberg and its history as one of the largest and richest industrial firm in 
Germany. Baden-Württemberg is one of the oldest industrial regions in Germany with 
a long history of worker solidarity, which when combined with the financial strength 
of Mercedes and other established fInTIs, had led it to play frequent role in the annual 
wage-pattem bargaining. The premium nature of the Mercedes brand and the high skill 
levels of workers have meant that wages are also among the highest in Germany. As a 
consequence, the Mercedes works council and IG Metall have been weil organized 
and successfully pushed increases in wages. But they have also worked on protecting 
a larger set of labour concems. For instance, the Mercedes works council focussed 
sorne of their efforts on humanizing work and experimenting with new forms of work 
organization. Mercedes had cooperated in these projects. 
At the same time that Mercedes was espousing shareholder value from the 
mid-1990s, it was also moving forward with new experiments in work organization. It 
even moved to copy many e1ements of the Toyota production system and 
implemented a lean production system. However, it is difficult to link the changes in 
work organization with the general shift towards shareholder value. 
In the crucial area of investment in training and education, several work 
councils argued Mercedes maintained a strong commitment. In repeated interviews 
with various levels of the works council at Mercedes, workers argued that the fInTI 
continues to invest heavily in worker training and that the company remains "a 
sought after employer" (Daimler-Benz former senior manager, interview, October 
2006). At one plant, the firm was increasing resources for training as a larger number 
of workers were coming from apprenticeship training unrelated to metalworking (i.e. 
trained as bakers and hairdressers). The commitment of Mercedes to worker training 
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remained high, as did the sense of security for the workforce. Though there have been 
occasional irritants, the only major rift came in 1996 after the government authorized 
a reduction in sick pay to 80 per cent of wages and Mercedes decided to try to 
irnplement this. The efforts quickly faltered. Mercedes capitulated and gave workers a 
major victory. 
6.2 The market for talent 
In the analysis of the market for "talent", 1 will firstly consider the global 
development of a market for talent and changes in the remuneration system for top 
management during the 1990s. Secondly, and more in particular, 1 will regard what 
kind of changes the traditional German management culture underwent in the 1990s. 
Finally, 1 will analyze in how far these tendencies changed the management structure 
and organizational culture of DaimlerChrysler. 
6.2.1 A new "global" market for talent 
The importance of top management's flexibility, strategic mobility, and 
financial performance has changed the way in which companies used to deal with 
their corporate elites and has led to the emergence of a 'secondary labour market' for 
top managers and specialised scientific or technical personnel (AllairelFirsirotu, 
2004; Solimano, 2006). Headhunters and recruitment agencies supply companies 
with highly qualified human resources, which used to be developed intemally by 
most of the companies (Finlay/Coverdill, 2003). 
In Anglo-Saxon economies, the recession in between 1981 and 1982 seems to 
have been a tuming point in labour relations. A great number of companies, being 
under pressure from competitive product and service markets, decided to rapidly lay­
off major parts of their personnel in arder to respond to the economic slow down. 
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Although many companies tried to reassure their employees, especially the middle 
management, after the recession that employment security has been re-established, 
most of the employees and managers knew by then that 'employment security' 
depends principally on their value on the market for "talent" (Allaire/Firsirotu, 2004). 
Political measures supported inter-firm mobility, integrating a universal social 
security and a 'transferable' pension system. Furthermore, also geographical mobility 
is supported by the state, eliminating more and more regional employment barriers 
between provinces and national employment barriers between nation-states. Besides, 
the evolution of values among the people, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, has 
converged from the importance of institutionalized security and loyalty towards the 
employer, towards the importance of personal 'autonomy' and 'entrepreneurship' at 
the work place (AllairelFirsirotu, 2004). 
6.2.2 Performance-orientated management remuneration 
Another aspect of the new market for "talent" is the variable remuneration37 of 
managers. Since the 1980s share option plans38 have become an integral part of top 
management remuneration in the USA. Soon their importance exceeded by far the 
one of basic pay. In the shareholder-value-oriented US economy the introduction of 
stock option plans for manager was widely welcomed and accepted by financial 
37 The total executive compensation is composed of: basic pay, bonus pay and additional share options 
or their economic equivalent (SARs, accretion rights, etc.), which leads to the following formulae: 
Total compensation = basic pay + boni + option rights. Basic pay and boni are considered as the total 
cash value compensation (Adams, 2002). 
38 A share option plan is understood as an agreement between a company and an obligee on the 
remuneration via options on the company's corporate shares. The period in which the options may be 
exercised begins with the ending of the retention period. The subscription priee is the amount to which 
the obligee has to buy one corporate share, exercising his share option. The fair value is defined as the 
value of one share option, representing the potential present profit in the case of exercise. In other 
words, it is the (market) value to which the option could be traded on the capital market. The intrinsic 
value embodies the amount ta which the present stock priee exceeds the agreed subscription priee. In 
the case that the stock price is lower than the subscription price the intrinsic value is zero. The intrinsic 
value is the value thatthe obligee wouId ascribe to a share option, if he had to decide at once about its 
exercise. At the end of the malurity of the option, the intrinsic value represents the value of the option 
(Adams, 2002). 
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experts and the general public. According to the prominent agency-theory, 
performance based remuneration would serve to align the interest of managers with 
the interest of shareholders, including minority shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Fama/Jensen, 1983; Jensen/Meckling, 1976). Perry and Zenner (2000) have identified 
quantitative indicators of the changes in the USA during the 1990s: 
•	 the Civi1ian Employment Cost Index rose by 20 per cent in the six years from 
1992 to 1998; 
•	 the Consumer Price Index rose by 16 per cent in the same period; 
•	 the median of the basic pay for the CEOs in the 500 largest US companies 
(S&P 500) increased by 29 per cent to US$ 811,000; 
•	 the median of the bonus rose by 99 per cent to US$ 750,000; 
•	 and the median actual cash value of the granted options rose by 335 per cent to 
US$ 1.6 million. 
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) prove that without the increase of share 
option plans, the CEO remuneration must have increased about over a million dollar 
in cash. The authors presume that this cash increase would have evoked a strong 
resistance among shareholders and even the resistance of the US govemment, which 
determined in the year 1993, that "not performance-based remuneration" exceeding 
one million dollar for the CEO and the company's four best paid employees, would 
be excluded from tax deductibility. Therefore, the three researchers conclude that 
share options have served as a way to hide excessive top management remuneration. 
Moreover, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) have also demonstrated empirically 
that performance-based top management remuneration does not always reflect itself 
in an increased share price of the studied companies. 
In the 1990s, European management remuneration saw a corresponding 
increase to the USA in executive compensation being based on share option plans and 
variable bonus pay. The management pay linked to stock performance led to a, 
beforehand, unthinkabLe high Leve1 of management remuneration in Europe. While in 
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fonner times wealth in such dimensions was acquired only as the result of successful 
entrepreneurship over many generations, now executive managers were able to gather 
riches in a few years. 
Traditionally, especially in stakeholder-value-based economies like Gennany, 
managers were remunerated according to fixed fmancial perfonnance indicators and 
the prevailing compensation difference between the salary of an average Gennan 
worker and a Gennan manager was not too great and thus still accepted and 
understood by the Gennan public. The following figure shows the estimated 
remuneration per board of management member, including basic pay, bonus pay and 
the economic value of additional share options, for several Gennan companjes and 
the Gennan chancellor in the year 2000. 
Figure 6.6	 Estimated German management remuneration (per board of 
management member in the year 2000) 
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However, the figures are only estimated in a study provided by Adams (2002), 
as Gennan companies were not obliged to publish detailed information on the 
remuneration of the board of management members until the year 2006. 
The Deutsche Bank, Infineon, and DaimlerChrysler, which are no longer 
influenced by one major shareholder at the end of the 1990s, pay their managers a 
high and strongly perfonnance-based remuneration, including an expensive stock 
option plan, to align the interest of managers with the interest of dispersed 
shareholders. Companies, like BMW, that still have major shareholders, like the 
Quandt family in the case of BMW, limit the remuneration of managers via stock 
options and align their interest with the interest of the company's managers by taking 
direct strategie influence on the board of management. 
6.2.3 Changes in the German management culture 
Being part of a traditionally stakeholder-oriented economy, German managers 
contend with strong voice from concentrated owners and banks, as weil as employees 
and unions. Management always used to face a dual pressure for both long-term 
profit maximization and employee utility (Aoki, 1988). Thus, the traditional 
management culture used to be highly consensus-oriented. Interests had to be 
negotiated in shifting coalitions, which involved patterns of horse-trading, issue 
linking, and package deals between different groups of management 
(Jackson/Hopner/Kurdelbusch, 2004). Several institutional features making up the 
social world of Gennan management supported this consensus orientation, which 
began to break up in the early 1990s: 
•	 Management careers tended to follow functional specializations, even within 
the management board. Educational backgrounds in science and engineering 
dominated the highest positions, the so-called Gennan "Technocrats". 
Managers remained tied closely to their occupation (Beru!) and thus 
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conspicuously lacked a generalist orientation. The strong tendency for 
technical functions to be incorporated into the management hierarchy also used 
to limit the relative importance of financial considerations (Lane, 1993). 
•	 Secondly, managerial authority tended to be rooted in technical competence 
rather than in supervisory or business-related skills. 'Management' was not so 
strongly set apart from other occupational groups in either educational 
background or forms of compensation. In fact, the productivist ethos of the 
business organization acted as an integrating mechanism, with strong focus on 
incremental technical innovation, high quality standards and build-up of long­
term market share (Hôpner, 2001). 
•	 Thirdly, the legal principle of collegiality and consensus orientation ln the 
German management board worked against a strong dominance of the President 
and balanced financial considerations with other management functions such as 
operations and personnel (Jansche, 1998). 
•	 Fourth, moderately high rates of internai promotion and long management 
tenures helped to stabilize the long-term relations that top managers enjoyed 
with their suppliers, customers, other corporations, banks, and works councils. 
The limited role of the external labour market also favoured the orientation 
toward long-term profits instead of short-term success. Moreover, managerial 
compensation traditionally avoided high power incentives such as stock 
options (Kürsten, 2006). 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, these traditional German management 
structures have been undergoing an extensive change toward a greater finance 
orientation and away from the traditional science and engineering focus. This shift is 
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symptomatic not only for shareholder demands, but the internationalization of 
managerial labour markets and the growing encounter of German junior management 
with Anglo-American management cultures. 
In his study, Hôpner (2003) collected information on the careers of ail 90 top 
managers who were chief executives in the 40 biggest listed industrial corporations in 
Germany during the 1990s. A few findings on the development of the career and 
education of top managers in the 1990s can be summarized: 
•	 There was a strong trend towards further professionalization. The share of 
chief executives without higher educational training declined from just under 14 
per cent to zero per cent in 1998 and 1999. The share of top managers who 
went through the German apprenticeship system was in decline (from 30 per 
cent in 1990 to 15 per cent in 1999). 
•	 The role of the externat labour market was also clearly rising. In 1990, 17 per 
cent of the observed top managers were recruited from outside; in 1999, the 
percentage rose to more than 35 per cent. As a result, the role of in-house 
careers has been declining since the mid-1990s. 
•	 The percentage of top executives who could be classified as financial experts 
with experience working in the financial division was rising. 39 per cent of chief 
executives have studied economics, 24 per cent have trained as lawyers, and 32 
per cent have studied natural science or technical subjects. Comparing these 
data with information on the 1970s (Poensgen, 1982) suggests a strong decline 
in the role of natural science and technical subjects. 
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•	 The average time in office among top managers was in dramatic decline since 
the early 1980s. 
The following figure ilIustrates the decreasing average time in office of German 
CEOs in Germany's 40 largest corporations. It is important to notice that the average 
years in office of CEOs in Germany have been decreasing since the 1960s, but the 
decisive rapid decline did not start until the early 1980s. In the period between 1980 
and 2005 the average years in office declined from 13 years in 1980, to 9 years in 
1990, to 7 years in 1996, and finally even to less than 5 years in 2005. 
Figure 6.7 Average years in office of German CEOs: 1960-2005 
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These changes in the 'social world' of German top managers help explain why 
shareholder value strategies enjoy an increasingly high reputation among managers in 
the late 1990s. The changing social background and career incentives for management 
influence their perception of corporate goals. The emergence of a highiy competitive 
labour market for managers requires the application of measurable performance 
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criteria. At the same time, the willingness of supervisory boards to fire top managers 
is on the increase. 
In the 1990s, several chief executives were forced to retire from office because 
of bad performance and the resulting crises of confidence in the supervisory board, for 
example Horst W. Urban (Continental), Anton Schneider (Deutz), Bernd 
Pischetsrieder (BMW), Heinz Schirnmelbusch and Heinrich Binder 
(Metallgesellschaft), Bernhard Walter (Dresdner Bank), Dieter Vogel 
(ThyssenKrupp). Beyond this, it can be argued that the increased importance of 
Financial Economics in education and career favours the willingness to utilize financial 
indicators (Aldrighi, 2002). 
In his study "Corporate Governance in Transition: Ten Empirical Findings on 
Shareholder Value and Industrial Relations in Germany" Hôpner (2001) investigates 
the changes in careers of CEOs in Germany's top 40 companies. 
At the beginning of the 1990s most of the CEOs passed a German 
apprenticeship system, were recruited from inside the company, and often had a more 
technical educational background. During the 1990s things changed. Today most of 
Germany's top CEOs are managers with financial expertise recruited from outside the 
company, who have passed a higher educational training, whereas less have passed 
the German apprenticeship system. This development reflects an important change of 
values within the German organizations. Traditionally it was important for German 
CEOs to have gained legitimacy among the company's workers and within the 
company through long years of hard work from the bottom, as apprentice, to the very 
top of the company, as CEO. The knowledge about the company and a technical 
expertise were generally more important than general managerial or financial skills. 
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Fundamental changes in the environment of the company, in particular in the 
market for capital and in the market for products and services, led to a change in the 
German market for "talent". The importance to improve financial results to satisfy 
international capital markets and the need to restructure companies in a way that they 
can compete in globalized markets for products and services opened the door for 
CEOs from the external market for "talent", who provided financial expertise and 
managerial knowledge and skills to drive organizational change. 
Figure 6.8 Careers of CEOs in German corporations: 1990-1999 
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6.2.4 The impact on the Daim/erChrys/er Corporation 
Pay and equity, a highly contentious issue in Germany, moved also to the 
forefront of the Daimler-Benz Corporation issues in the late 1990s. Daimler's CEO 
Jürgen Schrempp had earned criticism for his aggressive stance in favour of bringing 
German executive pay in line with American practices, which are both higher and 
more perfonnance-related. Daimler had moved 10 increase the use of stock options 
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for key managers and perfonnance bonuses for its workers. One of the biggest 
concems was containing the differences in executive pay. 
Table 6.2	 Board of management and CEO remuneration at 
DaimierChrysler39 (not including bonus pay and stock options) 
Year Remuneration of the members of the 
Board of Management 
(for the whole year) 
1995	 11.9 million DM (::::: 6.07 million Euro) for 
the ten members of the Board 
1996 14.0 million DM (::::: 7.14 million Euro) for 
thirteen members of the Board 
1997 20.0 million DM (::::: 10.2 million Euro) for 
eleven members of the Board 
1998 41.0 million Euro for seven-teen members 
of the Board 
1999 55.4 million Euro for eight-teen members 
of the Board 
2000 52.6 million Euro for four-teen members 
of the Board 
2001 22.0 million Euro for eleven members of 
the Board 
2002 50.8 million Euro for thirteen members of 
the Board 
2004 31.6 million Euro for twelve members of 
the Board 
total 276.81 million Euro 
Source: Grassltn (2005: 232). 
Average 
remuneration 
per Board 
member (for the 
whole year) 
607,000 Euro 
549,230 Euro 
927,272 Euro 
2,411,764 Euro 
3,077,777 Euro 
3,757,142 Euro 
2,000,000 Euro 
3,907,692 Euro 
2,633,333 Euro 
13,963,518 Euro 
Estimated Remuneration
 
of the CEO
 
(for the whole year)
 
1.6 million DM
 
(::::: 816,326 Euro)
 
(for the last eight months
 
from 05/95 and 12/95)
 
2.0 million DM
 
(::::: 1.02 million Euro)
 
3.32 million DM
 
(::::: 1.69 million Euro)
 
5.54 million Euro
 
5.82 million Euro
 
7.0 million Euro
 
3.66 million Euro
 
7.24 million Euro
 
4.86 million Euro
 
37.65 million Euro
 
Before the merger, Chrysler CEO Bob Eaton eamed US$15 million (::::: 10.94 
million Euro) to Schrempp's 1.69 million Euro. Chrysler CEO Eaton also had stock 
options worth between US$50 million (::::: 36.46 million Euro) and US$lOO million (::::: 
72.92 million Euro) (Grasslin, 2005). Pay differentials among executives in both 
finns at other levels were also large. Chrysler, like other American automakers, had 
39 The remuneration of the Board members has been published in Daimler-Benz, later 
DaimlerChrysler, annual reports. The remuneration of the Daimler-Benz, 1ater DaimlerChyrsler, CEü 
is only estimated according to the average remuneration of each Board member by the author Jürgen 
Grasslin. 
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moved toward compensating workers with annual bonuses linked to the performance 
of the automaker. In 1999, payments to Chrysler workers averaged $8,100 million (::::: 
5,906 million Euro) vs. $1,320 (::::: 963 million Euro) at Mercedes which is slowly 
moving to increase the variable e1ement in worker pay). German workers argued 
unsuccessfully that the company should shift toward a uniform bonus system 
worldwide. On the other hand, they were relieved when the following year they still 
received an average of $1,470 (::::: 1072 million Euro) for record profits at Mercedes, 
during a time where these profits were being swamped by massive losses at Chrysler 
in 2000 (St. Jean, 2004). The merger with Chrysler brought these issues to the 
forefront, but German labour did not object. This was a major firm strategy with the 
support of its shareholders. 
As a manager personality, Jürgen Schrempp broke with many German 
management traditions. Although his educational and professional background was 
technical and based on his internai career at DaimlerChrysler, Schrempp embraced 
the financial and business-oriented ideas produced by the American model of 
shareholder value. 
Jürgen E. Schrempp, born on 15 September 1944, in the south-western 
German university town of Freiburg, always sought to surpass his limits. He climbed 
the Italian Alps with Reinhold Messner and played chess with Gary Kasparov, 
working out every morning, chain-smoking, and playing the jazz trurnpet, drinking, 
and singing until late into the night (Vlasic/Stertz, 2000). Schrempp's father was 
captured by the Soviet army in 1944 and held as a prisoner of war until 1949, when 
Schrempp was five years old. The family of two parents and three boys lived in a 
small apartment while the father eamed a meagre living administering college 
admissions tests at the University of Freiburg. At age 15 Schrempp dropped out of 
high school to take a job as an apprentice mechanic at a local Mercedes-Benz 
dealership. At age 20 he married his first wife, a high school student named Renate, 
who recalled being overwhelmed by Schrempp's expansive personality. In 1964 
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Schrempp enrolled in the University of Applied Science at Offenburg, Germany, 
supporting himself and his wife not only by working as an auto mechanic but also by 
playing trumpet in a band at weddings and other events. Upon receiving his 
mechanical engineering degree in 1967, he accepted a job offer to work as a sales 
representative for Mercedes-Benz, the most notable subsidiary of Daimler-Benz. 
Figure 6.9 Jürgen E. Schrempp and his career al Daimler-Chrysler 
Biography of Jürgen E. Schrempp: 
Born as a son of a university clerk in Freiburg (15/09/1944) 
Joined as an apprentice motor mechanic Mercedes-Benz (1967) 
Attended university to train as an engineer (1967-1970) 
Returned to Daimler and held various posts (1970s) 
Appointed to management in the service division of Mercedes­
Benz South Africa (1974) 
Appointed board member responsible for engineering at Mercedes­
Benz ofSouth-Africa (1980) 
President of Euclid, Inc., a 100% subsidiary of Daimler-Benz in Cleveland, Ohio (1982) 
Vice President of Mercedes-Benz of South Africa (1985) 
Chairman of Daimler's aerospace subsidiary, Dasa (1989) 
Replaced Edzard Reuter as Chairman of Daimler-Benz (1995) 
Jürgen E. Schrempp surprisingly declares that he will resign as DaimlerChrysler CEO on the 
31 December 2005, Dieter Zetsche becomes his successor (28 July 2005) 
Source: Adapted from V1asic/Sterz (2000). 
After having gained the attention of the upper management of Mercedes­
Benz, he was sent to South Africa not for punishment but for a chance to expand his 
corporate horizons. In South Africa, Schrempp drove hundreds of miles a day, 
visiting manufacturing plants, auto dealers, and consumers. He became the chief 
salesman for Mercedes-Benz's South African operations. During 1974-1982 he was 
an outspoken opponent of apartheid, treating ail races equally in pay, benefits, and 
opportunities for advancement. His denunciations of apartheid came to the attention 
of the top management of Daimler-Benz, who selected Schrempp to head the 
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operations of Euclid, a subsidiary that manufactured heavy trucks in Cleveland, Ohio, 
in the United States (Grasslin, 2000). 
During his tenure as Chainnan of Daimler-Benz, Schrempp proved to be a 
master of boardroom politics, with the ability to make decisions quickly and the 
willingness to take risks. He called these decisions "digital" decisions: 
uncompromising yes/no detenninations that a computer might make. Jürgen 
Schrempp sought to be an important player on the worId stage, and he hoped to 
change the course ofhistory. As CEO of Daimler-Benz he tried to make his company 
and himself part of the new global economy that he thought was arriving in the late 
1990s. Believing that the most successful companies of the future would transcend 
cultures and national boundaries, he strove to make sure that his corporation would 
not be left behind to be remembered only in history. To keep Daimler-Benz strong, he 
chose to opt for a bold restructuring of the company and daring acquisitions that 
would make the company a universal presence throughout the world and a leader in 
every kind of auto manufacturing. Thus, he was responsible for significant 
restructuring and portfolio rationalization at Daimler-Benz, retuming the company to 
profitability in the year 1996, just one year after having started his work as Daimler's 
CEO and Reuter's suceessor, in 1995 (St. Jean, 2004). 
Schrempp broke German business taboos through his tough labour 
negotiations, ordering huge lay-offs to try to tum the company around. His aggressive 
American style management practices and his focus on shareholder value were not 
popular in many German business circles and especially not popular among the 
German public. Schrempp characterized his methods stating, "Nobody will ever 
spread a rumour about my having been brought up at a girls' boarding school." 
(Grasslin, 1999: 69). Schrempp was a charismatic leader who enjoyed being the 
centre of attention. He relied heavily on his magnetic personality to secure the loyalty 
of management and labour alike and to push forward his business initiatives. He was 
called "Neutron Jürgen" in the German press, an allusion to Neutron Jack Welch, who 
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earned the nickname because, like a neutron bomb, he left buildings standing while 
eliminating personnel at General Electric. While head of Deutsche Aerospace, 
Schrempp had cut operations that were losing money, most notably Fokker, Holland's 
aerospace company, and while leader of Daimler-Benz he had cut subsidiaries, 
earning the "neutron" nickname. But the ruthlessness implied by his nickname was in 
sorne ways undeserved; he usually agonized over his decisions to cut jobs, often 
thinking not in terms of profits and losses but in terms of what would benefit workers 
and customers. 
Schrempp was often compared to American business leaders because of his 
boldness. He wanted to change the world, and he was a German patriot who wanted 
Germany to remain a great economic power. Because of this vision, he often scorned 
such short-term concerns as stock market gains and losses to emphasize a long-term 
outlook that extended beyond his own lifetime. His insistence that Daimler-Benz 
research experimental power supplies, especially fuel cells, was part of his vision for 
the future. In the short-term, these alternative power supplies represented financial 
losses for the company, but Schrempp hoped that over time they would keep his 
company strong and healthy as petroleum-powered vehicles became obsolete. 
A driven and charismatic individual Schrempp also believed that business 
always cornes before personal or career considerations. When he announced the end 
to his 35-year marriage in 1999 he explained it by saying he wanted to concentrate on 
making the merger a success. In an interview with a Dutch newspaper Schrempp 
stated, "This company needs me more than 1 need the company. Do you think that's 
arrogant? 1 can tell. Write it down." (Rothman/Spiegelberg, 1998). Schrempp valued 
decisiveness over protracted consensus building. "He's very much a don't waste my 
time guy", commented Hypo Bank auto analyst Thomas Aney. Schrempp counted 
GE Chairman Jack Welch among his business heroes. 
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The compositIOn of Schrempp's closet circle of advisers, his so-called 
"kitchen cabinet,,40, composed of Eckard Cordes, a mergers and acquisition expert, 
Rüdiger Grube, who plotted corporate strategy at DASA, and Claudia Deiniger, a 
former secretary at DASA who became his personal assistant, as weil as his 
friendships with American shareholder-value-oriented managers, such as Jack Welsh, 
may be understood as another evidence of Schrempp's idea and aim to change 
traditional German business values at DaimlerChrysler from a traditionally 
stakeholder- towards a more shareholder-oriented model. 
The choice of advisers was a clear sign of Schrempp's shareholder-value­
oriented management style. However, although Schrempp's personal values seemed 
an important factor for DaimlerChrysler's shift towards the shareholder value model, 
the pressure from global capital markets and the global market for automobile 
products and related services were even more decisive factors. Moreover, the pressure 
from these markets enabled Schrempp to develop his vision of shareholder value at 
DaimlerChrysler, protected by the chairman of the supervisory board and personal 
friend Hilmar Kopper (Deutsche Bank), who shared his vision of shareholder value. 
When Jürgen Schrempp became CEO at Daimler-Benz in 1995, he immedi­
ately initiated cost-cutting measures by selling the biggest loss-making divisions and 
cutting the staff at corporate headquarters. His goals were "transparency, honesty and 
immediate disclosure of information" (Daimler-Benz, 1996). He set a high goal for 
Daimler's diverse operations: a return on capital of at least 12 per cent, coupled with 
a requirement to be as profitable as international rivais. Besides, together with 
Schrempp, a whole bunch of young international MBA graduates walked through the 
doors of the corporate headquarters in Stuttgart-Môhringen (Daimler-Benz former 
senior manager, interview, October 2006) to clean up the so-called "bullshit castle". 
Traditional consensus oriented structures were broken up by Schrempp' s dominant 
40 See chapter V, in 5.2.2.2 "The merger of Mercedes-Benz and Daimler-Benz". 
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board position, backed up by the chairman of Daimler-Benz's supervisory chairman 
Hilmar Kopper from Deutsche Bank41 • 
Although Daimler-Benz openly tried to embrace shareholder value principles 
in the 1990s, the company, ironically, became the subject of a lawsuit by an activist 
shareholder group that claimed company officiaIs for the deliberately misled of 
investors into expecting a profit in 1995. In fact, the company sustained a DM 5.7 
billion (2.91 billion Euro) loss (Bali, 2004). In May 1996, it was disclosed at the 
annual shareho1ders meeting that management was in fact aware of the risk before the 
profit prediction was made. Shareholders may have gone without a dividend in 1995, 
but the members of the management board got a bonus of about DM 600,000 
(306, 122 Euro) each for the "great burden they bore" in that year. German accounting 
principles, unlike American ones, did not require that individual salaries be revealed, 
but a1together the eight board members received nearly DM Il million (5.61 million 
Euro) in salary for the year until the year 2006. Shareholders were not pleased 
(Grasslin, 2005). 
6.3 The market for capital 
The analysis of the market for capital considers the shifts and changes in the 
German capital market during the 1990s and their effects on the management and 
corporate govemance system of DaimlerChrysler. 
6.3.1 Liheralization ofinternational financial markets 
Already since the 1980s, the financial scene has been rapidly and hugely 
modified around the world. The relentless harsh competition among financial 
41 The Deutsche Bank AG itself aggressively introduced performance-oriented top management 
remuneration in fonn of share option plans in the 1990s. The interests of the DaimlerChrysler 
management board and the dominant shareholder Deutsche Bank were thus coherent on the issue of 
new methods of variable management compensation. 
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institutions and the broad and intensive deregulation of their activities in the market 
for capital have promoted the continuous integration and liberalization of 
international financial markets (Aldrighi, 2002). 
In a great number of countries funded pension schemes have expanded at an 
enormously fast pace, fostering capital markets and non-bank financial intermediaries 
supplying this type of contractual savings. At the same time, individual and 
institutional investors have been increasingly aware of the returns from the broad 
range of alternative investment instruments - made available by the deregulation of 
financial markets together with the reduction in transaction costs resulting from the 
spread of information technology. In Europe, the launch of the European single 
monetary currency has been another leading force affecting national financial markets 
and institutions to open their national capital markets for foreign investors 
(Allen/Gale, 1995). 
In Germany, the liberalization and internationalization of the German 
financial market, which was expressed in the general increase of market­
capitalization, as well as the augmented international share listing of German 
companies, caused an important shift in the traditionally concentrated share 
ownership structure towards more dispersed ownership and increased the number of 
institutional investors in the German capital market (Kogut/Walker, 2001; Beyer, 
2003; JürgenslNaumann/Rupp, 2000). Prowse (1994) concludes that these changes 
did not occur evidently until the mid-1990s. Throughout the mid-1990s, however, the 
mentioned capital market pressures led already continually to the dissolution of the 
so-called "Deutschland AG". In fact, this model of a strong national network of 
banks and corporations characterized by a concentrated insider ownership structure 
has functioned weil for decades providing a stable platform of growth for German 
companies (Karsch, 2000). Therefore, it is comprehensive why Germany maintained 
and tried to maintain this stable structure for as long as possible. However, in the mid 
1990s international capital market pressures and Germany's integration in the 
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European financial market forced German economy to open itself to international 
capital market standards. A 1996 report by the California state pension fund 
(CaIPERS) reports that: 
"Gennany has recently been experiencing an economic slowdown causing many 
people to reassess the old ways of doing. [... ] The growth and liquidity of the 
international capital markets has made the cost of Gennan capital harder for 
German executives to ignore and caused more companies 10 begin 100king toward 
cheaper international sources. As Gennan corporations attempt to access the 
international capital markets, they are finding that the US and UK institutional 
investors that are the predominant source of this capital have certain expectations 
of management. " (Cal PERS, 1996). 
Consequently, the changes in the German market for capital, which evolved in 
the context of the general internationalization of financial markets, had a significant 
impact on the prevailing management and corporate governance system in Germany. 
6.3.2 The changing role ofthe German banks 
Traditionally, the big banks in Germany have been the incarnation of the 
proverbial "Deutschland AG", being the spider in the centre of the web of power and 
influence in the German economy for several decades. Until the end of the 1990s, the 
major German banks: Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank, had their 
representatives sitting on supervisory boards in more than four hundred major 
German companies. The supervisory boards had the essential duties to hire and fire 
the management board and approve or deny major financial decisions. Together, the 
supervisory and the management board provided a stable consensus-orientated system 
of checks and balances (Karsch, 2000). 
The close ties between the major banks and industry had begun already in the 
last century. When large amounts of privately held capital did not yet exist, German 
banks were founded to finance industrialization. In the immediate post-war years 
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bank finance was about the only source of start-up funding and working capital 
(Mole, 1990: 33). 
Figure 6.10	 Corporate debts in form of bank loans in relation to the total 
corporate debt: 1980-2005 
i 80 
"C 
:lf 70 -t-- ~,_____-- -----------------j
 
~
 
i: 60 t--'-=~~~~'"'~~~~ ...~~;::;::::::::=:;;;;:::_·8 
--+-USA
'3 50 +-----==-- ----""---------------j

S -Japan

... 
~ 40 .~--------"-~-----­ France 
Cl 
"""'*""" Germany~ 30~------------=::::::::::::~::::=--------
CIl	 
--iIl-UKCl, 
.~ 20 C~:::::;:==~~S;;:~;;;~~;~ 
,; 10 +­
..ll: 
; 0 +----r------,-------.,.-----,.------.---~ 
.I:l 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Source: Adapte<! from Tyrell (2006: 3). 
Gennan banks traditionally used to be '\miversal banks", which combine the 
roles played in other countries by a variety of different financial institutions: 
commercial banks, investrnent banks, merchant banks, savings banks, stockbroker 
and institutional investors (Mole, 1990: 33). The power of these banks lies in the size 
and diversity of their shareholdings in Germany's major companies. Typically they 
hold shares for the long-term, being interested in the financial well-being of the 
company and not only in short-term profits (Regan, 1992). 
On the one hand this system has been criticized for giving the banks too much 
power, however, on the other hand it has provided the German industry also with 
considerable stability. Therefore, the supervisory and management boards in the 
German publicly traded corporations have not had to deal with many of the problems 
that are aIl too frequent in the US: the savings and loan disaster, government bailouts 
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of large banks, insider trading, leveraged buyouts, hostile takeovers, or junk bonds 
(Glouchevich, 1992). 
Besides, Germany's banking system has been very effective in protecting 
publicly traded companies against hostile takeovers. German banks could not only 
vote the shares they own in a company, they were legally permitted to vote the shares 
they hoId for their customer; thus controlling as much as 60 per cent of the voting 
power in sorne companies (Drucker, 1995). As a result, hostile takeovers are nearly 
impossible because they can simply be blocked (Hill, 1994). 
The role of the German banks only began to change, when competition from 
international banks and developing financial markets became more intense in the late 
1990s. Their first reaction was to adopt cost-cutting measures in order to offer more 
attractive financial products to customers. Even in a country where the government 
considers job preservation a top priority, the large commercial banks entered into 
negotiations with their works councils to begin employment reductions (Keltner, 
1995). 
More importantly major banks began to reduce or eliminate industrial 
shareholdings in companies with economic problems from their portfolios (Hôpner, 
2001). For example, at the end of the 1990s, Deutsche Bank commenced to trim its 
large holdings in Klôckner-Humboldt-Deutz, in the transportation group Daimler­
Benz, and in the leading construction company Philipp Holzmann. These actions 
obviously appealed to shareholders, because Deutsche Bank stock rose almost 1% on 
news of the possible portfolio divestitures (Randlesome, 1994). As a matter of fact, 
the losses many companies had incurred during the 1990s had also resurrected the 
criticism of the German system of corporate governance, in which banks have 
extensive connections to industry in the form of shareholdings as weil as 
representation on the company's supervisory boards, in general. 
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As the European Community's legislation continued to loosen regulations, 
German banks began to rethink the way they did business and become more dynamic 
and competitive (Glouchevich, 1992). Basel 142, in force since 1992, and Basel II43 , in 
force since 2006, have had a strong impact on German banks, imposing new 
"international" standards on minimum capital requirements, supervisory review 
processes, and enhanced disclosure. For example, the new 25 per cent capital 
requirement for stock investments, in Basel II, obliges German banks to reduce the 
risk of their stock investments by financing a higher amount of security capital for 
each shareholding (Beekmann: 2004). 
Consequently major German banks, like the Deutsche Bank (DB), have 
decided to undertake a radical change in their corporate strategy: from being a 
German "universal bank" to becoming a specialized internationally competitive 
investment bank. In 1998, DB set up its subsidiary DB Investor to manage ail of its 
industrial holdings. DB Investor pressures managers of firms in which it holds equity 
stakes to boost profits, seIls equity stakes as soon as it can be done profitably, and 
buys equity stakes that promise to yield significant profits through resale within a 
short period, i.e. less than four years (New York Times, 1999). 
Along with reducing their holdings, banks have been curtailing their traditional 
role in corporate governance, i.e. the institutions and practices that regulate or control 
42 Basel 1 is the tenu which refers to a round of deliberations by central bankers from around the 
world, and in 1988, the Basel Committee (BCBS) in Basel, Switzerland, published a set of minimal 
capital requirements for banks. This is also known as the 1988 Basel Accord, and was enforced by law 
in the Group ofTen (G-IO) countries in 1992, with Japanese banks penuitted an extended transition 
period. Basel 1 is now widely viewed as outmoded, and a more comprehensive set of guidelines, 
known as BasellI are in the process of implementation by several countries (Deutsche Bank, 2007). 
43 Basel Il, a1so called The New Accord (correct full name is the International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards - A Revised Framework) is the second Basel Accord and 
represents recommendations by bank supervisors and central bankers from the 13 countries making up 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to revise the international standards for 
measuring the adequacy of a bank's capital. It was created to promote greater consistency in the way 
banks and banking regulators approach risk management across national borders. The Bank for 
International Settlements (often confused with the BCBS) supplies the secretariat for the BCBS and is 
not itself the BCBS (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007). 
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firm managers. In 1974 banks held 20 per cent of the supervisory board seats in the 
100 largest firms; by 1993 this percentage had shrunk to 6.3 per cent (Lütz, 2002). 
Bankers have reduced also the number of supervisory board chairs that they control. 
The KonTraG law, from 1998, introduced greater restrictions on the ability of banks 
to influence firms through the proxy votes they control. For example, a bank that 
owns more than 5 per cent of another firm's equity may no longer automatically vote 
the shares in that firm held on deposit in the bank (KonTraG, 1998). 
6.3.3 Increased market capitalization 
The relative success of German industrial firms in self-financing, the 
perceived need to grow in size and scale, or the risk of being shut out of global 
competition and the desire of banks to move away from traditional financing have 
pressed German firms in the 1990s to tap more and more into international capital 
markets (Foudy Jr., 2001). 
Between 1990 and 1996 the total number of domestically listed companies in 
Germany rose from 649 (23 per cent of the GDP) in 1990 to 680 (32 per cent of the 
GDP) in the year 1996 (Fukao, 1995). The stock market capitalization as a percentage 
of GDP rose by 39 per cent in this period. From 1997 to the middle of 2001 the 
number of Gennans owning shares or mutual funds rose from 5.6 million to 13.44 
million (i.e. 140 per cent). In western Germany 22.5 per cent of adults now own 
shares or mutual funds (in eastern Gennany the figure is 15.4 per cent). Despite the 
market crash in late 2000 and 200 1, this number continued to grow, although 
investors clearly preferred mutual funds to direct share ownership (DAI, 2001). From 
1983 to 1996, an average of 16 companies went public each year; in 1998, 78 firms 
went public and 1999, 167 finns went public; the vast majority did so on the Neuer 
Mark! (HutterlLeppert, 2000). 
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Figure 6.11	 Domestic market capitalization relative to GDP: A cross-country 
comparison between 1994 and 2005 
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In contrast to the relationship between banks and a growing number of large 
firms, the relationship between banks and smaller firms remains more firmly rooted 
in long-term, lending based relationships. For example, during the 1980s and 1990s 
numerous regulatory reforms were adopted with the intention of encouraging small­
and middle-sized enterprises (SMEs) to go public, but these efforts met with 
relatively Iittle success (at least until very recently). Instead, German SMEs continued 
to rely heavily on conventional bank loans. There are severa1 reasons for this, a 
primary one being the reluctance of SME owners to give up control over their firms. 
Also, accessing capital markets is usually more costly for smaller firms than bank 
loans, ail the more so because German SMEs have been weil served by a highly 
efficient commercialloan market (Sauve/Scheuer, 1999). 
Since German SMEs have been reluctant to go public, but nonetheless were 
confronted with declining equity levels since the 1970s, German banks and policy 
makers satisfied this need to a considerable degree by "patching up" the old system 
through establishing and expanding the regulatory basis for private equity companies 
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(Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften). These companies have grown steadily since the 
early 1980s and played an important role in rebuilding eastem Gennany as weil. 
However, the ro1e of private equity finns in Gennany is still1ess important than in the 
USA or the UK. In Gennany private equity firms have concentrated their activity on 
the Gennan "Mitte1stand" (medium-sized businesses) unti1 2005, whereas in Anglo­
Saxon countries they have invested in major companies (Handelsb1att, 2006). 
However, recent1y private equity companies have begun to invest a1so in Gennany's 
largest DAX 30 companies, which we will discuss further in the section about 
institutional investors in Gennany. 
6.3.4 International share listing ofGermanfirms 
In the 1990s several large Gennan finns moved toward intemationalizing their 
investor base (and capital sources), and thus weakening domestic shareholder control 
and bank connections, by listing on the New York Stock Exchange. By going abroad 
and by attracting inward investment by foreign institutional investors, the shareholder 
base of numerous large Gennan firms has become more widely dispersed and 
intemationalized. In Gennany, the intemationalization of the national capital market 
has increased the importance of intemational institutional investors, e.g. pension 
funds and investment funds. The intemationalization of the investor base of many 
large Gennan fmus (and the big three Gennan commercial banks, too) is connected 
to a growing emphasis by such finns on shareholder value, i.e. managing the 
company so as to maximize return on equity (which manifests itself in share priees 
and dividends). 
According to a study by the German stock exchange institute (DAI) 55 Gennan 
corporations were listed at a foreign stock exchange in 2005. Most of these 
corporations have acquired besides their original listing in Gennany one additional 
listing abroad. AU together there were 117 foreign listings registered for the 
mentioned 55 Gennan companies with foreign listings. The majority of Gennan 
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foreign listings can be allotted to European stock exchanges (SWX in Switzerland, 
Euronext in Amsterdam and Paris, LSE In London, etc.) 
(GlaumlThomaschewskilWeber, 2005). 
Figure 6.12 Share of stock exchanges in the world's market capitalization 
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During the 1990s, however, many German corporations started to list also at US 
stock exchanges, especially at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDQ), the 
world's most important stock exchanges in terms of market capitalization (44 per cent 
of the world's total market capitalization at the end of July 2005). 
The majority of these companies listed as ADRs at US stock exchanges. Only 
DaimlerChrysler and the Deutsche Bank listed as common stock, which reflected the 
high importance of the US capital market for the two German corporations. 
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Table 6.3 German corporations listed in the USA (July 2005) 
Company Stock exchange Form Date of listing 
Allianz AG NYSE ADR Cornrnon Nov. 2000 
Altana AG NYSE ADR Cornrnon May 2002 
Aixtron AG NASDAQ ADR Cornrnon March 2005 
BASF AG NYSE ADR Cornrnon June 2000 
Bayer AG NYSE ADR Cornrnon June 2002 
DaimlerChrysler AG NYSE Cornrnon Stock Oct. 1998 
Deutsche Bank AG NYSE Common Stock Oct. 2001 
Deutsche Telekorn AG NYSE ADR Cornmon Nov. 1996 
E.ON AG NYSE ADR Cornmon Oct. 1997 
Epcos AG NYSE ADR Cornmon Oct. 1999 
Fresenius Medical Care AG NYSE ADR Cornmon Sept. 1996 
Fresenius Medical Care AG NYSE ADR Preferred Nov. 1996 
GPC Bioteeh AG NASDAQ ADR Cornmon June 2004 
Infineon Technologies AG NYSE ADR Cornmon March 2000 
Pfeiffer Vacuurn Technol. AG NYSE ADR Corn mon July 1996 
SAP AG NYSE ADR Cornmon Aug.1998 
Schering AG NYSE ADR Cornrnon Oct. 2000 
SGL Carbon AG NYSE ADR Cornmon June 1996 
Siemens AG NYSE ADR Cornmon March 2001 
Source: Adapted from GlaumrrhomaschewskiIWeber (2005: 85). 
6.3.5 Changes in the German ownership structure 
The changes in the German ownership structure concemed both the 
composition and the identity of shareholders in Gennany. 
6.3.5.1 Majority shareholders 
In the Gennan system of "insider control", insiders - generally majority 
shareholders such as large banks, insurance fi nns, corporations and families ­
controlled the strategies and decisions of large Gennan firms, relatively free of the 
influence of stock markets or small shareholders (Ziegler, 2000). 
This tightly linked insider system rneant that corporate actors typically 
responded in sorne collective fashion to cornmon challenges as well as to challenges 
or problems facing an individual finn. The Gennan system rested on the corporate 
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strategies of these insiders. The strategy of large commercial banks, for instance, 
focussed on cultivating industrial development and competitiveness through a system 
of broadly negotiated industrial change (Zysman, 1983). Part ofthis strategy involved 
investment in maintaining strong networks (both capital and human) among larger 
firms and the cultivation of long-term relationships to corporate customers. 
During the 1990s, capital market pressures (which derived from German 
banks selling unprofitable strategie investments in their share portfolios, the 
internationalization of the German financial market, and the increasing market 
capitalization of German firms) led to a larger dispersion of share-ownership and, 
thus, to an important decrease of the influence of majority shareholders in the 
German capital market. 
6.3.5.2 Minoritv shareholders 
At the end of the 1980s, the German stock market was still quite small, but it 
was growing. "German investors see risk, while the Americans see possibilities" 
(Wall Street Journal, 1986) explained the state secretary of the German Ministry of 
Finance in 1986, the weak development of the German financial market. 
The German attitude towards the financial market did not change until the 
beginning of the 1990s. In 1987, only about 5% of the population owned stock. By 
1993 the number of shareholders had grown to about 10% of the population in the 
west. Most of the newcomers active in the financial market were in their twenties and 
early thirties at that time, belonging to a generation that has not seen their inheritance 
diminished by war or hyperinflation (Randlesome, 2002: 70). The increasing interest 
in the financial market led also to an increasing interest in stock market influences 
and the way companies do business. For example, if listed stock companies are 
building reserves with long-term stability in mind or if they rather pay important 
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dividends to attract shareholders and raise capital. This interest was new In the 
German business world. 
The long absence of 'small' shareholders in the traditional German financial 
market is another important factor in the development of the financial market in 
Germany and can be considered as a reason for the small size of the financial market 
in Germany until the end of the 1980s. According to their long absence, minority 
shareholders have traditionally not been well protected in the German corporate 
govemance system (Schmidt, 2004: 401). 
German company law protects insiders, like employees and unions, more than 
outsiders, in this case minority shareholders. The German insider-oriented accounting 
rules of the HGB led, furthermore, to a lack of transparency, especially compared to 
outsider-oriented International Accounting Standards (lAS) or the General Accepted 
Accounting Principles (US GAAP) (Hapner, 2001: 10). 
6.3.5.3 Institutional investors 
Another important phenomenon can be discemed in the category of financial 
holders. In their study Path dependence and financial markets: the economic 
geography of the German model, 1997-2003 Gordon L. Clark and Dariusz W6jcik 
(2004), investigated the changes in the share ownership structure in main industrial 
sectors in the 16 German Bundeslander (federal states). The two researchers revealed 
that during the 1990s, the share of banks remained tiny and that of insurance 
companies fell, whereas the share of other financial companies including mainly 
brokerage firms, venture capital, investment, and pension funds skyrocketed. 
The following figure provided by Gordon and W6jcik (2005) compares the 
structure of foreign holdings by type of holder in the years 1997 and 2003. The 
increase of holdings owned by individual shareholders, non-financial companies, and 
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other financial companies (including institutional investors), as weil as the rather 
small number of holdings owned by banks and insurance companies, reflect the 
important changes in Germany's ownership structure. 
Table 6.4 The structure of foreign holdings by type of holder 
Type of holder Number ofholders Number of holdings Value of holdings 
(EUR million) 
1997 2003 1997 2003 1997 2003 
INDIVIDUALS AND 21 44 21 46 6927 8074 
FAMIllES 
BANKS 6 8 6 9 1131 2536 
INSURANCE 5 8 21 21 7591 8664 
COMPANIES 
OTHER FINANCIAL 7 35 9 60 781 3874 
COMPANIES 
NON-FINANCIAL 48 86 53 93 12291 37227 
COMPANIES 
GOVERNMENT 3 5 4 8 7686 10910 
HOLDINGS 4 8 8 8 8892 599 
OTHER TYPES 4 12 4 13 415 949 
UNKNOWN TYPE 6 13 6 13 3530 2376 
TOTAL 104 219 132 271 49,244 75,208 
Source: Adapted from Gordon and W6jcik (2005: 1785). 
It is important to keep in mind that many of the new financial service firms 
are controlled by large universal banks and insurance banks, which have spun-off 
their investment and other non-credit or non-insurance activities (e.g. Deutsche 
Bank). The results of the study conducted by Gordon and W6jcik (2005) indicate an 
important shift from holders acting simultaneously as lenders or insurers of 
companies to holders with interests focussed more narrowly, on purely financial 
return for their investment. 
These new type of investors have led to new types of pressure. Institutional 
investors pursue financial interests through their investments, thus favouring 
profitability over growth and rather shorter time horizons. Institutions also have a 
strong preference for liquidity and generally refrain from active intervention in the 
fate of particular firms. Empirical studies show that institutional investors only rarely 
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attempt directly to influence management (Steiger, 2000). Their monitoring capacity 
lies in professionalizing information gathering and exit-oriented strategy. Therefore, 
stock priees are becoming more responsive to management decisions and more 
volatile, too. Investor activism targets the promotion of general practices of good 
governance, but rarely translates into strategie interest in corporate control 
(Jackson/Hôpner/Kurdelbusch, 2004). Between 1990 and 1998 the investment funds' 
share of aH German shares rose from 4 per cent to nearly 13 per cent. But much of 
this investment is concentrated in a relatively small number of large firms (Jürgens et 
al. 2000: 4). 
However, recently the activities of private equity firms and hedge funds have 
increased to important extent, influencing increasingly also strategie decisions of 
corporations. The buyout of Chrysler by the private equity company Cerberus is just 
one example. 
The following table shows the activity of private equity firms in Germany, 
comparing the years 2005 and 2006. The figures have been published by the 
Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften (BVK), the German 
association of private equity firms. 
Throughout the year 2006 the private equity firms operating in Germany had 
invested 3.6 billion Euro, a plus of 20 per cent compared to the previous year. The 
percentage of investments in Germany rose from 70.2 per cent in 2005 to 90.5 per 
cent. Throughout 2006 private equity firms invested 3.6 billion Euro in 970 
companies (2005: 3.1 billion Euro in 983 companies). More than two thirds of ail 
companies financed in 2006 have less than 100 employees and 72 per cent of them 
have turnovers under 10 million Euro. Ali companies that were provided initial or 
follow-on funding in 2006 had a total turnover of 47.3 billion Euro and 288,500 
employees. Ali portfolio companies of the private equity investors produced a total 
165 
Chapter VI / Analysis of the three markets 
turnover of 188.5 billion Euro with 962.400 employees. The vast majority of new 
investments was spent on the branches other services (42.7 per cent), mechanical 
engineering (18.5 per cent), iron, steel, light metal (5.5 per cent) and computer (4.3 
per cent). Hightech industries (computer, communication technologies, 
biotechnology, medical related) together received 12.9 per cent (2005: 28.2 per cent) 
of ail investments but can refer to almost one third of financed companies (BVK: 
2007). 
Table 6.5 Key racts about private equity firms in Germany: 2005-2006 
Key Facts 
31 Dec 2006 31 Dec 2005 
28.7 billion € Funds under management 26.5 billion € 
2.8 billion € Funds raised 2.9 billion € 
3.6 billion € Investments 3.1 billion € 
2,600.3 million € in .,. in buy-outs 1,767.9 million €in 
92 companies 82 companies 
1,037.7 million € in ... in venture capital 1,271.7 million € in 
878 companies 901 companies 
264.3 million € in ... in early stage 304.9 million € in 
337 companies 345 companies 
23.1 billion € Portfolio 21.5 billion € 
5,986 Portfolio companies 5,723 
Source: BVK (2007). 
While many financial experts see private equity firms as innovators and 
leaders of change, which accelerate the modemization of Corporate Germany, others 
regard financial investors as overly aggressive capitalists, which take advantage of 
the neo-liberal zeitgeist prevailing in Europe. In contrast to the USA and the UK, 
private equity firms have been negatively perceived as "Heuschreclœn,,44 ("Iocusts") 
in the German public due to the often radical ways they restructure companies 
44 The tenn "Heuschrecken" ("Iocusts") was used for the flIst time by the SPD chainnan Franz 
Müntefering in Gennany to describe the activities ofprivate equity frrms in the German economy. 
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(cutting costs through lay-offs or lower salaries) (Handelsblatt, 2007). 
It is important to note that, since 2005, private equity firms, which often invest 
for a period of 4-6 years in a company, in contrast to hedge funds, which invest 
usually only for a short-term period of 2-3 years, have begun to focus, besides on the 
German "Mittelstand", also on large German companies. The reasons for this change 
are firstly that today's private equity companies dispose over more capital than ever 
before and that secondly the large German top 30 companies have doubled their 
profits within the last three years, which make them an interesting investment target 
for private equity firms. In fact, the profit margin among Germany's 30 DAX 
companies rose from three to five per cent, which is, however, still mediocre in 
comparison to the margin in the USA or the UK (the world's top 50 companies reach 
a margin of about 10 per cent!) but which shows the large potential of German 
companies to increase this margin even further (Handelsblatt, 2007). 
In addition, many of Germany's top corporations are quite "cheap" to buy for 
private equity companies, e.g. Linde, one of Germany's largest corporations 
specialized in chemicals. The company would cost a private equity investor only 
about 12 billion Euro and although Linde is owned by three major shareholders 
(Deutsche Bank, Allianz, and Commerzbank), private equity companies have good 
chances to buy the company's shares as banks and assurance companies in Germany 
are aiming to decrease their stake in German companies (Handelsblatt, 2007). 
6.3.6 Financial market reforms in Germany 
The efforts to develop and promote financial securities markets in Germany 
became focussed in the early 1990s. 
In the context of the capital market integration in Europe, which banks 
expected to accelerate due to the monetary union, the German state itself took an 
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intense interest III these issues. The state was motivated by the fact that in 
international negotiations over financial market integration (the Basel Committee, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the EU itself) it was 
severely disadvantaged because it had comparatively little statutory authority and 
regulatory control over its own securities markets. For these reasons the Germans 
were frequently shut out of international cooperation efforts, and they feared that their 
inability to shape the terms of international financial market integration would 
severely disadvantage Germany economically (Lütz, 1998). 
Thus in early 1992, the German Ministry of Finance launched its "Finanzplatz 
Deutschland" (Finance Centre Germany) campaign, making it clear that the German 
government intended to take control of the reigns in the German reform process. 
The reorganization of the stock exchange system into a publicly traded 
company, the Deutsche Barse AG, in 1993, was one of the most important results of 
the new campaign. However, the reform was not an easy task, considering that the 
German Bundeslander (federal states) vigorously defended their prerogatives in 
supervising their own exchanges and feared a loss of influence. Therefore, the 
u1timate reform had to include many compromises but it still succeeded to make 
Frankfurt the sole focus of stock exchange promotion efforts in Germany. The reform 
led to a rapid expansion of securities trading in Germany during the second half of 
the 1990s. 
The second resu1t of the "Finanzplatz Deutschland' campaign was the Second 
Financial Market Promotion Law, in 1994. This new law harmonized the content and 
form of German regulation with international norms and EU directives. Moreover, it 
moved Germany away from the traditional self-regulation of securities markets and 
exchanges with the creation of an independent Federal Supervisory Office for 
Securities Trading. This new state agency, modelied after the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, was charged with enforcing a new legal ban on insider 
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trading and newly stringent information reporting requirements by issuers of 
securities and traders. The push for greater openness and transparency in reporting by 
public companies and in the markets represented a dramatic break with the past (Lütz, 
1998; Bali, 2004). 
The late 1990s witnessed another number of reforms that extended and 
expanded upon prior efforts. In early 1997 the Neuer Markt, a new electronic 
exchange for fast-growing technology firms, was introduced. In 1998 the Third 
Financial Market Promotion Law was passed. Also in 1998, an equity issues law 
(Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz, KapAEG) was promulgated which allows 
German firms to balance their books using the international (lAS) or American 
accounting standards (US GAAP). Use of these standards will increase transparency 
of company finances and thus give them greater access to foreign capital markets and 
investors (Lütz, 2000). 
The late 1990s became the time when many of the reform efforts of the 1980s 
and early 1990s finally congea1ed and began to have a significant impact on the 
behaviour of financial firms, large corporations, and German retail investors. The 
period from late 1996 to 1999 can be viewed as a second key conjuncture of events 
that fully cons01idated the institutional transformation process. It can therefore also 
be understood as marking the end of the critical juncture period during which the 
direction of institutional change was uncertain. It was during this time when the 
benefits of a decade's worth of reforms finally began to pay off for those who had 
invested so much in the new capital market-oriented path. From this conjuncture 
forward the momentum behind the new path appears unstoppable. 
6.3.7 Accounting: disc/osure and transparency 
In the US, where business depends heavily on the stock market for the 
provision of capital, accounting principles tend to be shareholder-driven. A company 
169 
Chapter VI / Analys is ofthe three markets 
demonstrates success by showing high profits; this makes management look good and 
keeps the share price high. In addition, high share prices help protect against 
unwanted (hostile) takeovers. 
In Germany the situation is the opposite: accounting principles are tax-driven. 
Companies are motivated to minimize profits because tax authorities use published 
company financial statements to determine the size of a company's tax bill. Since 
German business has traditionally relied on banks to provide capital, accounting 
principles are oriented toward protecting these creditor banks rather than informing 
the investor (Randlesome, 2002). Showing high profits would Iikely mean that more 
would have to be paid out to the shareholders in dividends as weil as to the 
government in taxes, and companies are already very effectively protected against 
hostile takeovers by the banks. 
Corporate taxes in Germany are much higher than in the US (53 per cent vs. 
34 per cent), but German companies get to declare lots of expenses and use very rapid 
depreciation to minimize profit. Under German accounting principles, companies 
may also set aside money to coyer potential liabilities. These allowances, deductible 
for German tax purposes, are not under US tax law, so German compames are 
motivated to reserve the maximum amount possible under law to reduce the 
company's tax bill (Corbridge et al., 1993: 45). Taxes can be further minimized by 
assigning historical cost rather than CUITent market value to assets but accounting for 
liabilities at CUITent value (Randlesome, 2002). Keeping the tax bill low allows 
companies to amass huge, hidden reserves in good times, which can then be used to 
provide stability in lean times. The bankruptcy rate in Germany is consequently very 
low, thus protecting creditors. 
The German accounting firm KPMG did a comparison study in 1988 of 
company results for German subsidiaries in the US using both American and German 
accounting methods. Earnings using the German calculations were only 42 per cent of 
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what they would have been using the American principles (Glouchevich, 1992: 52). 
The advantage of this conservative German approach is that nobody receives any 
unpleasant surprises. The disadvantage of this approach, as far as shareholders are 
concerned, is that profits that could be distributed to them as dividends remain in the 
company as reserves. 
In 1986, new accounting legislation was introduced that prohibited expense 
deductions that resulted in the hidden reserves of the past (Corbridge et al., 1993: 46). 
In 1995, a securities control agency was created, which has recently chastised 
companies for failing to comply with laws on timely disclosure of news that could 
affect share priees. Many companies, however, are still following the time-honoured 
practice of not making public negative news, hoping that it will be masked by later 
positive developments (Wall Street Journal, 1996b). International accounting 
practices are having more impact than governmental agencies, however. European 
Union (EU) legislation recommends that its member nations start getting used to 
International Accounting Standards (lAS) so that comparisons can already be made 
across industries and countries by members of the international financial community 
(Covill, 2001: 42-43). 
The case of the Dresdner Bank, in 1995, is a good example for a change of the 
accounting policy of German companies, which for decades provided the public with 
only seant information about their true performance and gave no details about their 
hidden reserves. In 1995, the bank announced for the first time a 17 per cent increase 
in net income for 1995, reporting untaxed reserves of about DM 9 billion (::::: 4.59 
billion Euro), which was essential1y the difference between the historical value and 
the market value of its holdings of stocks and bonds. Now shareholders and analysts 
looking for the best deal could compare their performance and solidity with that of 
international rivais (Wall Street Journal, 1996a). Shareholders may also be expecting 
bigger dividends in the future as a result. 
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Other firms hope that the EC's international accounting methods will 
eventually be accepted as adequate disclosure for a NYSE listing. Major German 
chemical firms Bayer and Schering published 1994 year-end accounts using the lAS. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission may indeed be interested in a compromise, 
since US pension funds are increasingly investing in foreign equities through foreign 
stock markets, thus bypassing the New York Stock Exchange (Covill, 1995). Whether 
the impasse is the fault of the insularity of the Germans in sticking by the ways or the 
Americans in insisting in their more transparent standards is moot. 
Until the mid-1990s, approximately 200 German companies were registered 
for trading in the illiquid over-the-counter market, which exempted them from US 
reporting and disclosure rules. Daimler was the first German company to "break 
ranks" and apply for full listing. 
6.4 The impact on the DaimierChrys1er Corporation 
The capital market had several important impacts on the DaimlerChrysler 
Corporation. In the 1990s, changes in the capital market led to changes in the share 
ownership structure, the corporate accounting principles, and the international share 
listing of the company. Furthermore, the general change of the role of banks in the 
German industry influenced also the role of the Deutsche Bank on DaimlerChrysler's 
corporate governance and management system. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the share ownership structure of Daimler-Benz 
AG reflected a typical German ownership structure, which was dominated by large 
German banks as majority shareholders. In 1991, the Deutsche Bank as a major 
shareholder owned 28 per cent, the Mercedes Aktiengesellschaft Holding (MAH) 
owned 25 per cent, it is important to note that Daimler-Benz and Mercedes-Benz had 
not merged into one company at this point, the State of Kuwait owned 14 per cent 
and only 33 per cent were hold by dispersed shareholders. 
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Figure 6.13 Daimler-Benz shareholder structure in 1991 
Deutsche Bank dispersed 
28%ownership 
33% 
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AktiengeselIschaft 
Holding (MAH) 
25% 
Source: Daimler-Benz (1992). 
In 1993, the Deutsche Bank had representatives on the supervisory boards of 
approximately 25 per cent of German public corporations (AGs), inc1uding Daimler­
Benz. Daimler-Benz's twenty-person supervisory board, at the end of 1993, inc1uded 
ten elected labour representatives, as required by law, and ten representatives of 
banks, the government, or the corporation. The chairman of the supervisory board 
was Hilmar Kopper of Deutsche Bank, the majority shareholder, which owned 24 per 
cent of the Daimler-Benz stock at the time (Daimler-Benz, 1994). Mercedes AG 
Holding held 25 per cent of the shares, while the Emirate of Kuwait owned 14 per 
cent of the company's share capital. When Arabs threatened to buy a controlling 
interest in Mercedes-Benz a few years earlier, Deutsche Bank intervened on behalf of 
the German economy to buy up the shares that were for sale, thus protecting the 
company from takeover (Thurow, 1992: 34). 
In 1994, the Deutsche Bank still owned 24 per cent, the State of Kuwait 13 per 
cent and 63 per cent were owned by dispersed shareholders (Daimler-Benz, 1995). 
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Figure 6.14 The Daimler-Benz shareholder structure in 1994 
Deutsche Bank 
24% 
State of Kuwait 
13% 
Source: Daimler-Benz (1995). 
By the end of the 1990s, Daimler-Benz's shareholder base grew and became 
more diversified. The Deutsche Bank, the firm's traditional majority shareholder45 , 
reduced its stake in the company, reflecting the retreat of German banks from their 
strategie role in corporate govemance, mentioned before. 
The merger with the American automobile manufacturer Chrysler was another 
important step in the intemationalization and dispersion of the company's share 
ownership structure. One year after the merger, in 1999, DaimlerChrysler's 
shareholder base grew by more than 30 per cent from lA million to 1.9 million 
sharehoiders - a significant expansion. The institutional investors, including Deutsche 
Bank (12 per cent) and the Emirate of Kuwait (7 per cent), still owned approximately 
75 per cent of total share capital. Private investors held the remaining shares (25 per 
cent) (DaimlerChrysler, 2001). 
45 Until the year 2005, Deutsehe Bank remained the largest DC shareholder. However, on 28 July 
2005, shortly before Jürgen Sehrempp resigned as CEO, Deutsehe Bank sold within a half an hour 35 
million DC shares, a value of 1.4 billion Euro, to institutional investors. Thus, the bank redueed its 
stake from 10.4% to 6.9%. The largest shareholder is now the Emirate of Kuwait with 7.2%. On 22 
November 2005, Deutsehe Bank sold another 25 million of its shares at a priee of 42.86 EUR per 
share. 
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Byearly 1998, 89 per cent of Daimler's and Chrysler's shares were still owned 
domestically. After a shareholder's pooling-of-interests through a share-for-share 
exchange of a GRS in DaimlerChrysler AG (DCX), the American equity ownership 
of the consolidated firm shrunk from 44 per cent to 21 per cent within 6 months, and 
the NYSE's dollar volume ofworldwide DCX trading also declined from 28 per cent 
to 5 per cent (Harris et al., 2004: 1). The proportion of European shareholders 
increased further to around 65 per cent, while US investors held only 21 per cent of 
the company's equity (DaimlerChrys1er, 2000). 
Figure 6.15 DaimlerChrysler's shareholder structure in 1998 
dispersed Deutsche Bank 
ownership 12% 
81% 
Source: DaimlerChrysler (1999). 
Another important change in the ownership structure of DaimlerChrysler 
occurred short1y after Schrempp resigned as CEO in the year 2005. The Deutsche 
Bank decided to take advantage of the increase of DaimlerChrys1er' s share price due 
to Schrempp's announcement to 1eave the company. On Ju1y 28, 2005, the Deutsche 
Bank sold 13 per cent of their remaining Daim1erChrys1er shares thus achieving a net 
profit of 35 million Euro. In this context, Hilmar Kopper, chair of Daim1erChrysler's 
supervisory board and representative of the Deutsche Bank, was accused to have used 
his insider know1edge about Schrempp's soon withdrawal (Zeit, 2006). However, the 
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Deutsche Bank could justify its actions, explaining that they had planned to sel! their 
stake in the company a long time ago, only waiting for the right moment to sell, when 
the share price would exceed 38.5 Euro. The last remaining larger shareholder at 
DaimlerChrysler was thus the State of Kuwait. In 2005, the State of Kuwait owned 7 
per cent of the shares, white dispersed shareholders owned the remaining 
DaimlerChrysler's shares, in fact, institutional investors owned 70.4 per cent and 
private investors owned 22.4 per cent of the company (DaimlerChrysler, 2006). 
Figure 6.16 DaimlerChrysler's shareholder structure in 2005 
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Source: DaimlerChrysler Annual Report 2005, 2006. 
The increasing importance of capital, as weil as the intemationalization and 
dispersion of the company's share ownership structure, in particular through the 
merger with Chrysler, implied for DaimlerChrysler also a change in accounting 
standards towards financial transparency and intemationalization and a better 
communication with shareholders. 
A general shift towards increased balance sheet transparency began for the 
Daimler-Benz AG already in the year 1993. On October 5, 1993, Daimler-Benz 
became the first German company to gain a full listing on the NYSE as American 
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Depository Reeeipts (ADRs). A full listing allows the stock to be purchased by 
institutional investors, insurance companies, and pension funds as weU as by 
individual investors. The priee Daimler-Benz paid for the full listing, however, was to 
produce two sets of accounts, one German and one American. 
On September 17, 1993, in preparation for the NYSE listing, Daimler-Benz 
publicly announced half-yearly earnings that had been calculated under US GAAP. 
This was the first time that any German public company had done so. The disclosure 
had widespread and long-lasting effects on Daimler-Benz and other German public 
companies. The company's release of eamings calculated under US GAAP was 
required under Rule 20-F of the Securities Exchange Commission Act of 1934, which 
regulates US securities markets. Rule 20-F reporting requirements apply to aU firms 
issuing or listing securities on national markets in the United States. The rule requires 
a reconciliation of the company's home-country financials to those that would be 
reported under US GAAP. Daimler reported the major effects of differences between 
US and German accounting rules on Consolidated Net Income and Stockholders' 
Equity (Ball, 2004). 
Daimler's 1993 20-F reconciliation shows Shareholders Equity under US 
GAAP as DM 26,281 millions, sorne 50 per cent higher than the equivalent HGB 
number of DM 17,584 millions. The largest component of the difference was DM 
5770 described as "Provisions, Reserves and Valuation Differences." This description 
is not very informative, but it does imply that in past years the company had made 
each of the above three types of journal entry to reduce book values and reported 
earnings. Subsequently, earnings can be inflated quite simply by transferring amounts 
out of the hidden reserves. A credit to earnings is accompanied by a debit entry - to 
reduce prior provisions for liabilities, or to reduce Shareholders Equity reserve 
accounts, or to increase the book values of assets. Daimler's DM 4262 millions of 
"Extraordinary Results" and "Gain on Sale of Securities" appear to faH into the 
second category, a transfer out of Shareholders Equity into the Income Statement for 
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the year. Under US GAAP these items wouId have been included in eamings in prior 
years, but their inclusion was deferred until 1973. It seems no coincidence that they 
were not included in eamings during good years and that they were included in a year 
that otherwise would have shown a loss. 
The German public was not informed about either fact. However, conservative 
balance sheets and underreporting of eamings in good times is consistent with the 
important German Vorsicht ("Prudence") principle, which allegedly is for the 
protection of creditors (Bradley/Sundaram, 2003). Had Daimler been a US company 
and reported a profit of DM 615 millions, and then subsequently revealed that it had 
made a loss of DM 1839 millions, there would have been an accounting scandai of 
major proportions. While it wouId have been eclipsed in magnitude by sorne 
subsequent accounting scandais (such as Worldcom and Enron), this would have 
ranked among the largest eamings restatements in history, and was an extremely large 
arnount at the time. However, the problem in the German system was not that 
Daimler initially failed to report a "bottom line" loss. The problem in Germany was 
that it subsequently reported the loss. Public reaction was swift and furious. 
Protesters carried black coffins in the streets of Frankfurt, and the tabloids referred to 
management board chairman Schrempp as "Neutron Jürgen," a reference to General 
Electric's ruthless CEO "Neutron Jack" Welch (Vlasic/Stertz, 2001: 129). 
A related complaint was that, in agreeing to comply with the SEC's insistence 
on US GAAP information, Daimler-Benz had undermined Germany's prospects for 
negotiating mutual recognition of accounting standards with US authorities. Mutual 
recognition was strongly advocated by the German authorities, for example Biener 
(1994). The concem was valid: Germany subsequently legislated to allow 
consolidated financial reporting under US GAAP, but the United States has never 
recognized HGB rules. The Daimler-Benz move also was seen as reducing the status 
of an accounting system that is rooted in the philosophy of Vorsicht ("Prudence"), 
with its underreporting of book value and heightened creditor protection. The merger 
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with an American corporation at the end of the 1990s, forced the German corporation 
Daimler-Benz to increase its efforts to comply with US accounting and disclosure 
standards. After the merger with Chrysler on November 17, 1998, DaimlerChrysler 
began trading in a single global registered share (GRS). The GRS guotes, trades and 
sett1es in US Dollars on the New York Stock Exchange and in DeutschmarkslEuros 
on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange through a new global share registrar linking German 
and US registrars and clearing faci1ities. Henceforth, DaimlerChrysler did not only 
become the first German company to be fully listed at the NYSE, it became also the 
first truly global share (Karolyi, 2003). Conseguently, DaimlerChrysler, still a 
German Aktiengesellschaft, had to adopt even further disclosure rules and standards 
to comply with US and international capital market standards. 
Figure 6.17 Phases of capital-market-oriented reporting at DaimlerChrysler 
1_19_9_3-_1_99_5 1_9_96_-_19_9_8 19_9_9_-2_°_02 2_00_3_-2_0_0_7__> 
Daimler-Benz DaimlerChrysler 
Listing NYSE Full Mutual financial Fulfilment of 
transfonnation Statements of further reporting 
Different fmancial to US GAAP "Daimler-Benz" requirements 
controlling systems Dual Reporting and "Chrysler" (e.g. through 
for internaI and system Sarbanes-Oxley 
external use (US GAAP/ Merger of the Act) 
HGB) financial controlling 
Transitional systems (between Introduction of 
calculating Introduction of Daimler and Chrysler International 
from HGB to quarterly and interna) and Financial 
USGAAP financial external systems) Reporting 
reporting Standards (IFS) 
Increase of 
disclosure duty Chrysler Corporation (through SEC) 
Full application of US GAAP
 
SEC-Reporting requirements (Fonn 10­
 SEC-Reporting requirements (Fonn 20­
KlIO-Q) F/6-K) 
Source: Adapted from Küting, Pfitzer, and Weber (2004). 
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However, in their study about the protection of minority shareholder interests 
at DaimlerChrysler, Harris, Jarrell, Mclnish, and Wood (2004) found that cross­
listing disclosure requirements, though they provide measurable reductions in 
asymmetric information, cannot make up for the weaker corporate governance 
structure in Germany, concerning the protection of shareholders. 
Increased disclosure and international accounting standards are, besides 
incentive-based executive compensation and voting rights, essential instruments for 
the protection of the interest of shareholders. Already in its 1996 annual report, 
Daimler-Benz (1997: 44--45) disclosed several radical changes to its governance. 
They were linked together under the intriguing title "Value-based management, US 
GAAP, and new controlling instruments." Under the subheading "Understanding 
value-based management," it described the version of the shareholder governance 
model that it had embraced as follows: 
"The permanent and continuous expansion of our company's value is only possible 
when the interests of ail groups that contribute ta our success are given the 
appropriate degree of consideration. Our economic performance and satisfactory 
returns for our shareholders depend on motivated employees, satisfied customers, 
and reliable and innovative suppliers. On the other hand, only a profitable company 
is in a position to obtain the funds required for securing the future from the capital 
market at relatively favourable terms and to offer its employees secure and 
challenging jobs and thus eam their long-term commitment. Management at 
Daimler-Benz is therefore dedicated to increasing the value of the Company for the 
benefit of everyone involved." (Daimler-Benz, 1997: 44). 
The word stakeholder was consplcuous In its absence in the statement. 
Management was careful to give recognition to major parties, using terms such as "ail 
groups that contribute to our success" and "everyone involved," but these terms do 
not imply participation by the parties in the decision process, an important ingredient 
of the stakeholder mode!. There was not even an indication that shareholder value 
was one of several objectives, to be balanced against other objectives such as 
employment security or creditor security. It was stated as the objective. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, 1 have presented the evolution and the changes in the market 
for products and services, "talent", and capital during the 1990s and analyzed their 
impact on the Daimler-Benz AG, later DaimlerChrysler AG until 2005. 
The globalization and increasing competition in the automobile market, the 
opening of the German capital market and the increasing influence of international 
investors (e.g. hedge funds, private equity companies, pension funds, etc.), as well as 
the shifts in German traditional management values and the market for "talent", have 
had a strong influence on the system of management and corporate governance of 
DaimlerChrysler. 
The analysis showed that DaimlerChrysler adopted important elements of the 
shareholder value model during the 1990s, especially after the merger with the 
American company Chrysler. Although DaimlerChrysler maintained legally a 
German corporation (Aktiengesellschaft), the merger with Chrysler and the forces 
from the market for products and services, capital, and "talent", forced Daimler to 
embrace certain Anglo-Saxon business values and practices, for example: incentive 
based management remuneration, international accounting standards, a more 
dispersed share owner structure, a corporate finance based primarily on international 
capital markets, and a shareholder value oriented management style. However, 
DaimlerChrysler remained legally a German corporation and had to maintain certain 
employee rights, such as the right of codetermination and the forming of work 
councils. 
The following figure 6.18 represents a brief synthesis of the shifts and 
changes within the DaimlerChrysler Corporation in the 1990s. 
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Figure 6.18	 Changes and shifts in DaimlerChrysler AG's management and 
corporate governance system in the 1990s 
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Source: Own illustration, 2007. 
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FINAL CONCLUSION 
Within the context of debates over convergence and path dependency of 
corporate govemance, this thesis has discussed the shifts and changes in the former 
Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft (AG), later the DaimlerChrysler Corporation, in the 
period from 1990 until 2005. Distinct features and characteristics of the environment 
of the Anglo-American model of shareholder value and the Continental-European 
stakeholder model of corporate governance have been outlined and implicated in the 
contemporary debate about changes in the German corporate structure. 
The case study of DaimlerChrysler reveals how German corporations 
incrementally adopted shareholder-oriented principles performance-based 
management remuneration, transparent disclosure and international accounting 
standards, value-based management, and reduced monitoring by banks and corporate 
networks - driven by international market forces, while they maintained important 
features of the stakeholder system - employees' codetermination, collective 
agreements and cooperation with work councils and unions. 
From a traditional German car manufacturer it grew in size and scope to an 
integrated technology corporation in the early 1990s. Until then Daimler-Benz AG 
represented a typical stakeholder-oriented German corporation. Shareholders were 
just one stakeholder among others. Company stakeholders, like suppliers, the 
government, unions, and employees played an important role in the system of 
decision-making. 
There existed a strong mutual loyalty between Daimler-Benz and its 
employees. As an employer, Daimler-Benz paid wages and salaries above the 
German average, promoted professional education and apprenticeship programs 
among its employees and offered many social benefits. Lay-offs were avoided and the 
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company considered its highly qualified and well-paid employees as competitive 
advantage against competitors. Solutions in times of economic crisis were found by 
the management in cooperation with the internal workers' council (Betriebsrat) and 
in sorne cases the powerful German union IG Metall. Furthermore, employees were a 
strong pillar in Daimler-Benz AG's corporate governance and management system, 
representing according to the German codetermination act (1976) half of the members 
of the Daimler-Benz supervisory board. 
Managers at Daimler-Benz were traditionally recruited from inside the 
company sharing the company's traditional "Swabian" business culture and German 
management values: high quality standards, stability, security, and continuity ­
implying a certain tendency to avoid risks. Management remuneration was not 
performance based and usually not linked to the share price performance. 
Daimler-Benz's fmancial results were only published under the German HGB 
accounting standards, thus protecting the company against the risk of detailed 
disclosure (German principle of "Vorsicht") but lacking transparency and explanatory 
power for international and dispersed minority investors and analysts. However, in 
1991, dispersed shareholders, only 33 percent of Daimler-Benz shareholder basis, 
were not in the position to put pressure on management in order to avoid information 
asymmetry about financial results. Corporate financing was mainly based on bank 
loans and Deutsche Bank, one of the most important creditors in Germany, was 
Daimler-Benz's major shareholder, holding 28 percent of the company's shares in 
1991. Being part of the so-called "Deutschland AG", Germany's strong inter-frrm 
and bank network, Daimler-Benz was protected against hostile takeovers and serious 
pressures from the international capital market. 
Until the 1980s, Daimler-Benz markets for products and services, including 
the automobile, aerospace and defence sector, were still regulated and in certain ways 
protected against foreign competitors. Within Germany Daimler-Benz ertioyed a 
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strong position among its competitors and international growth in sales flourished, 
while production capacities remained mainly in Germany. 
In the period between 1990 and 1998, Daimler-Benz underwent a nurnber of 
radical shifts and changes, which incrementally changed the nature of the company 
from a traditionally stakeholder-oriented to a more shareholder-value-oriented 
corporation. 
In the early 1990s, the globalization of the automobile market, the company' s 
core business sector, increased the pressure on Daimler-Benz to compete in a more 
efficient, deregulated, and competitive market. The company felt the need to grow in 
size in order to gain global economies of scale and scope against other competitors 
and to outsource an important portion of the value chain in form of modules and 
components to international suppliers in order to cut costs. To finance its 
international growth Daimler-Benz used new resources from international financial 
markets, listing at the NYSE and adopting for the first time in its corporate history 
international accounting standards. 
In the mid-1990s, a radical restructuring process including plant closings, 
business divestures, payroll and workforce reductions, brought the company back on 
track, redefining corporate strategy, goals and values. The new Daimler-Benz CEO 
Jürgen E. Schrempp, whose technical education and work experience were typical for 
a German top manager, did not have much in common with the traditional German 
management approach based on "compromise" with stakeholders. Schrempp's radical 
company concept ("Unternehmenskonzept") focussed on cost cutting and 
profitability. A serious rupture in Daimler's employee relationship was the 
consequence. Since then lay-offs, lower salaries, and the reduction of social benefits 
for employees have become a regular measure for DaimlerChrysler in times of crisis. 
In addition, clearly defined financial goals and transparent internaI and external 
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performance disclosure and controlling systems have set clearly defined financial 
goals for each individual business unit. 
In the late 1990s, Daimler-Benz's incremental reorientation towards 
shareholder value principles attained a new level. Schrempp initiated and realized the 
world's largest transatlantic merger, the DaimlerChrysler merger, and bought stakes 
in Mitsubishi and Hyundai to get a foothold in the Asian market. In the course of 
globalization, DaimlerChrysler became a global share and the company's shareholder 
structure became increasingly intemationally dispersed. In addition, the Deutsche 
Bank decided to sell a major stake in the company. New pressures arose from 
international financial markets (e.g. fund managers) on top management for stock 
performance, and for their replacement if it proves unsatisfactory. As shareholders' 
importance among other stakeholders increased, DaimlerChrysler's management 
remuneration became more performance-based in order to align management's 
interest with the interest of shareholders. Stock option plans, which had been a 
current fonn of management remuneration at Chrysler, were also introduced for 
German managers in the context of the German-American merger in 1998. 
At the end of the 1990s, DaimlerChrysler had converged toward a hybrid 
model of management and corporate governance. In his report on "Value-based 
controlling at DaimlerChrysler," CFü Gentz (1999: 6) described a company trying to 
evolve a more hybrid governance model than it had described in 1996, incorporating 
elements of both the D.S. and German systems. He now saw the need to merge the 
"common philosophies" of "shareholder value management at Chrysler" and "value­
based management at Daimler-Benz". DaimlerChrysler managed to preserve 
important features of the German loyalty/stakeholder model (e.g. codetermination, 
work councils, cooperation with unions, etc.), while it had adapted incrementally also 
principles of the Anglo-Saxon shareholder value model (e.g. performance-based 
management remuneration, transparent disclosure of financial results, etc.). 
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Thus, in the case study of DaimlerChrysler, the theory of convergence from a 
stakeholder towards shareholder value model, in an evolutionary process driven by 
market forces, can be confirmed - but only to a certain extent. The theory of path 
dependency, according to which national and cultural differences will remain in 
corporate govemance and management philosophies, may help us to explain why 
DaimlerChrysler never converged entirely to a shareholder-value-oriented mode!. 
DaimlerChrysler' s CUITent model of corporate governance and management seems to 
console the legal and political requirements of the national social market context in 
Germany with the needs and requirements to maintain competitive in a context of 
deregulated global markets. 
Finally, the recent sale of Chrysler to an international private equity company 
corresponds to DaimlerChrysler' s 'value-based management', which is based on 
shareholder value principles. To which extent the Daimler Group AG will converge 
further to the Anglo-Saxon shareholder value model, or reverse it, maintains an 
interesting question for a future study. 
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